826 F.3d 1054
8th Cir.2016Background
- Bonnie Dick, employed as a DSU custodian from 2004, experienced seizures in 2006 she attributed in part to floor-stripping/waxing products (iShine and LOE Stripper).
- After the seizures, DSU reassigned her from floor-stripping/waxing duties, provided transfers (library, May Hall) to areas with less vinyl flooring, and furnished a respirator which Dick refused to wear; DSU also sought to avoid exposing her to those products.
- Dick reported intermittent residual smell exposures over several years and in 2012 had an eye-burning reaction to a fungicide; she requested an accommodation to avoid neurotoxin-containing products in 2012.
- Dick filed internal grievances and an EEOC charge; state DOL and EEOC found DSU did not deny a reasonable accommodation. She later took extended medical leave and was terminated in 2014 when unable to return to work.
- She sued under the Rehabilitation Act (§ 504) alleging failure to reasonably accommodate; the district court granted summary judgment for DSU, holding (among other points) that Dick suffered no adverse employment action and many claims were time-barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statute of limitations | Dick argued the court misapplied limitations and should consider later exposures | DSU argued a six-year North Dakota personal-injury limitations period applies; many claims are time-barred | Court applied six-year period and held many claims (including 2006 requests) were time-barred |
| Adverse employment action (element of § 504 claim) | Dick claimed continued exposures, denied transfers/leave, lower pay, threats, and other harms constituted adverse actions | DSU argued it relieved her of stripping duties, transferred her, provided respirator and leave; residual/accidental exposures and denied preferred accommodations are not adverse actions | |
| Reasonableness of accommodation | Dick contended DSU failed to reasonably accommodate by not providing alternative protections/transfers or limiting exposures fully | DSU maintained its accommodations (duty modifications, transfers, respirator, leave) were reasonable and enabled essential job functions | Court held accommodations were reasonable; no tangible adverse employment action shown |
| Summary judgment appropriateness | Dick argued disputed facts require trial | DSU argued record lacks material disputes on elements of Rehabilitation Act claim | Court affirmed summary judgment for DSU — no genuine dispute of material fact preventing judgment as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2002) (Rehabilitation Act borrowing state limitations; treated like personal-injury claim)
- Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2003) (borrowing state statute of limitations when federal law has none)
- Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (limitations borrowing principle)
- Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete acts vs. hostile work environment; limitations analysis)
- Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., 523 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (prima facie elements for disability discrimination under Rehabilitation Act)
- Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2003) (modified burden-shifting in failure-to-accommodate claims)
- Hatchett v. Philander Smith College, 251 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 2001) (employer liable if it actually denied requested reasonable accommodation)
- EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001) (employer need only provide some reasonable accommodation, not employee's preferred one)
- Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995) (employer not required to provide indefinite leave as reasonable accommodation)
- Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510 (8th Cir. 2003) (transfer to other positions reasonable only in extreme cases)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; genuine dispute definition)
- Westchem Agric. Chems., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 990 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993) (reasonable-jury standard for genuine dispute)
- Vacca v. Viacom Broad. of Mo., Inc., 875 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1989) (mere factual dispute insufficient to overcome summary judgment)