Brown v. 1301 K Street Ltd. Partnership
31 A.3d 902
| D.C. | 2011Background
- Brown, a security guard, allegedly injured Feb. 21, 2005, at a building owned by 1301 K Street and managed by Hines.
- She settled her workers’ compensation claim with Allied Barton Security and its insurer and received a Lump Sum Settlement on Oct. 21, 2008.
- She filed suit against 1301 K Street and Hines, asserting negligence and statutory violations under OSHA and the Safety Act.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, relying on a signed disclaimer by Brown in Jan. 2005 waiving claims against Allied’s customers.
- Allied Barton merged with Barton Protective Services; by Aug. 2, 2004 Allied Barton Security existed as the entity implied by the disclaimer.
- The trial court granted summary judgment; the court held the disclaimer valid and enforceable against Brown’s claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the disclaimer valid under the WCA provisions? | Brown argues the waiver invalid under DC WCA sections 32-1516(b) and 32-1517. | Defendants contend the disclaimer does not waive WCA rights and is enforceable for third-party tort claims. | Disclaimer valid; not a waiver of WCA rights. |
| Does the disclaimer apply to 1301 K Street and Hines as customers? | Brown asserts the disclaimer applies only to Allied’s customers, not to these entities. | Allied Barton and customers were effectively the same at relevant times; both are protected. | Disclaimer binding against both appellees. |
| Is extrinsic evidence needed to interpret the disclaimer? | Brown relies on extrinsic evidence to show intended scope beyond facial language. | The language is facially unambiguous; extrinsic evidence unnecessary. | No extrinsic evidence required; plain language governs. |
| Should the disclaimer be invalid for public policy reasons? | Brown claims public policy bars waivers of statutorily mandated duties (OSHA/Safety Act). | No public policy against such waivers when limited to ordinary negligence and statutory duties. | Not against public policy; permitted to limit ordinary negligence claims. |
| May a waiver limit liability for statutory-duty claims like OSHA and Safety Act? | Such claims are statutory, not strict liability; waiver may be improper. | OSHA/Safety Act duties establish care standards; releases can cover ordinary negligence related to them. | Waiver viable to the extent it limits ordinary negligence under statutory duties. |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. Waller, 930 A.2d 176 (D.C. 2007) (recognizes limited enforceability of releases, not absolute invalidity)
- Noonan v. Williams, 686 A.2d 237 (D.C. 1996) (facially unambiguous releases may be interpreted with extrinsic evidence if ambiguous)
- Bolling Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, 475 A.2d 382 (D.C. 1984) (facially unambiguous releases reflect parties’ intent)
- Velasquez v. Essex Condominium Ass’n, 759 A.2d 676 (D.C. 2000) (statutory duties determine care and reasonableness for safety claims)
- Jimenez v. Hawk, 683 A.2d 457 (D.C. 1996) (OSHA can inform standard of care in negligence actions)
- Thoma v. Kettler Bros., Inc., 632 A.2d 725 (D.C. 1993) (OSHA/regulatory evidence relevant to standard of care)
- George Washington University v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43 (D.C. 1983) (public policy considerations in exculpatory clauses)
- Godette v. Estate of Cox, 592 A.2d 1028 (D.C. 1991) (public policy limitations on exculpatory clauses in fiduciary contexts)
- Meiggs v. Associated Builders, Inc., 545 A.2d 631 (D.C. 1988) (third-party protection under WCA; not to invalidate employee waivers)