Brian Herron v. Douglas Meyer
820 F.3d 860
7th Cir.2016Background
- Herron, a wheelchair-bound and incontinent federal prisoner, was assigned a wheelchair-accessible cell at USP Terre Haute; grab bars and a shower enabled safe transfers and hygiene.
- After other inmates labeled him a child molester (Walsh Act references), Herron filed grievances and a Privacy Act request to correct records; he was placed in segregation for safety and initially housed alone.
- Guard Douglas Meyer removed a prospective cellmate who had attacked a prior roommate, then returned and—according to Herron—threatened retaliation for filing grievances and moved Herron to a non–wheelchair-accessible cell lacking grab bars and a shower.
- Herron fell attempting to use the toilet without assistance, suffered head and spine injuries, and sued Meyer under Bivens alleging Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment/deliberate indifference) and First Amendment (retaliation for grievances) violations.
- The district court dismissed the First Amendment claim and granted Meyer qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim; the Seventh Circuit reviewed in Herron’s favor on both issues and vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether moving Herron to an inaccessible cell amounted to unconstitutional punishment or deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment | Meyer moved Herron to a cell he knew would likely cause injury as punishment for filing grievances; that decision caused physical harm | Meyer acted pursuant to a policy of relocating inmates who object to cellmates, expected other guards to assist, and did not intend harm | A jury must decide disputed facts; if Meyer moved Herron to cause injury, Eighth Amendment liability is possible — district court’s qualified immunity finding vacated |
| Whether Meyer is entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim | Qualified immunity is inappropriate where a guard deliberately uses unsafe conditions as punishment | Meyer claims no clearly established law prohibited the move given his belief assistance would be available | Because existing law prohibits guards from imposing their own punishment, qualified immunity is not appropriate on summary judgment if jury credits Herron |
| Whether the First Amendment protects Herron’s grievances from being punished (retaliation/penalty for speech) | Filing grievances and seeking record correction are protected petition/speech; attaching a price to that speech (moving him to unsafe cell) violates First Amendment | Meyer argues prisoners have no right to one‑person cells and his actions were administrative, not punishment for speech | Dismissal of the First Amendment claim was improper; claim survives pleading stage and may matter if facts show speech was punished |
| Procedural: whether dismissal without leave to amend was proper | Herron’s complaint need not include proof; amendment should have been allowed if needed | District court considered complaint deficient and dismissed First Amendment claim | Seventh Circuit remanded, vacating dismissal and indicating amendment should have been allowed rather than dismissal if required |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference standard for medical care of prisoners)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prison officials’ duty to protect inmates from violence; deliberate indifference test)
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (procedural protections for prisoner discipline)
- Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (Eighth Amendment prohibits guards’ use of punishment not authorized by conviction)
- Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2008) (guards may not impose personal punishment; relevant Seventh Circuit precedent)
- DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000) (prisoner grievances and speech protections)
- Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (First Amendment protections for prisoner complaints)
- Pratt v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2006) (complaint need not plead proof; factual development may follow)
- Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago, 786 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2015) (leave to amend favored over dismissal)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (public‑employee speech balancing test)
- Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (context‑sensitive protection for public‑employee speech)
- Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (balancing government interest vs. employee speech)
- Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (attaching a price to speech implicates First Amendment concerns)
- Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (protection against speech‑based penalties for independent contractors)
- Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009) (warning about confusing use of “retaliation” label in prisoner speech cases)