Brightwell v. Lehman, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496

Brightwell, sentenced to life for robbery and murder (1975), has been housed in multiple PA state prisons since 1977, including SCI-Somerset (2003–2004) and SCI-Mahanoy (2004–2006).
Brightwell claims serious medical conditions and deliberate indifference to medical needs, seeking accommodations (diabetic diet, skin lotion, warm cell, remedial eye surgery).
In May 2004 Brightwell filed grievances after a May 2004 diabetic shock; a subsequent misconduct report for lying was later dismissed without sanction.
On September 16, 2004 Brightwell filed an amended complaint alleging various federal and constitutional claims; the district court dismissed most claims, leaving Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and First Amendment retaliation claims.
During proceedings, Brightwell sought in forma pauperis status and appointments of counsel; three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) led to denial of IFP and thus counsel under § 1915(e)(1).
In 2007 the district court granted summary judgment for defendants; Brightwell timely appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Brightwell’s three-strikes denial bar § 1915(e)(1) counsel?	Brightwell argues he remains entitled to counsel despite § 1915(g).	Brightwell is barred from IFP and counsel under PLRA § 1915(g).	Yes; barred from § 1915(e)(1) counsel.
Was there adequate notice and opportunity to respond to summary judgment?	Brightwell insufficiently informed due to transfer mail issues.	Court granted extensions and resent filings; Brightwell had proper opportunity.	No procedural error; adequate notice and response time provided.
Were Brightwell's Eighth Amendment claims supported by material evidence for summary judgment?	Records show deliberate indifference to medical needs.	Record shows adequate care and no deliberate indifference; claims speculative.	No genuine dispute; summary judgment proper.
Was Brightwell’s First Amendment retaliation claim properly dismissed as a matter of law?	Misconduct charge was retaliatory and adverse to rights.	Disciplinary charge did not constitute an adverse action deterring rights.	Claim insufficient; no adverse action.

Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir.1993) (factors for appointing counsel in forma pauperis cases)
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (U.S. 2004) (statutory division of sections; three-strikes context)
Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.1998) (PLRA purpose to deter frivolous prisoner litigation)
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir.2001) (three strikes does not bar access to courts or counsel)
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (U.S. 1989) (court can request but not compel counsel; 'appointed' vs 'requested')
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (standard for deliberate indifference in medical care)
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492 (3d Cir.2002) (deliberate indifference standard for medical claims)
Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148 (3d Cir.1997) (First Amendment retaliation framework)
Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.2007) (plain error review and procedural default principles)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard and burden of proof)