Boaz v. FedEx Customer Information Services, Inc.
725 F.3d 603
6th Cir.2013Background
- Boaz worked for FedEx from 1997; her employment agreement required any suit to be filed within the time prescribed by law or six months from the event, whichever expired first.
- From Jan 2004–June 2008 Boaz performed duties formerly done by a higher‑paid male employee (Terrell) but was paid at lower grade rates; her last allegedly unlawful paycheck was June 30, 2008.
- Boaz sued in April 2009 under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Equal Pay Act (EPA), alleging unpaid overtime and sex‑based pay discrimination.
- FedEx moved for summary judgment, arguing Boaz’s claims were time‑barred by the six‑month contractual limitations period; the district court granted summary judgment for FedEx.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo and considered whether the contractual six‑month limitation operated as an impermissible waiver of statutory rights under the FLSA and EPA, and whether alternative grounds (exemption, lack of proof, EPA affirmative defense) supported affirmance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a six‑month contractual limitations period waives FLSA claims | Boaz: contractual limit cannot shorten statutory FLSA limitations or waive FLSA rights | FedEx: employees may shorten limitation periods for statutory claims (cites other statutes); contractual term controls | The contractual six‑month limit operates as an unlawful waiver as applied to Boaz’s FLSA claim and is invalid |
| Whether the six‑month limit waives Equal Pay Act claims | Boaz: EPA claims, like FLSA claims, cannot be waived by contract | FedEx: contractual limit should apply to EPA claims as well | EPA claims are likewise unwaivable; the provision is invalid as applied to Boaz’s EPA claim |
| Whether Boaz was exempt from FLSA (affirmative defense) | Boaz: her subjective belief or employer label is not dispositive; factual disputes remain | FedEx: Boaz testified her grade‑23 job was exempt | Court: subjective testimony insufficient; factual disputes prevent summary judgment for FedEx |
| Whether EPA liability fails for lack of comparator or because of employer’s non‑sex factor defense | Boaz: she and Terrell performed substantially similar work and FedEx paid Terrell more | FedEx: paid Terrell more due to legitimate reclassification/review (factor other than sex) | Court: material factual disputes exist about job duties and the asserted reclassification; summary judgment inappropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (employees cannot prospectively or retroactively waive FLSA rights)
- D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946) (waiver of FLSA rights is invalid)
- Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945) (contracts cannot deprive employees of statutory FLSA rights)
- Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (FLSA claims may be arbitral if alternative forum permits effective vindication)
- Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (purpose of EPA to eliminate depressed wages of women)
- Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27 (1987) (employer paying less than minimum wage may gain competitive advantage)