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Michael D. Tann v. United States
127 A.3d 400
D.C.
2015
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*1 TANN, Cooper, An D. Lannell Michael Rushing, Arnette, Sa James

tonio Beaver, Harris, Dajuan D.

quawn

Appellants, STATES, Appellee.

UNITED 10-CF-54, 09-CF-1438, 09-CF-

Nos. 09-CF-1450, 10-CF-55, 09-CF- 09-CF-1482, 09-CF-1483, 10-CF- Appeals.

District of Columbia Court 25, 2014.

Argued March 19, 2015. Nov.

Decided *15 Lovelace, appellant Tann. A.

Judith DC, Heslep, Washington, Thomas T. appellant Cooper. *16 Pérsico, Ar- appellant for

Deborah A. nette. DC, Kiersh, for Washington, R.

Steven appellant Rushing. Kemmitt,

Christopher Public Defender Klein, Service, Public with whom James brief, Service, on the for Defender appellant Harris. Riddell, Bea- appellant

Stephen W. ver. Gabriel, Assistant United

Elizabeth C. Attorney, with whom Ronald States Jr., Attorney conspiracy string crimes, at the and a Machen States violent filed, homicides, and Elizabeth including time the brief was that were committed Trosman, Mannarino, Bach, membership P. Laura their John connection with Giovanelli, gang Assistant United and John known the 22nd Street Crew. brief, Attorneys, They raise challenges States were numerous to their convictions in appellee. appeals. consolidated these however, exceptions, few With we affirm GLICKMAN, BLACKBURNE- Before judgments Superior of the Court. RIGSBY, THOMPSON, Associate In view of length opinion, Judges. commencing before our discussion PER CURIAM: claims, proceedings appellants’ below and trial, After a nine-month the six we set forth following table contents in this as an appellants case convicted aid the reader.

IIS that sat between Southern Avenue government presented

The evidence at Street Street, influencing ar- showing appellants’ trial there was Savannah gang’s operations. in the area around the base gang operating criminal street eas Southeast, cen- Street, goals organization Washington, of 22nd storage, packaging, purchase, on the investigation gang D.C. The of this re- tered illegal drugs within violent, organiza- profit, drug-trafficking vealed a and resale community. functioning tion the blocks of 22nd *18 gang committing of committed numer- serious acts of part Members as violence protect criminal in an participation ous acts of their in effort 22nd Street gang integrity of of territory its Specifically, and Crew. indictment articu- .the This took the form operations. misconduct appellant lated each into entered a designed safeguard of of acts violence conspiracy to “knowingly willfully and .... Often, organization. the violence was agree together justice to obstruct and perceived might directed at rivals who anyone assault kill whose interests gang’s territory drug threaten the contrary [appellants] to those of or might trade witnesses who undermine joint their associates.” In a nine-month operations through cooperation its appellants trial of from November law enforcement. July also endeavored to show that four commit- murders were names, gang

The in- was called various ted, part charged conspiracy, at Crew,” cluding the “22nd Street “The or near 22nd Street between 2003 and Deuce,” “Deuce-Deuce,” “Shipley Mar- 2006. The government contended ket,” Gunz,” “Young Squad and “Deuce these murders main- were directed toward Mafia.” For simplicity, it will be referred authority turf taining the the 22nd opinion to in this as the “22nd Street either, Crew, eliminating per- Street Crew.” The 22nd had a loose Street Crew ceived rivals or killing government wit- rank structure wherein would members Each in appellant nesses. involved was according to play different roles the level murders; appellant least one these authority respect they gained had Tann alleged played to have role in loyal- over through time demonstrations three four. The essential facts ty gang. to the Members that had major briefly each incident are recited respect achieved sufficient level of would here. “original gang- be referred to or as “OGs” junior

sters.” More members were la- I. The Leslie Jones Murder “baby gangsters” beled Iocs.” “little .drug Leslie Jones was dealer who sold government’s tended to Street, product near specifically 22nd ap- demonstrate the of all six involvement Shipley Market area. He had pellants the 22nd Street Crew. Lannell long-running feud with Tann that revolved Cooper part had been 22nd Street competition for drug around sales and a since Crew the 1990s un- achieved prior incident in of his which one relatives authority gang. matched level within the weapon. assaulted stolen his Tann part gang Michael Tann for a similar period behind Coo- and. was close evening On April Tann per in Da- hierarchy. Rushing, James party attended a with his small future wife Beaver, juan and Antonio Arnette carried Southeast, Tracey at his cousin’s house however, weight less organization; Washington, during At point D.C. some showing evidence was presented their evening, Tracey told that he was Tann long-standing 22nd involvement Street, going party. 22nd and left the Saquawn Street Crew and operation, its Tann, phone pay Leslie at a Jones found member, having Harris awas newer been from Shipley near Market and shot him high-ranking gang introduced another behind. 22nd Street Al- Crew member member. phonce eyewitness Little was an witness, Tyrone Curry, charged

