Brian Humphreys v. McCabe Weisberg & Conway
686 F. App'x 95
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Humphreys defaulted on his mortgage with Wachovia (later Wells Fargo) in 2010, prompting state foreclosure proceedings.
- State court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, holding Wells Fargo retained its rights as mortgage-note holder despite any assignment to Fannie Mae.
- During foreclosure, Humphreys sued Wells Fargo’s counsel and law firm in district court under the FDCPA for alleged false representations about Wells Fargo’s enforcement rights.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as the foreclosure issue had been litigated in the state proceeding; Humphreys sought to amend but did not attach a proposed amended complaint.
- Humphreys appealed; the Third Circuit reviews de novo Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and affords liberal construction to pro se pleadings, affirming on any valid basis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether issue preclusion bars FDCPA claims | Humphreys argues preclusion does not apply to relitigate foreclosure issues. | Wells Fargo argues the state foreclosure judgment resolved Wells Fargo’s rights to foreclose, precluding relitigation. | Yes; issue preclusion bars the FDCPA challenge to Wells Fargo’s foreclosure rights. |
| Whether FDCPA claim plausibly alleges false statements | Humphreys alleges defendants falsely claimed Wells Fargo could enforce the mortgage. | Defendants contend their statements were not false and Wells Fargo had enforceable rights. | No; the complaint fails to plead a materially false statement to a least sophisticated debtor. |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend | Humphreys sought to add federal and state claims with new defendants. | Amendment would be futile; new counts rely on the same flawed premise and rest on Iqbal standards. | No abuse; amendment would fail to state a claim and the court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519 (3d Cir. 2012) (construe pro se pleadings liberally; standards for dismissal)
- McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521 (3d Cir. 2009) (well-pleaded allegations presumed true on motion to dismiss)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (abuse of discretion standard for leave to amend)
- Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 767 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2014) (issue preclusion under Pennsylvania law)
- J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (holder in due course rights to enforce note)
- Montgomery County, Pa. v. MERSCORP Inc., 795 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2015) (right to enforce mortgage rights; assignment validity)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (liberal pleadings standard for pro se litigants)
- Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1996) (res judicata effects of appellate pendency)