Brandon Graham v. CIOX Health, LLC, 952 F.3d 972

Plaintiff Brandon Graham’s attorney requested Graham’s medical records from St. Mary’s Hospital for specified dates; CIOX Health (the hospital’s records vendor) searched, found no responsive treatment records, and sent a letter saying none existed.
CIOX billed a $24.85 “Basic Fee” for the search despite producing no medical-record pages.
Graham filed a proposed class action alleging the charge violated Mo. Rev. Stat. § 191.227, which permits providers to condition furnishing records on payment of fees for “search and retrieval.”
CIOX moved to dismiss, arguing the statute authorizes charging a search fee even if the search yields no retrievable records; the district court granted dismissal.
The Eighth Circuit (majority) affirmed: it held the “no records” letter qualifies as a furnished health-care record and the statute permits charging a search fee even when no retrieval occurs.
Judge Stras dissented, arguing the phrase “search and retrieval” is conjunctive (requiring both acts) and, under Finnegan, a fee may be charged only if retrieval occurs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CIOX “furnished” a health-care record under §191.227 when no pre-existing records existed	Graham: No responsive records existed, so nothing was furnished and no fee may be charged	CIOX: The vendor’s letter stating no records existed is itself a record and was furnished to the requester	Court: The letter is a health-care record and was furnished; fee authority applies
Whether §191.227 authorizes charging a fee for a standalone “search” when retrieval is impossible	Graham: “Search and retrieval” is conjunctive; both must occur before a fee may be charged	CIOX: The statute authorizes fees for search and for retrieval (distinct costs); a search fee may be charged even if retrieval yields nothing	Court: Statute permits charging a search fee separate from retrieval; dissent would require retrieval before charging

Halbrook v. Mallinckrodt, LLC, 888 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review and treating state-law interpretation as predictive exercise)
Stires v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611 (Mo. banc 2016) (presumption that “and” is conjunctive in statutory construction)
Finnegan v. Old Republic Title Co. of St. Louis, 246 S.W.3d 928 (Mo. banc 2008) (interpreting a statute requiring two acts joined by “and” as requiring both before a fee may be charged)
Parktown Imps., Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. banc 2009) (primary rule: give effect to legislative intent and plain language)
Kerperien v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 100 S.W.3d 778 (Mo. banc 2003) (when statute is unambiguous, courts must give effect to its language)