Bogar v. Baker
2017 Ohio 7766
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Decedent Thomas E. Bogar died testate owning 31-acre real property at 13300 Diagonal Rd., Salem, Ohio, with an inventory showing $99,705 in tangible personal property on the premises.
- Will made a single specific bequest: the real estate at that address “together with all contents of said real estate” to his brother Charles A. Bogar; the residuary estate was given to several named residual beneficiaries (including executor Mark Baker).
- A dispute arose over whether “all contents of said real estate” included trucks, automobiles, farm equipment, and other titled machinery found on the property.
- The probate court (on briefs and stipulated facts; parties waived evidentiary hearing) held that vehicles and farm equipment were not part of the specific bequest and passed via the residuary clause, reasoning they were higher-value, titled items not typically “contents” of a home.
- The appellate court found a latent ambiguity in the phrase “contents of said real estate,” rejected the probate court’s reliance on cases about intangible financial instruments, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to receive extrinsic evidence about the practical use of the disputed items and the testator’s intent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the specific bequest of the real estate “together with all contents of said real estate” includes vehicles, trucks, and farm equipment located on the property at death | Bogar: “contents” should be read geographically and include all tangible items physically on the property (including farm equipment and vehicles) | Baker/residuary beneficiaries: “contents” limited to household-type personalty; titled/high-value items (vehicles, specialized farm equipment) belong to residuary beneficiaries | The phrase presents a latent ambiguity; remand for extrinsic evidence to determine testator’s intent regarding automobiles, trucks, and farm equipment |
Key Cases Cited
- Polen v. Baker, 92 Ohio St.3d 563 (2001) (primary rule: court’s sole purpose in will construction is to ascertain testator’s intent from will language)
- Oliver v. Bank One, Dayton, N.A., 60 Ohio St.3d 32 (1991) (will language governs; ordinary or technical meaning applies unless context dictates otherwise)
- Boulger v. Evans, 54 Ohio St.2d 371 (1978) (extrinsic evidence admissible only when will language is ambiguous)
- Sandy v. Mouhot, 1 Ohio St.3d 143 (1982) (where terms are susceptible to various meanings, court may consider surrounding circumstances to determine intent)
- Holmes v. Hrobon, 158 Ohio St. 508 (1956) (list of extrinsic evidence types appropriate to reveal testator’s intent when uncertainty exists)