175 So. 3d 891
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Riordan Boblitt convicted of lewd or lascivious battery on a child (aged >12 and <16) and attempted sexual battery; appealed convictions and sentences.
- After closing, the court accidentally identified Juror Watson as the alternate and seated Mr. Arriaga as a principal juror; jurors were sent to deliberate.
- Defense counsel alerted the court that Arriaga was actually the alternate; court brought Arriaga back and questioned him.
- Arriaga admitted he had been in the jury room and had “started talking about the case” for a few minutes but claimed he only listened and did not participate.
- Trial court denied defendant’s motion for mistrial, reinstated Juror Watson to the panel, and attempted to "bring her up to speed." The court concluded Arriaga did not participate in deliberations.
- The appellate court found the alternate’s presence during substantive deliberations compromised jury secrecy and warranted reversal and a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Boblitt's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether presence of an alternate juror in deliberations requires mistrial | Presence of alternate during deliberations is per se reversible error; mistrial required | Error was harmless because deliberations had barely begun and Arriaga did not participate | Reversed: alternate’s presence during substantive deliberations mandates reversal and new trial |
| Whether harmless-error doctrine saves verdict when alternate merely listened | Even listening by alternate taints deliberations and is not harmless | Brief, limited presence and no participation makes error harmless | Court rejected harmlessness; even a few minutes of discussion with alternate present is reversible error |
| Whether substituting the originally dismissed juror cured the error | Substitution after the fact cannot cure compromised secrecy | Court’s corrective steps rendered the error harmless | Court held substitution did not cure breach of sanctity/secrecy of jury room |
| Whether pre-deliberation organizational activity exception applies | Not applicable because substantive discussion began | Discussion was minimal and organizational | Exception inapplicable; substantive discussion occurred and error not harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- Ludaway v. State, 632 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (presence of alternate during deliberations is reversible error)
- Tello-Lugo v. State, 47 So.3d 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (alternate’s presence after deliberations began required mistrial)
- Bouey v. State, 762 So.2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (alternate present in jury room during deliberations is reversible error; limited exceptions)
- Jacksonville Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Harrison, 530 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (pre-deliberation organizational activity may be harmless)
- Lamadrid v. State, 437 So.2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (alternate’s presence in deliberations is reversible error)
- Berry v. State, 298 So.2d 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (alternate juror participating in deliberations requires reversal)
- Eickmeyer v. Dunkin Donuts of Am., Inc., 507 So.2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (protecting sanctity and secrecy of jury room is paramount)