Brown v. District of Columbia
322 F.R.D. 51
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs are a certified Rule 23(b)(2) class of physically disabled Medicaid beneficiaries who have lived 90+ days in D.C. nursing facilities, are eligible for home- and community-based services, prefer community living, and allege the District’s transition services caused unjustified institutionalization under Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
- The court bifurcated trial: first phase to decide liability/class-wide proof (systemic deficiency + causation + Rule 23 fitness); second phase reserved for remedy if liability proven.
- Evidence at trial (2014–2016) showed the District operates the ADRC Community Transition Team, an MFP (Money Follows the Person) program with limited set‑aside housing vouchers, EPD Waiver and State Plan PCA programs, and various contractors (Qualis, Delmarva); CMS had imposed corrective action plans on DC’s waiver/PCA administration.
- Major cross-cutting barrier was housing: D.C. has scarce affordable, accessible subsidized housing; DCHA waiting list closed since April 2013; only 65 MFP vouchers exist; many class members need UFAS-accessible or subsidized units.
- Plaintiffs presented testimony and an expert asserting systemic failures in transition services; the District presented evidence of substantial outreach, enrollment processes, tracking improvements, and individualized barriers (housing shortage, landlord screening, documentation, medical complexity).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs proved a concrete, systemic policy/practice in DC’s transition services that causes class-wide unlawful segregation (Rule 23 commonality + Olmstead) | Plaintiffs argued DC’s transition system is systemically deficient (discharge planning, informing residents, enrollment, use of MFP vouchers) and those deficiencies substantially cause class members to remain institutionalized, remediable by single injunction | District argued many barriers lie outside its control (chiefly lack of affordable/accessible housing administered by DCHA), class lacks a uniform policy or practice causing the harm, and individualized obstacles preclude a single injunction | Court held plaintiffs failed to prove a concrete, systemic deficiency causally linked to class-wide segregation and that a single injunction could redress the harm; class-wide claims dismissed |
| Role of housing scarcity in causation and redressability | Plaintiffs minimized housing as the primary barrier, contending transition assistance (documentation, applications, outreach) is the key deficiency | District emphasized lack of available, accessible, affordable housing (closed DCHA waitlist, few accessible units) as the principal barrier beyond DC’s control, requiring individualized solutions | Court found housing scarcity is a central, systemic impediment outside the court’s power to order (DCHA is an independent authority); therefore class-wide relief would not reliably remedy institutionalization |
| Adequacy of DC’s dissemination, identification, enrollment, and tracking of transition services (six components of effective transition assistance) | Plaintiffs contended DC failed across multiple components (e.g., inadequate outreach, application assistance, enrollment delays, underuse of MFP vouchers) | District produced evidence of MDS Section Q screening, ADRC/CTT and MFP outreach, MES staff for enrollment, improved processing metrics, voucher support, and program tracking; acknowledged past deficiencies and CMS CAPs but showed reforms | Court found plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show systemic failure; record showed substantial programmatic activity and improvements, though individualized delays and past failures exist |
| Whether Rule 23(b)(2) certification could survive through proof at trial | Plaintiffs relied on earlier certification and argued the liability trial should validate class-wide injunctive relief | District argued certification required proof that a single injunction could provide class-wide relief, which plaintiffs could not show | Court concluded that under Rule 23 and Wal‑Mart/DL precedent plaintiffs must prove a uniform policy/practice causing common harm and that such harm is redressable by a single injunction; plaintiffs failed this burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (establishes integration mandate and three‑part Olmstead test)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (commonality requires common answers apt to drive resolution of the litigation)
- DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Rule 23 commonality requires a uniform policy or practice affecting all class members)
- In re District of Columbia, 792 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (denying interlocutory appeal; identified the specific deficiencies that could, at pleading stage, support class commonality)
- DL v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (clarifies Rule 23(b)(2) certification standards for injunctive relief)
- Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (relief must be limited to inadequacy that produced the injury and must be tailored to redress proven injury)