929 F.3d 762
5th Cir.2019Background
- Officer Faul responded to a 911 report of a possible armed robbery and arrived with a police canine to an apartment where Quamaine Mason and his former girlfriend were confronted by officers with weapons drawn.
- Faul was 3–6 feet from Mason, perceived Mason moving toward his waistband, released the dog, and began firing; Mason was shot five times, fell face down, and then was shot two more times.
- On the first appeal (Mason I), this Court vacated summary judgment for Faul as to the initial five shots and identified material fact issues about the final two shots and whether Mason was clearly incapacitated. 806 F.3d 268.
- On remand the matter was tried to a jury; the jury found Faul used objectively unreasonable excessive force but nonetheless awarded him qualified immunity.
- Appellants (Mason’s family) appealed, raising challenges to the trial court’s reliance on Young, evidentiary rulings excluding parts of expert testimony, jury instructions/interrogatories (including a proposed Second Amendment instruction), and the asserted inconsistency of the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court’s reliance on Young v. City of Killeen for qualified immunity and evidentiary rulings | Young was improperly applied to analyze qualified immunity and to exclude expert evidence | Young correctly states law that negligence or creation of danger does not defeat qualified immunity; limits on expert testimony were proper | No error: Young was an appropriate general authority and exclusions were permissible (expert could testify on dog procedures but not on pre-encounter acts) |
| Jury instructions and use of two interrogatories (excessive force; qualified immunity) | Charges (and reliance on Young) produced error and should have included a Second Amendment instruction | Pattern jury instructions were correct; Second Amendment instruction unnecessary because lawful-carry was not litigated | No error: court used near-verbatim Fifth Circuit Pattern Instructions; rejecting Second Amendment charge was proper given the record |
| Alleged inconsistency between verdicts (objective unreasonableness vs. qualified immunity) | Finding of unconstitutional excessive force is irreconcilable with granting qualified immunity | Jury could find force objectively unreasonable yet conclude reasonable mistake as to legality, supporting immunity | No fatal inconsistency: verdicts can be harmonized; immunity can apply if reasonable officers could have believed conduct lawful |
| Whether qualified immunity nevertheless fails as a matter of law | Appellants argued evidence at trial proved immunity unavailable | Faul argued facts were contested and jury could credit his perception and reasonableness | No: after trial credibility determinations, jury verdict must stand; qualified immunity sustainable under the facts found |
Key Cases Cited
- Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (prior panel opinion addressing summary judgment and qualified immunity issues)
- Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing limits on denying qualified immunity for negligence/creation of danger)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (qualified immunity protects reasonable, even mistaken, judgments by officers)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity can apply even where alternative means existed; cautions against over-reliance on Garner)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive-force standard: objective reasonableness)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (plaintiff must identify clearly established law particularized to the facts)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (distinguishes objective reasonableness in constitutional violation from immunity inquiry)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (requires precedent clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the rule sought)
- Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 327 U.S. 108 (1946) (court duty to harmonize apparently inconsistent jury answers before ordering new trial)