Brokenborough v. District of Columbia, 236 F. Supp. 3d 41

Background

Plaintiff Charnita Thomas, a DOC corrections officer since 2006, alleges years of sexual comments, propositions, touching, and quid-pro-quo conduct by Major Joseph Pettiford and other supervisors beginning in 2007, causing psychological injury and leaves from work.
Thomas reported the harassment to DOC Internal Affairs in Sept. 2012, filed EEOC/DCOHR charges in Aug. 2012 (amended Oct. 2012), then additional charges in Nov. 2014 and June 2015, and sued in Nov. 2013 (amended May 2014).
She asserts hostile work environment claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (equal protection), and a Title VII retaliation claim against the District; Pettiford is sued individually under § 1983.
Evidence includes Thomas’s deposition, statements by other female officers describing similar conduct, a DOC cease-and-desist order, protracted internal investigations, and medical records diagnosing stress/PTSD-related conditions.
Defendants moved for summary judgment; the court evaluated exhaustion, prima facie elements, employer affirmative defenses (Faragher–Ellerth), municipal § 1983 liability, individual § 1983 liability, and exhaustion/merits of retaliation claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Thomas exhaust administrative remedies for hostile work environment under Title VII?	Her 2012 charge (narrative) put EEOC/District on notice of ongoing sexual harassment despite checking only "retaliation."	The 2012 charge checked only "retaliation" and listed an end date, so it failed to exhaust a hostile-work-environment claim.	Denied for District — charge’s narrative sufficiently put agency on notice; hostile-work-environment claim plausibly inferred.
Did Thomas establish unwelcome, severe or pervasive harassment (Title VII / § 1983)?	Years of propositions, lewd comments, touching, avoidance, transfer, and medical treatment show unwelcome, severe/pervasive harassment.	Pettiford contends incidents were isolated or not unwelcome.	Denied as to Pettiford on hostile-work-environment prima facie elements — material facts for a jury exist.
Can District assert Faragher–Ellerth affirmative defense? (employer exercised reasonable care and employee unreasonably failed to use remedies)	Thomas feared retaliation/physical danger from supervisors and took alternative avoidance measures; she reported only when she felt able.	District points to anti-harassment policy and disciplinary actions and argues Thomas unreasonably delayed reporting.	District not entitled to summary judgment — factual disputes about the effectiveness/promptness of preventive measures and reasonableness of Thomas’s delay.
Is the District liable under § 1983 (municipal liability)?	DOC knew or should have known of harassment and tolerated a culture allowing it; evidence of disciplinary failures and later findings of lewd conduct.	District argues no municipal policy/custom caused constitutional violation and that it disciplined offenders.	Granted for District on § 1983 hostile-work-environment claim — plaintiff failed to show a policy/custom or deliberate indifference sufficient for municipal liability.
Is Pettiford personally liable under § 1983 / entitled to qualified immunity?	Pettiford, a supervisor, used authority to summon and harass Thomas; a reasonable jury could find he acted under color of law; right was clearly established.	Pettiford disputes facts (e.g., presence at roll call/office) and asserts qualified immunity.	Pettiford’s summary-judgment motion denied — genuine factual disputes exist and the right to be free from severe/pervasive sexual harassment was clearly established.
Did Thomas exhaust and prove Title VII retaliation claims?	She exhausted certain retaliatory acts in 2012 and a violent threat in 2014; those acts are causally linked to her complaints.	District contends many alleged retaliatory acts were unexhausted/time-barred or distinct discrete acts needing separate charges.	Mixed: Court grants summary judgment for District as to many unexhausted/time-barred retaliatory acts alleged pre- and post-2012; denies summary judgment as to the 2014 threat (materially adverse and exhausted).

Key Cases Cited

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (hostile-work-environment elements)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (severity/pervasiveness standard)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (social context and same-sex harassment principles)
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (employer Faragher–Ellerth defense)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (retaliation: materially adverse standard)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (discrete acts and exhaustion/time bar)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity framework)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (municipal liability / deliberate indifference)
Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302 (municipal § 1983 liability test)