Bonilla, Ronald Antonio
2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1880
Tex. Crim. App.2014Background
- Appellant Bonilla was convicted of four counts of indecency with a child (two counts as to D.B. with an indictment date listed as “on or about” Jan. 1, 1995; two counts as to M.B. with dates in 2002). Jury convicted on all counts and assessed 14 years each.
- After punishment, the State asked the trial court to run the D.B. sentences consecutively (stack) on top of the M.B. sentences; the court ordered cumulation over a general defense objection.
- The statutory issue: a 1997 amendment to Tex. Penal Code § 3.03 permits cumulation of sentences for child-sexual-offense convictions only for offenses committed on or after Sept. 1, 1997.
- The record contained extensive testimony that Bonilla abused D.B. repeatedly from the mid-1990s through at least 2002; the indictment used “on or about” language and the jury returned general verdicts without forcing the State to elect a specific incident.
- On appeal Bonilla argued the D.B. counts (alleged with a 1995 date) could not be stacked because they preceded the 1997 effective date; the court of appeals affirmed, applying a “some evidence” test that post-1997 acts occurred.
- This Court granted review and affirmed: where evidence shows some acts occurred after Sept. 1, 1997, the trial judge has discretion to cumulate; the appellant also forfeited a specific objection at trial by failing to preserve the precise complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court could stack D.B. sentences when indictment/judgment list a pre-1997 date | Bonilla: listed 1995 date controls; pre-1997 offenses cannot be stacked | State: “on or about” pleading permits proving any date within limitations; evidence showed abuse continued after 1997 | Held: The indictment/judgment date is not dispositive; if there is some evidence offenses occurred after Sept. 1, 1997, judge may cumulate under §3.03(b)(2)(A). |
| Standard to trigger judicial discretion to cumulate where incidents span pre/post amendment | Bonilla: stacking unauthorized because charged dates predate amendment | State: trial court needs only “some evidence” that offenses continued post-1997 | Held: Adopted the “some evidence” standard (consistent with Miller/Owens/etc.); record here amply showed post-1997 abuse. |
| Preservation/burden on appeal — who must show judge erred | Bonilla: cumulation order unauthorized and may be raised on appeal as illegal sentence | State: appellant failed to make specific trial objection; forfeiture applies | Held: Appellant bore burden to preserve a precise objection at trial; failing that, appellate review requires record showing jury could not have found post-1997 acts. Court found appellant did not meet that burden. |
| Effect of State’s failure to elect a specific incident when proof covers multiple dates | Bonilla: State should bear consequences; pre-amendment dates alleged in indictment create entitlement to concurrent sentences | State: no election required absent defendant’s request; general verdicts may cover multiple incidents | Held: A defendant may request election; failure to request one forfeits that procedural protection; but if there is no evidence post-1997, stacking is unauthorized and results in an illegal sentence (not forfeitable). Here, evidence supported post-1997 acts so stacking stood. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Bahena, 195 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (evidence of molestation spanning pre- and post-Sept. 1, 1997 supports cumulation discretion)
- Miller v. State, 33 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ("some evidence" test to trigger judge’s discretion to relate/stack prior convictions)
- Owens v. State, 96 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003) (trial court may cumulate if there is some evidence offenses occurred after Sept. 1, 1997)
- LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (unauthorized cumulation yields an illegal/void sentence and may be raised for the first time on appeal)
- Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ("on or about" language permits proof of dates other than those alleged so long as within limitations)