Brignac v. United States
239 F. Supp. 3d 1367
N.D. Ga.2017Background
- Plaintiff alleges Dr. Lewis Jackson, while employed by Family Health Centers (a FSHCAA "deemed" entity), sexually assaulted him during a medical exam on Aug. 29, 2012. Plaintiff reported the incident to local police.
- Jackson previously worked at the USP Atlanta and was terminated after allegations he sexually assaulted inmates; he was later indicted and pled guilty to sexual abuse charges.
- Plaintiff sues under the FTCA, alleging (Count 1) negligent hiring and retention of Jackson by Family Health Centers/United States, and (Count 2) negligent failure by USP to report Jackson’s misconduct to state licensing authorities/NPDB.
- The United States moved to dismiss Count 1 under Rule 12(b)(1) arguing (a) FSHCAA limits suits to acts related to medical functions, (b) the FTCA intentional-tort exception bars the claim, and (c) the discretionary-function exception applies; it moved to dismiss Count 2 under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to plead a duty to report to licensing boards.
- The court treated the jurisdictional attack as facial, accepted the complaint’s allegations as true for Count 1, and evaluated Count 2 under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Ruling: the court denied dismissal of Count 1 (FTCA/FSHCAA coverage applies; §233(e) removes the FTCA assault/battery bar where assault arises from negligent medical-related functions; discretionary-function exception inapplicable given alleged notice of prior illegal conduct) and granted dismissal of Count 2 (Georgia statute cited requires reporting to local law enforcement, not licensing boards).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether negligent hiring/retention claim is covered by FSHCAA/§233(a) | Negligent hiring/retention is a "related function" to medical services and thus falls within §233(a) coverage | FSHCAA immunity limited to acts "related to performance of medical...functions" and hiring/retention are not such acts | Held: Covered — hiring/credentialing obligations are "inextricably woven" into medical functions and facts tie the harm to medical care; §233(a) does not bar suit against the U.S. |
| Whether FTCA intentional-tort exception (§2680(h)) bars Count 1 | (Implicit) claim framed as negligent hiring/retention, not an intentional-battery claim | Assault/battery exception bars claims "arising out of" assault or battery | Held: §233(e) abrogates §2680(h) for assaults/batteries arising out of negligent medical-related functions; claim may proceed against the U.S. |
| Whether the discretionary-function exception (§2680(a)) bars negligent hiring/retention | The Government’s failure to act after notice of illegal conduct removes discretion; plaintiff alleges the U.S. knew or should have known of Jackson’s misconduct before hiring | Hiring/retention decisions involve policy judgment and are generally discretionary and thus exempt | Held: Not dismissed — because plaintiff plausibly alleges notice of illegal conduct before hiring, discretionary-function exception does not apply at this pleading stage |
| Whether USP owed a duty to report to state licensing boards/NPDB under O.C.G.A. §31-7-9 (Count 2) | USP negligently failed to report Jackson’s misconduct to Georgia Composite Medical Board and NPDB | Georgia statute requires immediate reporting to local law enforcement; it does not require reporting to licensing authorities/NPDB; the Government did report (indictment) | Held: Dismissed — §31-7-9 imposes duty to report to local law enforcement, not to state licensing boards or NPDB, so Count 2 fails to state a claim |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (U.S. 1983) (general rule that the United States may not be sued without consent)
- Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799 (U.S. 2010) (FSHCAA limits recovery to suits against U.S. for medical-related functions and makes suits against health centers exclusive remedy)
- Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503 (U.S. 2013) (statutory provision that mirrors §233(e) abrogates FTCA intentional-tort exception for medical functions)
- Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (U.S. 1991) (two-prong test for discretionary-function exception)
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (U.S. 1988) (framework for determining discretionary-function exception applicability)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard: plausibility requirement)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must contain sufficient factual matter to be plausible)
- Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (§233(a) coverage depends on whether conduct was in doctor capacity and tied to medical treatment)
- Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (FSHCAA does not cover employment-discrimination claims unrelated to medical functions)
- Tonelli v. United States, 60 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 1995) (failure to act after notice of illegal behavior is not discretionary; distinguishes negligent hiring vs. negligent supervision)