Blood v. Bledsoe
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14411
| 3rd Cir. | 2011Background
- Blood, a prisoner at FPC Lewisburg, began a 60‑month Tennessee sentence on February 9, 2004 for forged securities.
- During that term he was sentenced in Delaware (March 13, 2006) to 78 months for related offenses; Tennessee later remanded and resentenced.
- Tennessee was resentenced on August 14, 2006 to 51 months, to be served concurrently with Delaware.
- BOP aggregated the sentences, treating Tennessee as commencing February 9, 2004 and Delaware as commencing March 13, 2006, resulting in a 103‑month‑plus term with a July 29, 2011 projected release date after good time.
- Blood challenged the computation under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), arguing disputed time should count toward Delaware; district court denied, and Blood appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BOP properly credits disputed time under § 3585(b). | Blood contends the disputed time should be credited to Delaware. | BOP treated the Tennessee sentence as commencing on its original date, avoiding double credit under § 3585(b). | BOP correctly credits disputed time to Tennessee; no double credit to Delaware. |
| Whether the Delaware court's statement created a credit implication for the disputed time. | Delaware intended to credit the time toward Delaware. | Statement reflected expectation of BOP credit, not a court‑imposed credit; no control over § 3585(b). | Delaware's statement did not create a credit toward Delaware; BOP framework controls. |
| Whether the district court erred in denying Blood's § 2241 petition. | Disputed time should reduce his Delaware sentence and shorten release. | Program Statement 5880.28 is a permissible interpretation aligning with § 3585 and does not permit Blood’s proposed credit. | No error; district court's denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002) (context matters in interpreting sentencing statements and credit)
- United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (Supreme Court 1992) (exclusive authority of BOP to grant credits under § 3585(b))
- Allen v. Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1998) (deference to BOP policy statements interpreting § 3585(b))
- Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (Supreme Court 1995) (Chevron‑like deference to agency interpretations permissible as long as reasonable)
- United States v. Blood, 259 Fed. Appx. 712 (6th Cir. 2007) ( Sixth Circuit treatment of aggregate sentencing in analogous context)