9 F. Supp. 3d 571
D. Maryland2014Background
- Bretemps, a lifelong Brentwood resident and former councilman, vocally opposed creation of a Town police department; Mayor Wright supported it and clashed with Bretemps.
- After David Risik became Town Chief (Dec. 2009), he intensified enforcement of Town code provisions regarding vehicle parking and property maintenance.
- Risik issued citations and tow warnings to Bretemps (March–April 2010); Bretemps contested and some matters were dismissed or nolle prossed.
- At a March 9, 2010 council meeting, video shows a heated exchange but not clearly disorderly conduct; Risik nonetheless filed criminal charges and sought arrest warrants; prosecutors declined to proceed on some charges.
- Bretemps was later arrested on obstruction-related charges; those charges were dropped. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false prosecution, abuse of process/malicious prosecution, conspiracy (against Wright and Risik), and a Monell claim against the Town.
- The court denied defendants’ summary judgment motion, finding genuine disputes of material fact on causation, probable cause, and municipal liability that a jury must resolve.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment retaliation (§ 1983) | Bretemps says citations/charges were retaliatory for his protected political speech opposing the police dept. | Defendants contend citations were lawful enforcement of code against an unrepentant scofflaw and not motivated by speech. | Denied summary judgment — jury could find enforcement was retaliatory and would chill a reasonable person; causation is plausibly shown. |
| Fourth Amendment — prosecution without probable cause | Bretemps argues arrests/charges (disorderly conduct; obstruction) lacked probable cause. | Defendants assert objective probable cause existed based on the incidents. | Denied summary judgment — video, prosecutor’s reaction, and disputed facts permit a jury to find lack of probable cause. |
| Abuse of process / malicious prosecution | Bretemps contends legal process was used to seize and punish him without probable cause; proceedings ended in his favor. | Defendants deny malice and claim lawful prosecutions. | Denied summary judgment — elements (seizure via process, lack of probable cause, favorable termination) are disputed and jury must decide. |
| Conspiracy and Monell municipal liability | Bretemps alleges Wright and Risik conspired and the Town is liable for policies/customs that caused the violations. | Defendants invoke intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and deny municipal-policy liability. | Denied summary judgment on both — intracorporate doctrine inapplicable to two individuals acting together; evidence could support a finding that the Mayor set policy/directive giving rise to Monell liability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (summary-judgment standard; view facts in light most favorable to nonmovant)
- Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (retaliation may be actionable even if the act could have been proper for other reasons)
- ACLU v. Wicomico County, Md., 999 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1993) (retaliation actionable under § 1983)
- Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2006) (objective ‘‘reasonable person’’ chilling test in retaliation claims)
- Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012) (malicious prosecution as a Fourth Amendment claim requires seizure via legal process, lack of probable cause, and favorable termination)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy/custom causing constitutional violation)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (official with final policymaking authority can create municipal policy for § 1983 liability)