37 Cal. App. 5th 980
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Petitioner Arprubertito Bontilao (serving 15-to-life for second-degree murder) filed a habeas petition in Santa Clara County challenging a 2017 Board of Parole Hearings denial of parole.
- Pursuant to Maas, Bontilao requested and received notice of the judge assigned to decide his habeas petition; the superior court initially assigned Judge Weinstein, then on June 29, 2018 reassigned the matter to Judge Vanessa Zecher "for all purposes." The June 29 order was mailed to petitioner and received July 3.
- Bontilao submitted a peremptory disqualification motion under Code Civ. Proc. § 170.6 on July 23 (delivered to prison officials July 23, dated July 20).
- The superior court struck the § 170.6 challenge as untimely under the statute’s "all purpose assignment" timing rules; the appellate proceedings followed and the Supreme Court granted review and remanded to this Court of Appeal to decide timeliness.
- The Court of Appeal analyzed whether § 170.6’s all-purpose-assignment exception applies to habeas petitions and, if so, whether the assignment to Judge Zecher triggered the shortened filing period and whether Bontilao complied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bontilao) | Defendant's Argument (Board / Superior Ct.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 170.6 timing rules — specifically the all‑purpose‑assignment exception — apply to habeas corpus petitions | § 170.6 already covers "special proceedings" (Maas), and the all‑purpose/criminal/civil labels do not apply to habeas; apply the general rule or the 10/5 rule instead | The catch‑all in § 170.6(a)(2) brings proceedings not explicitly listed (like habeas) within the all‑purpose framework | The court held the all‑purpose assignment rule may apply to habeas petitions via the statute’s catch‑all provision |
| Whether the June 29 assignment to Judge Zecher constituted an "all purpose" assignment under Lavi | Assignment was temporary/reassignments occur; petitioner argued it did not create an expectation that one judge would process the matter | Court’s labeling and lack of contrary evidence presume an all‑purpose assignment; Lavi’s standards met here | The court held the June 29 order constituted an all‑purpose assignment |
| Whether the civil (15‑day) or criminal (10‑day) all‑purpose deadline governs a habeas petition challenging a parole denial | Petitioner urged use of civil timing or the general rule (and suggested computing deadlines by Rules of Court deadlines) | Board argued criminal analogy fits habeas review of parole denials; use catch‑all to pick closest analogy | The court analogized habeas challenging a parole denial to criminal matters and applied the 10‑day criminal all‑purpose rule (with 5 mail days under §1013) |
| Whether petitioner’s late filing should be excused on due process/access‑to‑courts grounds | Claimed limited English proficiency, restricted law library access, and reliance on another inmate delayed filing; asked court to deem filing timely | Board disputed language barrier and diligence; trial court did not have to excuse untimeliness absent record showing | The court rejected the due process excuse (issue forfeited in superior court and statutory timing cannot be rewritten by court); challenge was untimely and properly struck |
Key Cases Cited
- Maas v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 962 (2016) (habeas corpus is a "special proceeding" under §170.6 and petitioner is entitled to notice of the assigned judge and may bring a §170.6 challenge)
- People v. Superior Court (Lavi), 4 Cal.4th 1164 (1993) (explains the all‑purpose assignment test and the sequencing of timing exceptions for §170.6)
- Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.4th 106 (2009) (describes the prison‑delivery rule for filing dates)
- People v. Romero, 8 Cal.4th 728 (1994) (courts may summarily deny habeas petitions without an evidentiary hearing)
- Pappa v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 54 Cal.2d 350 (1960) (section 170.6 procedural limits and one‑motion safeguard rationale)
- Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.3d 182 (1977) (§170.6 is a peremptory, automatic disqualification right; timing rules limit abuse)