927 F.3d 427
6th Cir.2019Background
- Williams pleaded guilty (2000) to attempted felonious assault under Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.11(A); Shepard records do not indicate which statutory prong applied.
- In 2006 he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the district court applied the ACCA enhancement based on three prior convictions (including the 2000 Ohio assault), sentencing him to 180 months.
- Williams filed multiple § 2255 motions; earlier motions were denied or found to require authorization as second or successive filings.
- After Johnson II (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)) invalidated the ACCA residual clause and Welch made that decision retroactive, Williams sought collateral relief arguing his sentence rested on the now-void residual clause.
- The Sixth Circuit en banc decision in Burris (912 F.3d 386) held Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.11(A)(1) categorically mismatched the ACCA/GUIDELINES elements clause, prompting remand to consider whether Williams could pursue a second/successive § 2255 and whether his sentence must be vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AEDPA provisions (§2244(b)(1), §2255(h), §2244(b)(4)) bar the court from adjudicating Williams's second/successive §2255 | Williams: §2244(b)(1) applies only to state prisoners; §2255(h) thresholds are nonjurisdictional and met given Johnson II | Government: AEDPA can operate as mandatory claim-processing rules; some courts treat parallel §2244 limits as applicable to §2255 | Court: §2244(b)(1) does not apply to federal §2255 movants; §2255(h) and §2244(b)(4) are nonjurisdictional claim‑processing rules (forfeitable) and do not bar review |
| Whether Williams obtained authorization to file a second/successive §2255 under §2255(h) | Williams: He relies on Johnson II as a new substantive rule; it is more likely than not the sentencing court relied on the residual clause | Government: Movant must show sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause; otherwise authorization fails | Court: Williams met §2255(h)(2) preponderance test—Calloway was the controlling precedent at sentencing and pointed to the residual clause—so he is entitled to bring the successive motion |
| Whether the Ohio felonious assault conviction still qualifies as an ACCA predicate under elements clause after Burris and Johnson II | Williams: §2903.11(A) cannot satisfy the elements clause categorically; combined with the void residual clause, ACCA enhancement fails | Government: Could attempt to argue elements clause still supports predicate or that sentencing record permits alternative reliance | Court: Following Burris, §2903.11(A)(1) is a categorical mismatch with the elements clause and Shepard record is inconclusive as to prong, so the conviction cannot serve as an ACCA predicate |
| Remedy: Whether Williams’s ACCA sentence should be vacated and remanded | Williams: Vacatur and resentencing required because only two valid predicates remain | Government: (Implicit) contend sentence should stand if alternative grounds support ACCA application | Held: The court VACATED Williams’s ACCA sentence and REMANDED for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Burris v. United States, 912 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Ohio § 2903.11(A)(1) categorically mismatches the ACCA/elements clause)
- Williams v. United States, 875 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2017) (panel decision addressed Williams’s earlier §2255 claims before en banc consideration)
- Anderson v. United States, 695 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2012) (prior panel had held Ohio felonious assault qualified under the elements clause)
- Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Supreme Court held ACCA residual clause unconstitutional)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson II substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012) (analysis of which AEDPA/§2253 filing requirements are jurisdictional vs. claim‑processing)
- Potter v. United States, 887 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2018) (explained preponderance showing needed to demonstrate sentencing relied on residual clause)