823 F.3d 1212
9th Cir.2016Background
- Farkas, a civilian NAFI golf-instructor at a Navy base, reported cash theft and then was placed on administrative leave during a base budgetary/criminal investigation.
- An NCIS detective interviewed Farkas on base; before the interview the detective required Farkas to place keys, wallet, and change in a lockbox and administered a pat-down; Farkas was later cleared, reinstated, and given back pay.
- Farkas sued under Bivens for employment-related due-process and First Amendment retaliation claims against base administrators, and for a Fourth Amendment seizure claim against the NCIS detective.
- The district court dismissed the employment-related Bivens claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (holding they are precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA)) and granted summary judgment for the detective on the Fourth Amendment claim.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: (1) CSRA and related safeguards preclude Bivens employment claims by NAFI employees; (2) no Fourth Amendment violation because Farkas impliedly consented to the lockbox procedure by entering the restricted base and interview area.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CSRA precludes Bivens employment claims by NAFI employees | Farkas: Bivens suits should be available for employment-related constitutional violations despite NAFI status | Defendants: CSRA and related statutory/regulatory safeguards counsel against a Bivens remedy for federal/NAFI employment disputes | Held: Precluded — CSRA-related special factors and alternative safeguards bar employment-related Bivens claims by NAFI employees |
| Whether exclusion of NAFI employees from CSRA is inadvertent and allows Bivens | Farkas: Exclusion leaves him without adequate remedies, so Bivens should apply | Defendants: Congress deliberately exempted NAFI employees; other statutory protections exist | Held: Exclusion intentional; existence of other protections (e.g., DoD whistleblower rules, Navy grievance procedures) weighs against Bivens |
| Whether placing personal effects in a lockbox during an on-base interview was a Fourth Amendment seizure | Farkas: The lockbox requirement was a seizure that violated Fourth Amendment | Detective: Requirement was routine, consensual protocol for restricted-base interviews, not a seizure | Held: No seizure — implied consent by voluntarily entering restricted base and interview area; objective circumstances negate expectation of privacy |
| Whether additional alleged intrusions (fingerprints/photograph) create a claim | Farkas: Briefly referenced potential claim | Defendants: Not addressed | Held: Waived — issue not developed on appeal and thus not reached |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (recognizing implied damages remedy for certain constitutional violations)
- Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (special factors and existing remedial schemes can preclude Bivens relief)
- Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (CSRA’s remedial scheme can preclude constitutional tort claims by federal employees)
- United States v. Morgan, 323 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2003) (visitors to military bases have diminished privacy expectations and impliedly consent to searches/seizures)
- United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426 (9th Cir. 1994) (consensual-encounter principles in Fourth Amendment context)
- Fausto v. United States, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) (CSRA’s integrated remedial scheme and exclusivity in federal employment disputes)
- Blankenship v. McDonald, 176 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1999) (CSRA can preclude Bivens actions even when statutory remedies are incomplete)
- Zimbelman v. Savage, 228 F.3d 367 (4th Cir. 2000) (CSRA exclusivity plus alternate safeguards counsel against Bivens for NAFI employees)
- McAuliffe v. Rice, 966 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1992) (Congressional intent to exempt NAFI employees from federal civil service rules)
- Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1997) (deliberately crafted statutory remedial systems are special factors precluding Bivens)
- Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2015) (standards for de novo review and Bivens analysis)
