196 Cal. App. 4th 1533
Cal. Ct. App.2011Background
- Bleavins sued the Dannenbaums’ attorneys in a prior case alleging seven theories, including misrepresentations and frivolous litigation tactics.
- Allstate Defense, under a reservation of rights, was provided to the Dannenbaums in Bleavins I, represented by the firm.
- Bleavins I was later dismissed; Bleavins then filed this action against the defense attorneys.
- The firm moved to strike under anti-SLAPP, seeking dismissal of all but the fraud claim; the trial court granted as to fraud only.
- The appellate court held all Bleavins’s claims arise from statements or conduct in connection with litigation and thus fall under § 425.16.
- Remand was required for the trial court to award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing anti-SLAPP defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do all Bleavins claims arise from protected activity? | Bleavins argues claims are not tied to petitioning rights. | Firm contends all claims arise from protected litigation-related acts. | Yes; all claims arise from protected speech/petition activity. |
| Standing to challenge insurance defense | Bleavins claims injuries from defense arrangement in Bleavins I. | Bleavins lacks standing to challenge Allstate’s payments or defense decisions. | Bleavins has no standing to challenge the insurance contract relationship. |
| Likelihood of prevailing on the claims | Bleavins asserts misrepresentations and abuse of process by defense counsel. | No authority supports a duty of care from defense counsel to a third party. | Bleavins cannot show a reasonable probability of prevailing on any claim. |
| Remand for attorney fees | N/A | Prevailing party should recover fees under § 425.16(c)(1). | Remand to award attorney fees and costs to prevailing party. |
| Whether fraud claim falls within anti-SLAPP | Fraud claim relates to promises in Bleavins I. | Fraud claim fits within protected activity as related to litigation. | Fraud claim falls within anti-SLAPP scope; other claims do as well. |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69 (Cal. 2002) (defines 'arising from' to include acts based on speech or petitioning)
- Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (Cal. 1999) (explains public interest limitation for non-official proceedings)
- Dowling v. Zimmerman, 85 Cal.App.4th 1400 (Cal. App. 2000) (anti-SLAPP analysis framework and pleadings/scenario)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (Cal. 2002) (two-step anti-SLAPP process; burden shifting)
- Seltzer v. Barnes, 182 Cal.App.4th 953 (Cal. App. 2010) (protective scope of anti-SLAPP; evidentiary standard)
- Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 733 (Cal. 2003) (expanded discussion on anti-SLAPP applicability)
- Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53 (Cal. 2002) (defines 'probability of prevailing' standard)
- City of Santa Monica v. Stewart, 126 Cal.App.4th 43 (Cal. App. 2005) (public interest and anti-SLAPP considerations)
- Moore v. Shaw, 116 Cal.App.4th 182 (Cal. App. 2004) (official proceedings scope without public-interest limitation)