BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
593 U.S. 230
SCOTUS2021Background:
- Baltimore sued energy companies in Maryland state court alleging concealment of environmental harms from fossil fuels.
- Defendants removed the suit to federal court asserting multiple bases, including federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C. §1442 and several other federal statutes.
- The district court reviewed each asserted basis for removal, rejected them all, and remanded the case to state court.
- Normally 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) bars appellate review of remand orders, but contains an exception permitting review for remands "pursuant to section 1442 or 1443." Congress added §1442 to that exception in 2011.
- The Fourth Circuit held it could review only the district court’s §1442 analysis and affirmed; other circuits disagree on whether the §1447(d) exception permits review of the entire remand order.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether §1447(d) authorizes appellate review of all issues in a remand order when the defendant invoked §1442 or §1443 in removing the case.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of §1447(d) appellate review | Review should be limited to the portion of the remand order addressing §1442/§1443 only | If removal relied on §1442/§1443, the court of appeals may review the entire remand order | The Court held the entire remand order is reviewable when removal was "pursuant to" §1442 or §1443 |
| Meaning of "removed pursuant to" | A case is removable "pursuant to" §1442/§1443 only after a federal court has held those statutes authorize removal | A defendant’s §1446 notice asserting §1442/§1443 suffices to remove "pursuant to" those statutes | The Court held invoking §1442/§1443 in the removal notice satisfies "pursuant to" for §1447(d) review |
| Policy — gamesmanship and delay | Allowing full review will encourage frivolous tacking-on of §1442/§1443 to secure appeals and delay merits | Statutory text governs; existing rules and §1447(c)/Rule 11 can deter frivolous removals | The Court declined to let policy override clear statutory text and noted sanctions/legal deterrents exist |
Key Cases Cited
- Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) (appeal of an "order" permits review of the entire certified order)
- Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (federal courts must determine whether they have authority to decide a case before remanding)
- Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013) (courts must decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction)
- Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (statutory context can limit scope of review of state-court judgments)
- United States v. Keitel, 211 U.S. 370 (1908) (statutory text and context can narrowly circumscribe appellate rights)
- Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) (distinguished limits on appealability under §1447(d)'s general clause)
- Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (addressed appealability of certain remand orders under §1447(d))
- Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41 (2012) (policy arguments cannot overcome a clear statutory directive)