Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
141 S. Ct. 2321
| SCOTUS | 2021Background
- Arizona permits multiple voting methods: in-person precinct or voting centers, early in-person voting, and no-excuse early mail ballots (27 days pre-election); some counties use precinct-based election-day voting where ballots cast in the wrong precinct are not counted.
- HB 2023 (2016) criminalized third-party collection of early ballots except for postal workers, election officials, a voter’s family/household members, or caregivers.
- The DNC and others sued under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (and alleged discriminatory intent regarding HB 2023), claiming both rules disparately burden American Indian, Hispanic, and Black voters.
- District Court upheld Arizona rules after a bench trial (found limited disparate impact and no discriminatory intent for HB 2023); Ninth Circuit en banc reversed, finding disparate burden and, as to intent, a “cat’s paw” theory; Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- Supreme Court considered statutory text of §2, declined to announce a single test for all time/place/manner claims, articulated guideposts for §2 totality-of-circumstances analysis, and reviewed both the results and intent claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing to defend out-of-precinct ruling on appeal | Petitioners lack standing to appeal because private intervenors were required | Arizona AG (Brnovich) and State have standing as authorized state representatives | State represented by AG has Article III standing; one party with standing suffices to review the issue (standing upheld) |
| §2 challenge to out-of-precinct policy (discarding wrong-precinct ballots) | Policy disparately burdens minority voters (higher rates of discarded ballots) and, given local conditions, denies equal opportunity to vote | Policy imposes only the usual burdens of voting, has small absolute disparate impact, serves important administration and integrity interests | Policy does not violate §2: burdens are modest, disparate impact small in absolute terms, state interests (administration, accuracy, precinct integrity) weigh against finding violation |
| §2 challenge to HB 2023 (ban on third-party ballot collection) | Ban disproportionately burdens minorities (esp. Native Americans with limited mail access), reducing opportunity to use mail voting | Law leaves several practical ways to vote, includes family/caregiver exceptions, protects election integrity and prevents pressure/intimidation and fraud | Law does not violate §2 on the record: plaintiffs failed to quantify disparate burden; even if disparity existed, state interests in election integrity and preventing undue influence justify the restriction |
| Discriminatory intent claim against HB 2023 (Fifteenth Amendment and §2) | Legislative history and context show racial purpose or that legislators were used as instruments ("cat’s paw") | Evidence shows sincere, race-neutral legislative debate about fraud risks and procedure; partisan motives distinct from racial intent | District Court’s finding of no discriminatory intent was not clearly erroneous; "cat’s paw" theory inapplicable to Legislature; intent finding affirmed on appeal review standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (construing amended §2 and framing totality-of-circumstances vote-dilution inquiry)
- Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (plurality) (discussing intent requirement prior to 1982 amendments to §2)
- Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (recognizing "usual burdens of voting" and that mere inconvenience is insufficient to establish constitutional violation)
- Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (noting State interest in preserving integrity of its election processes)
- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (framework for adjudicating discriminatory intent)
- Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (clear-error standard for appellate review of factual findings)
- Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (appellate review of district court factual findings)
- Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (context on Section 5 preclearance and its removal altering enforcement landscape under §2)