Brendan Dassey v. Michael Dittmann
877 F.3d 297
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Brendan Dassey, a 16‑year‑old with low‑average to borderline IQ, gave a videotaped March 1, 2006 statement confessing to rape, murder, and mutilation of Teresa Halbach; he had earlier given limited statements on Feb 27.
- March 1 interrogation: voluntary pickup with mother’s consent, Miranda warnings, three‑hour “soft” room interview with frequent breaks, food, and no physical force; interrogators repeatedly urged honesty and said cooperation would help him.
- Dassey’s account shifted repeatedly on key details; some highly incriminating details were volunteered in response to open‑ended prompts, others emerged after leading or suggestive questioning.
- Wisconsin trial court found the March 1 statement voluntary; Court of Appeals affirmed; state supreme court denied review. Dassey was convicted and sentenced to life.
- Federal habeas: district court granted relief finding the confession involuntary; a divided Seventh Circuit panel affirmed; the en banc court reversed, holding the state courts’ voluntariness ruling was reasonable under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dassey’s March 1 statement was voluntary under the Due Process Clause | Dassey: juvenile, limited intellect, high suggestibility + repeated assurances that honesty would "set you free" and leading questioning overbore his will | State: no physical coercion, Miranda waiver, comfortable setting, breaks, many incriminating details volunteered, investigators made no specific promises of leniency | Held: voluntary — state court decision was a reasonable application of Supreme Court voluntariness law under §2254(d)(1) |
| Proper standard of review under AEDPA (§2254(d)) | Dassey: state court unreasonably applied federal law and misapplied facts | State: deference required; must deny relief unless state ruling was unreasonable | Held: AEDPA deference applies; state court’s judgment not objectively unreasonable |
| Whether interrogators made promises of leniency (factual issue under §2254(d)(2)) | Dassey: cumulative assurances and implied promises induced confession; trial court finding otherwise was unreasonable | State: statements were general encouragements to be honest, not specific or legally significant promises | Held: trial court’s factfinding (no frank promises) was reasonable; not an unreasonable factual determination |
| Ineffective assistance / conflict of interest claim under Cuyler/Mickens | Dassey: counsel had an actual conflict affecting representation | State: no actual conflict; no prejudice shown | Held: rejected — no actual conflict; courts agreed with district court’s reasoning |
Key Cases Cited
- Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (voluntariness assessed by totality of circumstances)
- Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (deference under AEDPA where rule is general and factors point both ways)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (§2254(d) is highly deferential; state decisions not unreasonable merely because federal judges disagree)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (unreasonable application standard for §2254(d)(1))
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (coercive police conduct required for involuntary confession)
- Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (juvenile confession found voluntary where general encouragement of cooperation not coercive)
- Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (purpose of voluntariness test is to determine whether defendant’s will was overborne)
- J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (juvenile suspects require special care in custodial/voluntariness analyses)