Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902

Brown and Owens, armed with a handgun, accompanied by the victim after initially planning to rob him.
The group moved to a location where Brown allegedly participated in the violence and later ran back to the victim’s car, which drove away with Brown in or near the vehicle.
Robbins witnessed Brown flee the scene; the victim was shot ten times and died before responders arrived.
Brown gave two statements: an initial false alibi implicating another man, and a later, revised account admitting lies and stating Owens forced him to drive to the murder site.
Brown attempted to implicate Owens and a fabricated alibi; he lied to police in the first statement and later admitted lying, claiming Owens directed the crime.
Brown was convicted of felony murder and related offenses; Owens’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence under Jackson	Brown argues evidence fails to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.	State contends the record supports a rational jury's verdict.	Sufficient evidence supported the verdict.
Circumstantial-evidence standard under OCGA 24-4-6	Evidence is solely circumstantial and insufficient to exclude other hypotheses.	Presence with others and conduct support guilt beyond reasonable doubt.	Evidence satisfied OCGA 24-4-6; guilt not excludable to alternate hypotheses.
Asportation element of kidnapping under Garza	Movement of the victim was incidental to robbery and assault.	Movement was purposeful to isolate the victim and enable murder.	Asportation element proven under Garza factors.
Admission of hearsay co-indictee confession (Chambers exception)	Owens's hearsay confession should be admitted to show alibi weaknesses.	Rule 403 and Chambers exception permit admission if trustworthy and corroborated.	The trial court did not abuse discretion; exclusion proper given lack of sufficient trustworthiness and corroboration.
Ineffective assistance of counsel	Axam failed to make five objections, prejudicing Brown.	Counsel's strategic decisions and recollection barriers justify not objecting.	No deficient performance or prejudice; strategy and recollection support decisions.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
OCGA § 24-4-6, Garza v. State (Ga. 2008) (four-factor test for circumstantial evidence (pre-amendment Garza interpretation))
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973) (co-indictee confidences admissible under exceptional circumstances)
Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809 (Ga. 1997) (two-hour closing argument rule in murder cases and presumptive prejudice for violations)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (highly deferential review of Strickland’s prejudice prong)
Russell v. State, 269 Ga. 511 (Ga. 1998) (post-trial strategy governs assessment of counsel's actions)
Re: McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342 (Ga. 2008) (patently unreasonable tactical decision standard)
Garza v. State, 284 Ga. 696 (Ga. 2008) (four-factor test for asportation under kidnapping statute)
Drane v. State, 271 Ga. 849 (Ga. 1999) (trial court’s evidentiary ruling reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Chambers v. State, 273 Ga. 346 (Ga. 2001) (affirms Chambers-type assessment in Georgia context)
Brown v. State, 260 Ga. 153 (Ga. 1990) (presence and participation in criminal conduct)
Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32 (Ga. 2009) (courts resolve credibility determinations by juries)