Brown v. Brown
102 N.E.3d 72
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Rose A. Brown and Russell J. Brown executed a revocable “Brown Family Trust” (via an unlocated Trust Agreement and an admitted but unauthenticated “Abstract of Trust Agreement”) and a quitclaim deed placing ~129.54 acres into the Trust in 2000.
- Rose died in 2013; Russell died in 2014. Rose and Russell had reciprocal 1985 wills leaving their probate estates to the survivor and then to their six (3 biological + 3 step-) children; Russell’s 2013 will instead named only his three biological children as residuary beneficiaries.
- After Russell’s death, Russell A. (“Anthony”) Brown (one child) assumed control as presumed successor trustee, discovered only the Abstract (no full Trust Agreement), and held proceeds from the land.
- Anthony filed for declaratory relief to identify the Trust, successors, and distribution; Rose’s children (Appellants) counterclaimed, arguing all six children were intended beneficiaries and seeking half the Trust assets.
- Trial court found a valid revocable trust existed but that the Trust’s purposes after both settlors’ deaths were unascertainable because the operative Trust instrument was missing; it terminated the Trust and, exercising equitable authority and statutory guidance, distributed assets equally to Russell’s three biological children (Appellees).
- Appellants appealed, raising issues about the court’s authority to determine beneficiaries without the Trust instrument, settlors’ intent to include six children, characterization of Rose’s ownership interest, evidentiary rulings, and excluded testimony about pre-trust property acquisition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anthony/plaintiff) | Defendant's Argument (Appellants/Rose’s children) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court may determine trust terms/beneficiaries when the written Trust instrument is missing | Court may terminate an unworkable trust and fashion distribution when purpose and beneficiaries are unascertainable; equitable powers permit relief | Trial court erred by refusing to determine beneficiaries from extrinsic/parol evidence and the Abstract | Court: Trial court correctly concluded missing instrument + inadequate extrinsic evidence precluded inventing terms; termination proper under R.C. and equity |
| Whether settlors intended all six children as successor beneficiaries | Anthony: Trust primarily served settlors during lifetimes; no clear & convincing evidence names six children as successors | Appellants: 1985 wills, positioning of co-successor trustees, and family practice show intent to include all six | Court: Evidence insufficient (not clear & convincing) to establish that intent; cannot supply terms from whole cloth |
| Proper distributees after termination (should assets be split among six or three) | Anthony: Under statutes and Russell’s 2013 will, assets should go to Russell’s three children; distribution without reopening probate permissible | Appellants: As Rose’s successors, they are entitled to half because Rose was co-settlor and had equivalent ownership rights | Court: Equitable application of R.C. 5804.09 and R.C. 5808.17 supports distribution to Russell’s three children; trial court’s distribution affirmed |
| Admissibility of Rose’s out-of-court statement (hearsay) about distribution per the 1985 wills | Anthony: Exclusion proper (hearsay); even if admitted, it would not meaningfully change outcome | Appellants: Statement admissible under hearsay exceptions (party/admission, present state of mind, co-trustee) | Court: Trial court acted within discretion to exclude; exclusion was harmless because disposition aligned with Rose’s will in relevant respects |
Key Cases Cited
- Arnott v. Arnott, 132 Ohio St.3d 401 (2012) (trial-court interpretation of trust instruments reviewed de novo; evidentiary admission of trust documents considered)
- Saunders v. Mortensen, 101 Ohio St.3d 86 (2004) (interpretive principles for contracts and related evidence applied to resolve disputes over instrument terms)
- Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 86 Ohio St.3d 431 (1999) (admissibility of evidence and standard for reversing evidentiary rulings: abuse of discretion)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (definition of abuse of discretion for appellate review of trial-court decisions)