Bland v. United States
153 A.3d 78
D.C.2016Background
- Defendant Charles Bland was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF) and the trial judge imposed an enhanced mandatory minimum (3 years) under D.C. Code § 22‑4503(b)(1) because Bland had prior convictions for armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW).
- At trial Bland stipulated only that he had a prior felony conviction punishable by more than one year; he and defense counsel expressly agreed the jury need not know the nature of the priors and did not contest the prosecutor’s representations about their substance.
- Bland appealed, arguing Fifth and Sixth Amendment error because a judge — not a jury — found that his priors were "crimes of violence other than conspiracy," and he also contended the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support that predicate finding.
- The government had filed an information and provided a certified judgment of conviction to Bland’s counsel before trial; the record contains prosecutor statements and defense counsel acknowledgments identifying the prior offenses as armed robbery and ADW.
- The trial judge did not obtain Bland’s personal on-the-record affirmation/denial of the priors as required by D.C. Code § 23‑111(b), but Bland never identified this omission as a basis for relief and did not dispute the substance of the priors.
Issues
| Issue | Bland's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bland waived his Apprendi claim | Bland now argues constitutional error because judge, not jury, found violent priors | Bland expressly stipulated to keep priors from jury; counsel agreed jury need not know priors and would not contest enhancement | Waived — invited-error/stipulation prevents taking opposite position on appeal |
| Whether Apprendi requires jury to find priors were "crimes of violence" | Jury must find any fact increasing mandatory minimum | Apprendi excepts the fact of a prior conviction; court may resolve legal characterization of priors | Rejected Bland: prior-conviction exception controls; judge may decide whether priors qualify |
| Sufficiency of evidence that priors were armed robbery and ADW | Government did not produce certified judgments to court at sentencing; insufficient proof | Government filed information, provided certified judgments to defense, and record contains admissions and counsel acknowledgments | Held sufficient on the totality of the record; no genuine dispute about the priors |
| Whether conspiracy-based liability would bar enhancement | If prior convictions were based on conspiracy theory, they might be excluded | UPF enhancement excludes conspiracy convictions, but statutory scheme treats substantive convictions as crimes of violence regardless of liability theory for purposes of enhancement | Rejected Bland: record does not show priors were only conspiracy convictions; enhancement proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Preacher v. United States, 934 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2007) (invited-error/doctrine bars asserting on appeal a position taken to obtain a trial benefit)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing statutory maximum must be found by a jury, except the fact of a prior conviction)
- Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (recognizes exception for prior convictions as judge-found facts)
- Eady v. United States, 44 A.3d 257 (D.C. 2012) (confirms prior-conviction exception post-Apprendi in D.C. courts)
- Towles v. United States, 115 A.3d 1222 (D.C. 2015) (determination that a prior conviction is a "crime of violence" is a legal question for the court)
- Brocksmith v. United States, 99 A.3d 690 (D.C. 2014) (plain-error standard and harmlessness where defendant raises no factual dispute about priors)
- Tann v. United States, 127 A.3d 400 (D.C. 2015) (party may adopt or acquiesce in another’s statement as an admission)
