Blanton v. Torrey Pines Property Management, Inc., 3:15-cv-00892

Plaintiffs Monya Blanton and Diane Joa rented units at a complex managed by Torrey Pines Property Management (TPPM); both allege TPPM enforces an occupancy policy limiting persons per bedroom.
Blanton alleges she was steered away from a two-bedroom and forced to rent a larger, more expensive unit because of familial status; after giving birth to a fourth child, TPPM allegedly evicted her for violating occupancy limits.
Joa rented a three-bedroom unit with five children beginning in 2009; TPPM initially allowed occupancy despite two minors, but new 2013 lease listed only three occupants (all adults by then).
TPPM later served Joa a three-day notice in 2014 and subsequent notices in 2015 regarding excess occupants; Joa added an adult son to the lease after one notice.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserts seven causes of action including FHA and FEHA familial-status discrimination; defendants moved to dismiss only the first two causes of action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (standing).
The court treated defendants’ motion as a factual attack on standing and considered evidence outside the complaint for Joa; for Blanton the court found the SAC allegations sufficient to proceed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Joa has Article III standing to pursue FHA and FEHA familial-status claims	Joa contends discrimination occurred from initial tenancy when minors lived with her and she was prevented from listing all children on the lease	Defendants present evidence that when TPPM enforced the occupancy policy (2014–2015), all of Joa’s children were adults, so no one met the statutes’ "under 18" familial-status definition	Dismissed: Joa lacks standing because enforcement occurred only after children were adults; any earlier deprivation was not enforced and is a counterfactual injury
Whether Blanton has Article III standing to pursue FHA and FEHA familial-status claims	Blanton alleges she was denied access to a two-bedroom due to familial status and later evicted for occupancy reasons, causing concrete harm (higher rent, eviction)	Defendants argue TPPM initially allowed Blanton to occupy a three-bedroom while pregnant and waited long to evict, implying no cognizable injury	Denied: Court found Blanton adequately alleged injury, causation, and redressability in the SAC; defendants did not rebut these allegations with evidence sufficient to defeat standing

Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court) (Article III standing standard)
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (Supreme Court) (standing limits courts to justiciable controversies)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court) (party asserting federal jurisdiction bears burden)
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.) (facial attack standard on 12(b)(1))
Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358 (9th Cir.) (factual attack standard on 12(b)(1))
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.) (distinguishing facial and factual jurisdictional attacks)