485 F.Supp.3d 588
E.D. Pa.2020Background
- Apr. 16, 2018: Bolger was rear-ended by Mary Utermohlen; Bolger sued the Utermohlens (negligence) and State Farm (underinsured motorist claim) in Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (filed Feb. 27, 2020).
- May 28, 2020: The Common Pleas Court sustained preliminary objections in part, severed Bolger’s UIM claim against State Farm, and transferred the remaining claims against the Utermohlens to Bucks County; the UIM claim stayed in Philadelphia.
- June 25, 2020: State Farm filed a Notice of Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) after receiving the state-court order severing the non-diverse party.
- The district court issued an Order to Show Cause questioning removal based on the long-standing voluntary-involuntary rule (which bars removal when a state court involuntarily eliminates a non-diverse defendant).
- Central legal dispute: whether the plain text of § 1446(b)(3) (which authorizes removal within 30 days of receipt of an “order or other paper” showing removability) permits removal when a state-court order—not the plaintiff’s voluntary act—creates diversity.
- Holding: The court concluded § 1446(b)(3) is unambiguous; an authoritative state-court “order” can trigger the 30-day removal period, displacing the judge-made voluntary-involuntary rule, and therefore federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state-court order that eliminates a non-diverse defendant (an involuntary act) can trigger the 30-day removal window under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), or whether the voluntary-involuntary rule bars removal | Bolger: the voluntary-involuntary rule prevents removal when the state court involuntarily dismisses/severs a non-diverse defendant | State Farm: § 1446(b)(3) expressly authorizes removal within 30 days of receipt of an “order” showing removability; “order” plainly includes a court’s severance order | The court held § 1446(b)(3) is unambiguous; an authoritative state-court order can trigger removal; the voluntary-involuntary rule does not override the statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (reiterating that courts must follow statutory text and not rely on extratextual considerations)
- McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (textualist instruction to ascertain original meaning of statutory terms)
- Powers v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92 (1898) (origin of the voluntary-involuntary rule)
- Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635 (1900) (distinguishing Powers where dismissal was involuntary and therefore not removable)
- In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010) (canon: begin and end with statutory language when unambiguous)
- Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (statutory text controls interpretation)
- Nuveen Mun. Tr. ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2012) (defendant bears burden to prove federal jurisdiction)
- Guerra v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 936 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2019) (federal courts have independent obligation to determine subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) (legislative history only used to resolve genuine ambiguity)