The indictment in this case Another murder. appellants gunfire running six with conspiracy and with heard the and saw Tann *19 pro- Arnette niggers’ pockets.” them Tánn “Pat of the crimé. from the scene away pockets pat to Terrence Jones’s ceeded Tracey, and another to confessed later face. Witnesses stated and hit him in the named Donald Crew member 22nd Street resisted point at Terrence Jones some Matthews, committed the mur- he had Cooper him in by hitting Cooper, and shot der. to Jones tried response. When Terrence shot him and away, Cooper again. Murder crawl II. The Terrence Jones Queen Assault Richard ap- testified that Witnesses further time as Terrence proximately the same April on of Terrence Jones The murder attack, Tann appellant Jones was under argument an 22nd began'with males appeared, other unidentified Donald Mat and gang member between Street car, Queen against a resident, Kyara pinned Richard and a 22nd Street thews his beating going through him and began li Johnson, type about apparently Matthews, According to' Donald Kyara’s pockets. served at quor that was ground in the up gun Tann off the quarrel picked birthday party. The verbal shot him fight Queen with it midst violent before was threatened become away, sister, he to run the back as tried by Kyara’s Arm up broken Shaunta enough to badly but not wounding Queen close friend strong. Shaunta called her later, days escape. his prevent Several him come to Terrence Jones and asked shot Matthews that he had situation Tann told make sure that 22nd Street to trial, Queen. Queen At testified that his Jones went was control. Terrence under friend, cigars Richard assailants had stolen cash 22nd Street with carrying night. was approached Mat he Queen. Terrence Jones and had a brief conversation thews Taylor and Ber- III. Murder James “just explained that he him. Matthews Mackey nard Assault argument Kyara] but [with had an nothing.” reported wasn’t Witnesses A third murder occurred 22nd Street peacefully and later,- their interaction ended years early a little over two without incident. evening Again, the events May This precipitated by argument. Johnson, According Kyara appellant disagreement Omar time it was between exchange of the between Arnette learned Tyndle during Ashley Harrison which Terrence Jones and Donald Matthews and Tyndle. may struck Harri- Harrison [referring appellant Coo- yelled, “Doe” Street, and son was an to 22nd outsider Kyara Cooper respond, ‘Where per] heard gang Tyndle girlfriend member Armstrong at?” then heard Shaunta Alphonce Little. (believed ask, Cooper) to be someone nickname], climaxed,' dispute As the Harrison made “Squirt [appellant Arnette’s his lack of of Little faking?” Arnette nodded the di- reference to fear who’s “go get your baby[’s] telling Tyndle Richard rection of Terrence Jones and At up to that Queen Cooper go told the street father” words effect. “hammer,” argument between Harrison with his which was the street time of the 22nd gun. Cooper approached Tyndle, for a Ter- various members name dispersed in different pointed gun at him Crew were rence Jones and Street Street; witness testi- places with his on 22nd one while Arnette hit-Terrence Jones Then, crew,” including appel- according to several wit- fied that one “little hands. Harris, nesses, Tann as well as Little Cooper said words to the effect lants members, gang other house. Little and several testified that Foreman told *20 court. gathered a basketball When Harris near and Little that he he believed had Harrison-Tyndle dispute, word of the and fired the -shot that killed James Taylor. Little, challenge spread by- to Harrison’s There was no to show that either Little, Harris, gang, to-the word mouth Tann, although Harris or aware of each Tann, gang and members raced to- other shooting role in the otherls and the pres- Harrison from directions on ward different gang ence of other members during the 22nd event, Street. knew of in Foreman’s involvement Following incident, the murder. Har-

