Bouchard v. State Emps. Ret. Comm'n, 328 Conn. 345

Background

Plaintiffs Bouchard, Malone, and Fox are state retirees whose final, prorated longevity payments were not included in base‑salary calculations for pension benefits; their retirements were finalized in 1994, 1998, and 2001.
In Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, this court held the commission had misinterpreted the retirement statutes by excluding final prorated longevity payments from base salary calculations.
After Longley (Oct. 2, 2007), the commission resolved to apply Longley prospectively and later (April 2009) limited retroactive recalculation to retirees who retired on or after Oct. 2, 2001 or whose benefits were not finalized as of that date.
The three plaintiffs sought recalculation administratively; the commission denied relief citing a six‑year cutoff and other defenses. Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal and a class declaratory judgment action in Superior Court.
The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ administrative appeal (ordering retroactive recalculation) but denied the class claim as time‑barred. The commission cross‑appealed; the Supreme Court reviewed timeliness and tolling issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an analogous statute of limitations may be borrowed to govern administrative claims for statutory pension benefits	Plaintiffs conceded a limitations period applies but argued accrual was at Longley or tolling applies	Commission argued a limitations period is appropriate and the six‑year contract period (§ 52‑576) governs	Court: Borrowing an analogous statute for administrative proceedings is appropriate; apply six‑year contract period
When the cause of action accrued for retirees seeking recalculation under Longley	Accrual occurred when Longley was decided (2007) because plaintiffs could not have prevailed earlier	Accrual occurred when retirees’ benefits were finalized (date of audit) because all operative facts then existed	Court: Accrual occurred when the retirement awards were approved/finalized (1994, 1998, 2001 for plaintiffs)
Whether continuing violation or continuous‑course doctrines toll the statute of limitations	Plaintiffs contended ongoing underpayments and fiduciary relationship tolled accrual	Commission insisted no continuing violation; miscalculation was a one‑time wrongful act and tolling is inapplicable	Court: Neither continuing violation nor continuous course of conduct applies; tolling denied
Whether Longley must be applied retroactively to all retirees regardless of finalization date	Plaintiffs/class argued like treatment and broader retroactivity	Commission defended limited six‑year retroactivity and prospective application	Court: Because plaintiffs’ claims were time‑barred, no relief; did not adopt broad retroactivity here and remanded to render judgment for commission on administrative appeal

Key Cases Cited

Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149 (2007) (court held commission misinterpreted retirement statute by excluding final prorated longevity payment)
Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193 (2007) (when statute is silent, courts borrow most suitable limitation based on nature of right)
Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1 (1998) (judicial decisions presumptively apply retroactively to pending cases)
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) (three‑factor test for prospective vs. retroactive application of judicial decisions)
Amoco Oil Co. v. Liberty Auto & Electric Co., 262 Conn. 142 (2002) (ignorance of damage does not prevent accrual except in fraudulent concealment)
Polizos v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Conn. 601 (2001) (cause accrues when plaintiff can successfully maintain an action)
Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99 (2013) (statute of limitations begins when cause of action accrues)
State v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 211 Conn. 464 (1989) (continuing violation applied in discrimination context where each payment was a fresh violation)
Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575 (2011) (distinguishes continuing violation from continuous course of conduct tolling doctrine)