535 F.Supp.3d 709
M.D. Tenn.2021Background
- Plaintiff Debbie Ann Bolton sued Gallatin Center for Rehabilitation & Healing, LLC in Tennessee state court after her mother, Ruth Summers, contracted COVID-19 at Gallatin’s nursing home and died on March 29, 2020; claims: gross negligence and recklessness.
- Gallatin removed to federal court asserting federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arguing the PREP Act either (a) necessarily raises a federal issue, (b) completely preempts state-law claims, or (c) is implicated by artful pleading; Gallatin also relied on HHS materials and an HHS Advisory Opinion.
- The PREP Act (declared for COVID-19) provides broad immunity to “covered persons” for claims arising from covered countermeasures, channels most remedies to an HHS-administered Process Fund, and permits a narrow judicial remedy for willful misconduct (with special D.C. venue and exhaustion rules).
- The United States submitted a Statement of Interest and the court considered HHS’s Fourth Amended Declaration and Advisory Opinion; Bolton challenged removal and sought remand (later withdrawing a request for fees).
- The district court rejected Gallatin’s federal-jurisdiction theories and remanded the case to state court, declining to rule on whether PREP Act ordinary preemption applies to the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Bolton's Argument | Gallatin's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bolton’s state-law claims “necessarily” raise a substantial federal question under Grable/Gunn because PREP Act immunity is implicated | Complaint asserts only state-law negligence/recklessness and does not raise PREP Act issues | PREP Act immunity is a substantial, disputed federal issue that must be resolved in federal court | No — claims do not necessarily raise a federal issue; PREP Act would be an affirmative defense, not a required element |
| Whether the PREP Act completely preempts state-law claims, creating federal jurisdiction | PREP Act is an immunity statute and does not create exclusive federal causes of action for non-willful-misconduct claims | PREP Act creates an exclusive federal remedy and thus completely preempts state law | No — PREP Act is not a complete-preemption statute for these claims; it generally provides immunity and administrative remedies, not an exclusive federal cause of action |
| Whether the artful-pleading doctrine permits removal because the claims actually depend on federal law | Complaint legitimately pleads state-law claims and Bolton is the master of the complaint | Bolton disguised a federal PREP Act case as state-law claims | No — artful-pleading does not apply absent complete preemption or necessity of resolving federal issues, neither of which exists here |
| Whether the court may retain jurisdiction under § 1367 after removal | Remand is proper; supplemental jurisdiction cannot create original jurisdiction | Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the case is in federal court | No — supplemental-jurisdiction statute cannot be a source of original jurisdiction for removal; removal must be proper initially |
Key Cases Cited
- Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 2007) (removal standards and burden on removing defendant; plaintiff is master of the complaint)
- Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2005) (complete-preemption doctrine is a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule)
- Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (artful-pleading doctrine limits plaintiffs from disguising federal claims as state claims)
- Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (embedded federal-question doctrine elements)
- Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (four-part test for substantial, disputed federal issue jurisdiction)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (federal defenses do not provide basis for removal)
- Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (paradigm of federal issue embedded in state claim: negligence per se based on federal duty)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (complete preemption converts state-law claims into federal claims)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (clarifies limits of well-pleaded complaint rule and preemption defenses)
- Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2003) (complete preemption standards in Sixth Circuit)
- Roddy v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Inc., 395 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing ordinary preemption from complete preemption)
- Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005) (standard for awarding attorney’s fees on remand)
- Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 1996) (supplemental-jurisdiction statute cannot supply original jurisdiction for removal)