Boy Scouts of America National Foundation v. Superior Court
206 Cal. App. 4th 428
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Real parties in interest John Doe 1–3 allege Knox sexually molested them between 1977–1987, with abuse linked to Mormon Church and Boy Scouts associations.
- They sued Knox, the Mormon Church, and Boy Scouts of America entities for various torts and intentional acts.
- The Boy Scouts demurred claiming all claims were time-barred under CCP 340.1(b)(1) due to filing after the plaintiffs’ 26th birthdays.
- The trial court sustained the demurrers except for the fifth claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), which it overruled.
- Quarry v. Doe I (2012) arose during writ review; petition kept alive despite dismissal of the fifth claim, to address whether 340.1(a)(1)’s delayed discovery applies to entities.
- The court ultimately held the 340.1(a)(1) delayed discovery does not extend to entity defendants, making the IIED claim time-barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 340.1(a)(1) delayed discovery extends to entities | Doe argues 340.1(a)(1) applies to perpetrators and entities via §17. | Boy Scouts maintain (a)(1) covers only a person, not an entity; (a)(2)-(3) cover entities with different limits. | No; a(1) does not extend to entities; distinctions with (a)(2)-(3) control. |
| Whether a “person” in 340.1(a)(1) includes corporations | Doe contends §17 defines “person” to include corporations in (a)(1). | Scouts rely on statutory context showing separate “person” and “entity” terms; 26th birthday applies to entities. | No; context and history show “person” does not include an entity for (a)(1). |
| Whether IIED claim timely under 340.1(a)(1) or barred under (b)(1) | Doe maintains the delayed discovery period makes IIED timely. | IIED against an entity is governed by (b)(1) with 26th birthday bar; (a)(1) inapplicable to entities. | Time-barred under (b)(1) because filed after 26th birthday. |
| Role of legislative history in interpreting 340.1(a)(1) | Doe relies on AB1651 history to show intent to extend against entities. | History shows explicit distinction between person and entity; extend only for perpetrators under (a)(1) and entities under (a)(2)-(3). | Legislative history supports rejecting inclusion of entities in (a)(1). |
| Joseph v. Johnson applicability to entities | Doe cites Joseph as supporting timely discovery against perpetrators. | Joseph involved an individual perpetrator; does not apply to entity defendants. | Inapplicable to entities; does not aid timing for Scouts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Quarry v. Doe I, 53 Cal.4th 945 (Cal. 2012) (expanded limitations for third-party defendants; clarified entity distinction)
- Joseph v. Johnson, 178 Cal.App.4th 1404 (Cal.App.4th 2009) (held delayed discovery applicable to Penal Code 266j acts, not to entities)
- Tietge v. Western Province of the Servites, Inc., 55 Cal.App.4th 382 (Cal.App.1997) (origin of 340.1 delays for childhood abuse against nonfamily members)
- Debbie Reynolds Prof. Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.4th 222 (Cal.App.1994) (historical limits on childhood abuse statutes)
- Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.4th 531 (Cal.2007) (statutory interpretation principles for California statutes)
- Klein v. United States of America, 50 Cal.4th 68 (Cal. 2010) (avoid inserting omitted terms in statute; contextual reading)
- International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 319 (Cal. 2007) (statutory interpretation and context rules)
- Diamond View Limited v. Herz, 180 Cal.App.3d 612 (Cal.App.1986) (definition of term ‘person’ vs. entity in statutory context)
- Smith v. Selma Community Hospital, 188 Cal.App.4th 1 (Cal.App.2010) (interpretation of statutes with disjunctive ‘or’ in defining categories)