Bowman v. State
422 S.C. 19
| S.C. | 2018Background
- Marion Bowman was convicted of murdering Kandee Martin and sentenced to death; evidence included eyewitness accounts, DNA, recovery of the murder weapon, and arson of the victim’s car.
- During the penalty phase defense called James Aiken, a prison-classification expert, to testify that Bowman would adapt to prison and that life without parole would be severe punishment.
- On re-cross, the Solicitor elicited limited testimony from Aiken about general prison conditions (recreation, libraries, TV), to which defense counsel did not object (an earlier objection about escape was sustained).
- On direct appeal this Court upheld Bowman’s convictions and later in Burkhart (2007) held that general prison-conditions evidence can inject an arbitrary factor into sentencing in some circumstances.
- Bowman filed a PCR claim arguing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s re-cross about prison conditions; the PCR court denied relief and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bowman) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to prosecutor’s re-cross about general prison conditions | Counsel was deficient per state precedent because prison-conditions testimony is irrelevant and should have been excluded | Counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to call Aiken to portray LWOP as harsh; limited Solicitor response was invited and proportional | Court: Counsel not deficient — strategy was reasonable and PCR record supports that finding |
| 2. Admissibility: prison adaptability vs general prison conditions | Bowman: General prison-conditions testimony is irrelevant and prejudicial in sentencing | State: Defense opened the door by presenting adaptability evidence; limited responsive inquiry was permissible | Court: Reaffirmed state-law distinction; adaptability evidence admissible, general conditions usually not, but invited reply and narrow responses can be allowed; here scope was limited and admissible as response |
| 3. Whether Burkhart requires presumed prejudice when prison-conditions evidence admitted | Bowman: Burkhart (and concurrence) means any such statutory violation mandates reversal/no harmless-error inquiry | State: Burkhart does not abolish harmless-error review in all cases; prejudice must still be shown under Strickland in PCR | Court: Burkhart does not universally preclude harmless-error analysis; in PCR Strickland prejudice must be shown and Bowman failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result |
| 4. Whether invited-response doctrine excuses prosecutor’s questioning | Bowman: State’s questions still improper and prejudicial despite defense testimony | State: Defense opened the door; invited reply doctrine permits proportional response | Held: Invited-reply applicable; solicitors’ limited questions were appropriate and not unfairly prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bowman, 366 S.C. 485, 623 S.E.2d 378 (S.C. 2005) (direct appeal affirming convictions; noting prison-conditions evidence is generally irrelevant)
- State v. Burkhart, 371 S.C. 482, 640 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. 2007) (held general prison-life evidence may inject an arbitrary factor in some cases; concurrence argued against harmless-error review)
- McHam v. State, 404 S.C. 465, 746 S.E.2d 41 (S.C. 2013) (Strickland standard and PCR review principles)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test)
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1986) (evidence of adaptability to prison is constitutionally relevant mitigation)
- Plath v. State, 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619 (S.C. 1984) (defense opened door to prison-conditions evidence; state’s responsive testimony permissible)
- Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (U.S. 2002) (due process requires jury be informed when life means no parole)
- Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (U.S. 1976) (capital sentencing requires individualized consideration of offender and offense)
- Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (U.S. 1976) (Eighth Amendment requires consideration of character and record in capital sentencing)