984 F.3d 532
7th Cir.2021Background
- Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), enacted 1994 and amended repeatedly (notably 1996 "substantial equivalency" and 2006 "other-jurisdiction" provisions), imposes lifetime reporting, photo/disclosure, frequent in-person verification, residency/work restrictions, and public listing for many registrants.
- Six plaintiffs: convicted decades ago (most pre‑SORA), completed sentences, later moved to (or returned to) Indiana from states that required them to register; Indiana required them to register even though, had they remained Indiana residents since conviction, Wallace v. State would have exempted them.
- Indiana’s administrative position (and statutory scheme) tied registration to either: (a) an out‑of‑state equivalent offense (substantial equivalency) or (b) being required to register in another jurisdiction (other‑jurisdiction clause). The State conceded substantial‑equivalency couldn’t constitutionally be applied to these pre‑SORA convicts.
- Procedural posture: consolidated suits; district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and enjoined SORA’s application to them on grounds including violation of the right to travel, equal protection, and ex post facto; State appealed.
- Seventh Circuit affirmed on the right‑to‑travel ground: applying SORA’s other‑jurisdiction provision to these relocating pre‑SORA offenders creates a two‑tier class of Indiana citizens (new arrivals vs longstanding residents) and thus violates the Privileges or Immunities component of the right to travel; court did not reach the federal ex post facto claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to travel (third component: newly arrived citizens) | Relocating pre‑SORA offenders are treated worse than similarly situated longstanding Indiana residents, violating the Privileges or Immunities right to equal treatment of new citizens. | SORA’s application depends on whether the person was required to register elsewhere, not on duration of residency; any travel connection is incidental. | Held for plaintiffs: Indiana’s other‑jurisdiction rule effectively discriminates based on timing of migration and fails strict scrutiny; constitutional violation of right to travel. |
| Federal ex post facto (retroactive punishment) | Retroactive imposition of registration is punitive and barred. | State says SORA is regulatory and may be applied when the registrant already had an obligation elsewhere; some Indiana precedent allows cross‑state maintenance of existing obligations. | Not decided on appeal (affirmance rests on right‑to‑travel); district court had found ex post facto violation as alternative. |
| Statutory basis for registration (substantial equivalency vs other jurisdiction) | Substantial equivalency cannot be used to compel pre‑SORA offenders to register; plaintiffs rely on Wallace. | State invoked other‑jurisdiction provision as primary basis; previously argued both grounds but conceded substantial equivalency inapplicable here. | Court proceeded on premise substantial equivalency cannot be applied to these plaintiffs and evaluated constitutionality of other‑jurisdiction reliance. |
| Application to persons who moved to Indiana before 2006 (Snider, Bash) | Applying 2006 other‑jurisdiction rule retroactively resurrects an expired obligation and conflicts with Wallace. | State contends the other‑jurisdiction provision can retroactively impose registration if another state required it. | Court expressed serious doubt that Wallace permits retroactive resurrection for pre‑2006 movers; nevertheless resolved case on right‑to‑travel ground without issuing a definitive state‑law holding. |
Key Cases Cited
- Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (right‑to‑travel’s third component; newly arrived citizens must be treated like other state citizens)
- Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009) (Indiana Supreme Court: SORA’s retrospective application to pre‑SORA offenders imposes punitive burdens under Indiana Constitution)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (federal ex post facto analysis of sex‑offender registration statutes)
- Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009) (Indiana Supreme Court: extensions of preexisting registration obligations may not be punitive)
- Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88 (Ind. 2016) (Indiana Supreme Court: maintaining an out‑of‑state registration obligation in Indiana is not necessarily punitive)
- State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2016) (same: marginal effect/migration of registration obligation across state lines not punitive)
- Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016) (per curiam) (same line: out‑of‑state registration obligations can be continued without violating state ex post facto clause)
- Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (durational or fixed‑point residency distinctions among state citizens are constitutionally suspect)
- Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (durational residency classifications disfavored)
- Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto‑Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (plurality) (right to migrate protects residents from being disadvantaged solely by timing of migration)
- Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (right to travel cases striking durational residency rules for vital benefits)
- Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (one‑year durational residency for voting struck down)
- Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishes residency‑based discrimination from classification based on out‑of‑state experience/acts)