2019 Ohio 2164
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Parents (Leah Kate Brown and Clinton Brown) divorced by dissolution in 2015 and adopted a jointly filed shared parenting plan giving both legal custody and specific parenting time (Tues/Thurs evenings and alternate weekends). Twins (Daughter and Son) born 2009.
- Daughter participated in competitive cheer since age four; by 2017 it required weekend competitions that conflicted with Father’s weekend parenting time.
- Father stopped supporting Daughter’s cheer in 2017, demanded Mother pay and provide makeup time, then refused to cooperate; tensions escalated after Father’s 2016 remarriage and a short-lived civil protection order he filed against Mother.
- Mother enrolled Daughter in cheer for 2017–2018 and withheld Daughter from several of Father’s weekend parenting times so Daughter could attend competitions; Father filed contempt motions and sought termination of shared parenting (or alternatively a modification for more parenting time).
- A magistrate (and later the trial court) terminated the shared parenting plan, named Mother sole residential parent and legal custodian, gave Mother sole decision-making authority over extracurriculars/medical matters (with a one-activity-per-season limit), found Mother in contempt as a first offender for several violations, awarded Father makeup time and limited fees; child support calculations were entered.
- On appeal, the court affirmed all rulings except it reversed and remanded solely to recalculate child support because the trial court did not rule on an objection concerning Mother’s additional income (aerobics teaching) and the worksheet may not have reflected that income.
Issues
| Issue | Brown (Father) Argument | Brown (Mother) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether terminating the shared parenting plan (vs modifying it) was an abuse of discretion | Court should have modified the plan to increase Father’s parenting time rather than terminate shared parenting | Termination was permissible because both parents moved to terminate and shared parenting was no longer in the children’s best interest | Court: No abuse of discretion; termination allowed under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c) and supported by the record |
| Whether awarding Mother sole residential parent/legal custodian was against the manifest weight of the evidence | Shared parenting with equal time was in the children’s best interest; Father contends the court misweighed evidence | Mother argued Father’s refusal to cooperate and refusal to allow Daughter to attend cheer justified sole custody | Court: Mother as sole residential parent supported by weight of the evidence (high parental conflict, Father’s refusal to communicate, Father’s withholding of support for cheer) |
| Whether granting Mother sole decision-making authority over extracurriculars/medical was an abuse of discretion | Father argued Mother shouldn’t get sole authority because she violated court orders and can schedule activities during his time | Mother argued Father’s unwillingness to cooperate made joint decision-making impracticable; court limited Mother to one activity per season that interferes with parenting time | Court: Not an abuse of discretion to award decision-making authority to residential parent, with the one-activity-per-season constraint |
| Whether the court erred in calculating child support by failing to consider all of Mother’s income | Father argued the court didn’t include Mother’s aerobics income and therefore child support was incorrect | Mother did not clearly present expense offsets; court did not rule on Father’s objection | Court: Remanded for recalculation because the trial court failed to rule on the objection and may not have accounted for that income |
| Whether the court erred averaging Mother’s 2017 bonus over three years | Father argued the three-year average should ignore years with no bonuses and treat $17,500 as the average; alternatively the statute was misapplied | Mother/court averaged the three-year period including years with zero bonuses, resulting in $5,833 counted toward income | Court: Proper to average including years with zero; statute permits lesser of three-year average or prior year’s bonus |
| Whether the GAL report was inadmissible hearsay and whether GAL impermissibly acted as an attorney | Father argued the written GAL report contained hearsay and the GAL should not examine witnesses like an attorney | Mother/court relied on GAL’s investigation and testimony; local rule authorized GAL participation; GAL testified and was cross-examined | Court: No abuse of discretion in admitting GAL report (no prejudice shown); local rule permitting GAL participation consistent with Sup.R. 48 and permissible here |
| Whether contempt and sanctions were inadequate or mischaracterized (first offender vs multiple offenses) | Father argued multiple violations warranted higher-tier contempt finding and greater attorney-fee awards ($500 per contempt motion) | Mother argued she was a first offender and sanctions were within discretion; court awarded presumptive local-rule fee because Father produced no evidence of actual fees | Court: Finding of first offender not an abuse of discretion (no prior contempts proven); fee award appropriate given lack of evidence of actual fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415 (1997) (standard: domestic relations court has broad discretion in custody matters; appellate reversal only for abuse of discretion)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (abuse of discretion defined as unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable conduct)
- Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 (2012) (standard for reviewing manifest weight of the evidence)
- Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142 (1989) (trial court has wide discretion in child support determinations)
- State ex rel. Clermont County Dept. of Human Servs. v. Walsson, 108 Ohio App.3d 125 (12th Dist.) (prior-contempt proof required to elevate offender status)