Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151

The Browns (Kody, Meri, Janelle, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan) are a plural family featured on TLC’s Sister Wives; Utah investigated them under the state bigamy statute, Utah Code § 76-7-101.
The Browns sued Utah officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations (free exercise, association, speech; due process; equal protection; Establishment Clause).
The Utah Attorney General submitted a declaration adopting a non‑prosecution policy for religious polygamy (AG Policy); Utah County Attorney Buhman later filed a declaration announcing a substantially identical Utah County Attorney’s Office Policy (UCAO Policy) refusing to prosecute bigamy absent inducement by fraud or collateral crimes.
The district court denied mootness and granted partial summary judgment to the Browns (striking the cohabitation prong and narrowly construing the “purports to marry” prong), then awarded attorney’s fees under § 1988; Buhman appealed.
The Tenth Circuit assumed the Browns had standing at filing but held the case became constitutionally moot after Buhman’s May 22, 2012 declaration adopting the UCAO Policy and closing the Browns’ investigation; it remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss without prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the case presents a live Article III controversy after the UCAO Policy	Brown: threat of prosecution remains credible and policy may be tactical or reversible	Buhman: formal, sworn UCAO Policy and closed investigation remove any credible threat	Held: Moot — UCAO Policy eliminated credible threat of prosecution
Whether voluntary cessation doctrine bars mootness	Brown: voluntary cessation exception applies because policy could be revoked or was adopted to evade review	Buhman: must show recurrence is reasonable; he satisfied heavy burden by sworn policy and lack of prior prosecutions	Held: Voluntary cessation exception inapplicable — defendant showed it is not reasonably expected to recur
Whether potential successors could revive enforcement defeats mootness	Brown: successors could change policy; thus controversy remains	Buhman: speculation about future officials insufficient to defeat mootness	Held: Speculative successor action does not prevent mootness
Whether plaintiff sought damages such that case would not be mooted by cessation	Brown: past harms and residual relief language imply damages	Buhman: complaint sought only prospective declaratory/injunctive relief; damages not pursued	Held: Only prospective relief sought; mootness analysis appropriate

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (Article III case-or-controversy limits federal judicial power)
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (standing/injury-in-fact for pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges)
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) (voluntary cessation standard and mootness)
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (standing requires concrete, particularized, and imminent injury)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (three standing elements: injury, causation, redressability)
Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2006) (prosecutorial assurances can moot pre‑enforcement suits; fact-specific credibility factors)
Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007) (application of prosecutorial statements and Winsness factors)
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2010) (voluntary cessation and government self-correction in mootness analysis)
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (mootness as standing across time; requisite interest must persist)
Dias v. City & County of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009) (residence/intent-to-return affects credible-threat analysis)