549 F. App'x 545
7th Cir.2013Background
- Bradley pleaded guilty in 2004 to heroin distribution and was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 to 228 (then 223) months; he did not object at sentencing.
- He filed a § 2255 petition raising ineffective-assistance claims (including counsel-induced plea and failure to appeal) and challenging career-offender predicates; courts denied relief after evidentiary hearing and appeals; COA issues were limited and litigated.
- Bradley later sought clerical corrections to his PSR and pursued a § 2241 habeas petition arguing post-N Johnson/Begay that his victim-intimidation conviction no longer qualified as a violent felony for career-offender treatment; the district court denied the § 2241 petition.
- A prior Seventh Circuit panel affirmed the § 2241 denial reasoning that Bradley’s sentence remained below the statutory maximum, but the court here concludes that reasoning misapplied Narvaez and that the panel’s decision was a merits determination.
- Bradley then filed successive Rule 60(b) motions seeking relief from the habeas judgment, arguing Gonzalez v. Crosby permits attacking procedural defects in prior habeas proceedings; the district court denied relief as untimely, outside Rule 60(b)’s scope, and not showing extraordinary circumstances.
- This appeal turns on whether Bradley’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks a procedural defect (permitted under Gonzalez) or is a disguised successive habeas petition subject to § 2255(h) restrictions.
Issues
| Issue | Bradley's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bradley can use Rule 60(b) to reopen the prior denial of his § 2241 petition | Gonzalez allows Rule 60(b) relief to attack defects in habeas proceedings (here, panel’s misapplication of Narvaez) | The motion attacks the merits of the prior habeas ruling and is therefore a successive habeas application barred absent § 2255(h) certification | Denied: the motion is a merits attack and thus a successive petition governed by § 2255(h) |
| Whether the prior Seventh Circuit panel erred in concluding Bradley’s sentence being below the statutory maximum precluded Narvaez relief | Narvaez and Brown permit collateral review where career-offender status was based on predicates that no longer qualify, regardless of statutory-maximum argument | The statutory-maximum point bars relief | Court: prior panel’s statutory-maximum rationale was wrong, but that error makes this motion a merits challenge not salvageable under Rule 60(b) |
| Whether Gonzalez v. Crosby’s distinction (procedural defect vs. merits attack) applies to Bradley’s complaint about the panel’s legal error | Bradley: the panel’s procedural error (failure to apply Narvaez properly) is like Gonzalez’s tolling-error example and thus reviewable under Rule 60(b) | Gonzalez distinguishes merits attacks from procedural rulings; a ruling that resolves the merits cannot be relabeled as procedural to evade AEDPA limits | Court: Gonzalez does not permit relabeling a merits determination as procedural; Bradley’s motion attacks the merits and is a successive petition |
| Whether Bradley’s Rule 60(b) motion satisfies § 2255(h) to be treated as a successive petition | Bradley did not assert newly discovered evidence or a new retroactive constitutional rule | Government: Bradley failed to satisfy § 2255(h) certification requirements | Held: Bradley did not meet § 2255(h); relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishes procedural challenges to habeas proceedings from merits attacks and explains limits on Rule 60(b) in habeas context)
- Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizes narrow exception allowing collateral review when career-offender classification rests on predicates that no longer qualify)
- Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013) (confirms Narvaez’s approach to career-offender-based collateral relief)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines violent felony language later relied upon in career-offender challenges)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (construes what crimes qualify as violent felonies under ACCA and related analyses)
- In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) (addresses when § 2241 may be used given § 2255 limitations)
- Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000) (procedural point on habeas filing rules cited in Gonzalez analysis)