Brister, Mark Randall
2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1916
Tex. Crim. App.2014Background
- Appellant Mark Brister was convicted of felony DWI and the jury found he “used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle,” leading to a 40-year sentence; the trial court included the deadly-weapon finding in its judgment.
- On direct appeal the Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed the deadly-weapon finding, holding the evidence insufficient to show the vehicle was used in a manner that placed others in actual danger. 414 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013).
- Facts at trial: officer Warner testified he stopped Brister after observing Brister cross the center line into oncoming traffic once; the officer was about ten car lengths behind; there were very few, if any, other vehicles present; Brister otherwise drove normally and stopped when signaled.
- Two other officers testified generally that the car type is capable of causing serious injury or death, but neither observed Brister driving or testified to danger to any particular person.
- State sought discretionary review, arguing (1) intoxication per se shows a vehicle driven in a manner capable of causing death or serious injury, and (2) crossing the center line with an officer ten car lengths behind was sufficient to show actual danger to others.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, could support a deadly-weapon finding requiring (a) the object be a deadly weapon, (b) used or exhibited during the felony transaction, and (c) other people were put in actual danger.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Brister's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether intoxication alone (felony DWI) suffices to prove a vehicle was used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury for a deadly-weapon finding | A BAC ≥ .08 or impairment is per se dangerous; intoxication satisfies "manner" so every felony DWI can support a deadly-weapon finding | Statute and precedent require proof that the vehicle was used in a manner that actually endangered others; intoxication alone is insufficient | Rejected: intoxication alone does not automatically authorize a deadly-weapon finding; specific evidence of use and danger to others is required |
| Whether brief crossing of the center line into oncoming traffic (with officer ~10 car lengths behind and few other cars present) suffices to show others were put in actual danger | Crossing into oncoming traffic demonstrates a real risk to others and supports a deadly-weapon finding | The single brief crossing, with no evidence anyone else was placed in danger, is hypothetical and insufficient | Affirmed court of appeals: evidence was insufficient to show others were put in actual danger; deadly-weapon finding reversed |
| Whether "others" includes the actor (driver) for purposes of actual danger requirement | Argues "others" can include the driver, so driver-endangerment suffices | Statutory language and precedent treat "others" as persons other than the actor; danger to the driver alone is insufficient | Held that "others" denotes persons apart from the actor; danger to the driver alone does not meet the standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Cates v. State, 102 S.W.3d 735 (establishes standard of review for deadly-weapon sufficiency)
- Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250 (deadly-weapon finding justified if vehicle posed an actual, non-hypothetical danger)
- Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795 (vehicle may be a deadly weapon depending on manner of use; factual examples where high-speed/wrong-way conduct supported finding)
- Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013) (court of appeals reversed deadly-weapon finding for insufficient evidence)
- Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388 (operation of a vehicle does not necessarily require driving; context on DWI elements)