Boyd v. Office of Personnel Management
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4865
| Fed. Cir. | 2017Background
- Robin Boyd, a former Postal Service mail processor, applied for immediate disability retirement under FERS; OPM approved interim benefits in June 2011 but instructed her to apply for Social Security and to notify OPM of any award.
- SSA awarded Boyd disability benefits effective August 2012; she notified OPM in September 2012 but negotiated the Social Security checks instead of setting them aside.
- OPM adjusted Boyd’s FERS annuity and determined she was overpaid $3,322 for Aug–Dec 2012, proposing recovery via monthly offsets; Boyd requested a waiver and submitted a 2013 Financial Resources Questionnaire to OPM.
- OPM denied the waiver (finding she was at fault), reduced the monthly offset from $92 to $40 based on the submitted questionnaire, and Boyd appealed pro se to the MSPB but failed to respond to procedural orders (claimed e-mail notices were deleted by her fiancé).
- The administrative judge and the full Board upheld OPM’s denial, finding Boyd at fault for negotiating SSA checks contrary to OPM’s June 21 letter and finding no good cause for her procedural noncompliance.
- The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, holding the Board misapplied OPM’s own Prompt Notification Exception and remanding to decide whether Boyd knew or suspected she was overpaid and, if not, whether recovery would be against equity and good conscience.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Boyd was "without fault" under OPM rules after she notified OPM of SSA award | Boyd: she notified OPM within 60 days, so Prompt Notification Exception makes her "without fault" | OPM: she was at fault because she negotiated SSA checks despite June 21 letter instructing not to | Court: Boyd meets Prompt Notification Exception; Board erred in finding fault without deciding whether she knew or suspected overpayment |
| Whether knowledge/suspicion of overpayment requires application of the Set-Aside Rule and raises an "exceptional circumstances" requirement | Boyd: she may not have known/suspected she was overpaid and thus should be judged under equity/good conscience (financial hardship) | OPM: even if without fault, she must show "exceptional circumstances," not mere hardship | Court: Set-Aside Rule applies only if recipient knew or suspected overpayment; unknowing recipients may seek waiver based on equity/good conscience (e.g., financial hardship); remand to determine knowledge/suspicion |
| Whether the Board properly declined to consider equity/good conscience because of finding of fault | Boyd: Board should have assessed equity/good conscience if she was without fault or unknowing | OPM: no need—fault found so waiver unavailable; alternatively, Boyd did not show exceptional circumstances | Court: Board’s fault finding was legally erroneous; must determine knowledge and then consider equity/good conscience on remand |
| Whether Boyd showed good cause for failing to respond to MSPB electronic orders | Boyd: e-mail notices were deleted by fiancé, causing nonreceipt | MSPB/OPM: Boyd chose e-filing and is responsible for monitoring case activity and preventing e-mail filtering; no good cause shown | Court: affirmed MSPB’s discretion; pro se status and deleted emails do not excuse failure to meet e-filing obligations (Board’s decision on this issue upheld) |
Key Cases Cited
- Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir.) (discussing standards for reviewing administrative determinations)
- Phillips v. United States Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (good-cause standard and diligence expectations in procedural defaults)
- Rocha v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 688 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Board acted within discretion denying untimely filings where petitioner lacked due diligence)
- Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (agency interpretations of regulations not entitled to deference if plainly erroneous or inconsistent)
- Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (limits on deference to post hoc agency litigation positions)
- Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (delegation to agency officials, not appellate counsel, for regulatory interpretation)
- Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 782 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (waiver of agency deference when agency fails to press the argument)
- Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussion of deference to agency positions in briefing)