Brown v. Cox
2017 UT 3
| Utah | 2017Background
- Melvin Brown lost the 2016 Republican primary for Utah House District 53 by nine votes and challenged the results under Utah Code § 20A-4-403(2).
- District 53 spans multiple counties; ~95% of votes were mail-in. After a recount, election officials disqualified 32 ballots for unverified signatures and 70 ballots for lack of pre‑election postmarks.
- Brown asked the Lieutenant Governor to verify signature‑verification procedures and to count the 70 ballots he asserted were mailed before election day; the Lieutenant Governor declined and certified Logan Wilde the winner.
- Brown filed a verified complaint directly in the Utah Supreme Court under § 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii), which directs multi-county election contests to the Supreme Court. He sought orders (including mandamus) to have the contested ballots counted.
- The Supreme Court sua sponte raised and briefed whether § 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii) unconstitutionally expanded the Court’s original jurisdiction; the Court issued a per curiam finding the statutory grant unconstitutional and invited Brown to amend his pleading as a petition for extraordinary writ.
- Brown did not amend; he moved to dismiss. The Court issued this opinion explaining why the statute is unconstitutional and why Brown’s original pleading had pleading/threshold defects for extraordinary-writ relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii) validly confers original jurisdiction on the Utah Supreme Court for multi-county election contests | Brown: Legislature may grant Supreme Court original jurisdiction for multi-county election contests and the Election Code should be construed as providing such jurisdiction | Wilde: The Legislature may not expand the Supreme Court’s constitutionally derived original jurisdiction; doing so forces the Court into factfinding and opens the floodgates | Held: § 20A-4-403(2)(a)(ii) is unconstitutional—Legislature cannot enlarge Supreme Court original jurisdiction beyond the Constitution |
| Whether the statute can be read as amending or filling gaps in the Supreme Court’s procedural rules (avoiding constitutionality problem) | Brown/Lt. Gov.: The statute should be read as special statutory procedure compatible with the Court’s extraordinary‑writ rules | Lt. Gov.: The statute fills procedural gaps and can be treated as rule refinement allowing Supreme Court action | Held: The statute cannot be treated as a legislative amendment of the Court’s procedural rules because the Constitution requires the Court to adopt rules and the Legislature may amend them only by clear supermajority (joint‑resolution) process; the statute was not enacted in that form |
| Whether the Supreme Court should treat Brown’s verified complaint as an extraordinary-writ petition despite statutory defect | Brown: Court should exercise discretion to treat complaint as writ given election timing exigency | Lt. Gov.: Supports treating as writ; urges that the statute fills procedural gaps | Held: Court may treat the pleading as a petition for extraordinary writ, but Brown’s complaint failed to satisfy Rule 19 requirements and lacked factual support showing why district court relief was impractical |
| Whether the Supreme Court should resolve disputed factual issues about when ballots were mailed | Brown: Anecdotal evidence and postal tests show many ballots were mailed pre‑election and should be counted; Court should investigate | Wilde/Respondents: Supreme Court is not the proper factfinder; district courts are better suited to resolve contested factual inquiries | Held: The Court declined to perform extensive factfinding on the bare pleading; such factual disputes are more properly and practicably resolved in district court and must be supported by affidavits or records to justify extraordinary relief |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983) (Legislature may create appellate jurisdiction but cannot alter constitutionally provided original jurisdiction)
- State ex rel. Robinson v. Durand, 104 P. 760 (Utah 1908) (courts’ constitutional writ powers cannot be enlarged or abridged by the Legislature)
- Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1995) (Legislature cannot diminish the Supreme Court’s constitutionally derived writ powers)
- Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1066 (Utah 2002) (court may treat an election‑related pleading as an extraordinary writ petition when exigencies justify it)
- Maxfield v. Herbert, 284 P.3d 647 (Utah 2012) (statutory special procedures do not automatically override general court rules; rules may fill procedural gaps)