36 F.4th 1306
11th Cir.2022Background
- Plaintiff Bradley Dorman, a Jewish inmate at Broward County Main Jail, participated in Passover in 2017 but was denied participation in 2018 for failing to meet a 45‑day pre‑registration deadline (deadline Feb. 14, 2018; Passover began Mar. 30, 2018).
- Dorman used the jail's computer kiosk to message chaplains in both years; in 2018 chaplains told him the deadline was posted on the kiosk homepage.
- Dorman filed a pro se § 1983 complaint alleging violations of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and the Due Process Clause for insufficient notice; he sought declaratory/injunctive relief and damages.
- The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), finding no substantial burden under RLUIPA/First Amendment and that kiosk posting provided adequate due process notice; amendment was denied as futile given his late (post‑holiday) request.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: the 45‑day registration requirement was not a substantial burden and the electronic kiosk posting was a constitutionally adequate method of notice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 45‑day registration deadline substantially burdened Dorman's religious exercise under RLUIPA (and thus the First Amendment) | The deadline effectively prevented Dorman from participating in Passover in 2018; change from 2017 shows the rule was unnecessary | The deadline is a neutral administrative requirement permitting full participation if timely requested and is an administrative convenience, not coercion | Not a substantial burden; merely an inconvenience. RLUIPA claim fails and First Amendment claim likewise fails. |
| Whether the kiosk posting of the deadline satisfied due process notice requirements | Dorman was unaware of the kiosk posting; notice should have been printed near the kiosk or personally provided given his prior participation | Posting the deadline on the kiosk homepage (which inmates routinely use to communicate with staff) was reasonably calculated to provide notice | Notice was adequate under Mullane; electronic kiosk posting was reasonably calculated and personal notice was not required. |
| Whether dismissal with prejudice and denial of leave to amend was appropriate | Dorman argued defective notice and sought relief; impliedly sought amendment | Defendants argued complaint shows he sought participation after Passover began, making amendment futile | Dismissal affirmed; leave to amend denied as futile because his request came after the holiday had begun. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., 551 U.S. 308 (accept factual allegations as true on review of dismissal)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (established plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (applies plausibility standard to pleadings)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (prison regulations valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests)
- Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (RLUIPA imposes heightened protection for institutionalized persons' religious exercise)
- Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (substantial‑burden inquiry under RLUIPA)
- Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.) (examples of substantial burden)
- Thai Meditation Ass'n of Ala., Inc. v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2020) (clarifies substantial‑burden formulations)
- Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (notice must be reasonably calculated to inform interested parties)
- Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (due process does not require actual receipt of notice)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (prison liberty‑interest framework)
