2018 IL App (2d) 170340
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- In August 2012 the Blevins purchased a Glen Ellyn house from the Marcheschis; the sales contract referenced the statutorily required Residential Real Property Disclosure Report.
- In the Disclosure Report the sellers represented they were not aware of material defects in walls or floors.
- Beginning in late 2012 plaintiffs discovered significant water damage and fungal contamination behind a kitchen wall; remediation and inspection (GZA) revealed the damage predated closing and opined sellers likely knew of it.
- Plaintiffs sued (Feb. 2015) for breach of contract, consumer fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation; defendants moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (statute of limitations/affirmative matter) and 2-615 (failure to state a claim).
- The trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice (struck references to the Disclosure Report and applied the Disclosure Act’s one-year limitations period), later dismissed amended complaints, and the plaintiffs appealed.
- The appellate court reversed, holding the Disclosure Act’s one-year limitation does not bar common-law claims based on Disclosure Report statements and that plaintiffs’ original complaint adequately pleaded ultimate facts of defendants’ knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Disclosure Act’s one-year limitations period (765 ILCS 77/60) bars plaintiffs’ common-law claims based on statements in the Disclosure Report | Blevins: The one-year Disclosure Act limit does not apply to common-law claims (fraud, breach, negligent misrep.) even if they rely on a Disclosure Report | Marcheschi: Claims arise from the Disclosure Report and therefore are time-barred under the Act’s one-year limitations period | Reversed trial court: Section 45 of the Disclosure Act preserves common-law and statutory remedies; the one-year limit in section 60 does not extinguish common-law claims based on Disclosure Report statements. |
| Whether the complaint pleaded sufficient ultimate facts to survive a 2-615 motion (failure to state a claim) | Blevins: Complaint alleged ultimate facts (defendants knew of water infiltration/damage) supported by GZA’s opinion; plaintiffs need not plead evidentiary detail | Marcheschi: Pleadings contained only conclusions and opinions, lacking factual allegations showing knowledge | Reversed trial court: Under Illinois fact-pleading rules a plaintiff may allege a defendant’s knowledge as an ultimate fact; the complaint sufficiently pleaded ultimate facts to state causes of action. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rolando v. Pence, 331 Ill. App. 3d 40 (2002) (Disclosure Act does not limit common-law fraud claims based on statements in a Disclosure Report)
- King v. Ashbrook, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1040 (2000) (Disclosure Report incorporated into contract does not change available common-law remedies or governing statute of limitations for those remedies)
- Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479 (2012) (standard for 2-615 dismissal: pleadings construed in plaintiff’s favor; review de novo)
- Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148 (2012) (principles governing 2-619 motions and that conclusions unsupported by facts are not accepted)