Then, multiple Harris witnesses saw. and ris fled the area in disguise and lived for open at Tann fire Omar Harrison. Seven weeks several until his arrest: they witnesses testified that Harris saw shooting. Four witnesses saw Tann shoot- Laquanda IV. Johnson Murder

ing. One testified between witness and . Keisha Frost Assault gang shooting and ten were members five although with Tann en masse and Harris for Notábly purposes this appeal, ap- testimony conflicting. was Two wit- pellant Cooper was tried for and convicted seeing to gang nesses testified member the-murder Terrence Jones 2006. Blaylock during a gun Antonio with drawn At the time of the instant 2008-2009 trial According the incident. to another wit- appellants case, in this Cooper was ness, people” “a lot of addition Tann serving lengthy prison sentence shooting. were and Harris Cooper’s trial, crime. At govern- Little, Alphonce firing who ment Kyara denied listed Johnson and her older sister, Johnson, weapon, immediately Laquanda stated potential' after wit- ended, gunfire first waves of he 'Kyara heard- nesses. testified about Cooper’s separate gunshots coming set of from an- shooting of following Terrence Jones her argument other location the street.” “across Laquanda These with Matthews. was Foreman, by shots fired were who eyewitness not an Terrence Jones Robert junior Little was a very testified member murder; however, Cooper had made sev- of the 22nd Street Crew. saw Foreman eral incriminating statements to her in the firing and heard Tann Harris at Har- . and aftermath of that -Ultimately, incident. rison, attack, compelled join felt in the Laquanda trial, testify did at the 2006 .not shooting as well. started at but she could be seen the courthouse - during supporting the trial her La- sister. started,- firing Once Omar Harrison quanda protective younger of’her sis- away his truck jumped into and drove reputation ter and known abe However, safely. Taylor, James a 22nd “gatekeeper” seeking those access to .for standing Street resident who had been Kyara. truck, near Harrison’s was hit bullet ’ Mackey, head died. Bernard Cooper was convicted at the end June bystander, another innocent was also later, Approximately two weeks standing nearby grazed by and was a bul- 11, 2006, early morning July

let the back. (who sisters been relocated from 22nd trial) because of Alphonce Cooper’s ran Har- Street returned appellant Little with girlfriend Appellant ris to the house Harris’s 22nd Street visit friends. Alphonce him Beaver told pack bags preparation watched his saw the sisters and go hiding. they into Little that back. investi- Robert Foreman found were Little their, Harris at girlfriend’s gated presence and Little Harris’s -confirmed that Laquanda Bolling, the mother out a 22nd Karen hanging sisters Johnson, Frost, Laquanda Kyara testified while house with Keisha Street street, on the he Cooper was.still appellant met Beaver Little Mend. Johnson’s her Laquanda offered approached another 22nd Street Dwayne Wright, keep Kyara money if would drugs and she discussed member. The three men Grew during his 2006 trial off the stand they- “got agreed that the sisters and Terrence'Jones; murder they should be killed— go” meaning — gov- cooperation-with their because of arrest, Cooper out over sent After *21 further Little dis- Beaver and ernment. prison to' individuals tures from numerous to going of- was do them cussed which one persuade (by them- in to have an effort Beaver, arguing he had killing. necessary) Johnson sisters and force if already duty gang his testi- done testify against-him. Cooper others to trial, Cooper’s his fying in defense to allied street reached out members an obligation persuaded that he had Little Street, including gang on Brian Gil 17th Wright sisters. to eliminate the Johnson have them Tyrel Hargraves, liam and to Little, gave Beaver gun and retrieved Gang Kyara. mem 22nd Street search partial sunglasses pair Little a a. ally Dewey Honesty gang and ber Travis . completed disguise. Preparations were Cooper, from also testified Chappell from Rob- “hoodie” when Little secured (including jail, them instructed and others .Foreman, escape from route ert and an Beaver, Tann, Harris, Rushing, appellants Rushing, agreed to drive appellant who. Little) to gang Alphonce find and member from, away the scene of Little and Beaver Boll- points. Karen the sisters at various shooting. the anticipated Cooper was ing testified that-after also arrested, Laquanda her not to let implored house Alphonce up walked Little Cooper, explaining Kyara testify against the Johnson sisters. where he had seen [Cooper]” and that Tann had “talked inside, Laquanda but Kyara Johnson was “[Cooper] to know was [La- wanted Lit- porch on with Keisha Frost. letting quanda] going help him women, shot both opened tle fire be- and testify.” her sister hoving was Kyara. Laquanda that Keisha died, Kyara, looking out but Keisha lived. other witnesses after approached Tann window, upstairs of an witnessed the Taylor-Bernard Mackey inci- James away from the shooting. Little -ran scene Anderson, Zartia dent. threatened He Avenue. toward 23rd Street and Southern Taylor to'the sister James witnesses in Rushing collected Little and Beaver murder, going to stated that he was and get rid of the car and Little to instructed co- “straighten things regarding-their out” gang mem- Beaver directed .hoodie. Tann also operation government. with the Maryland bers to his mother’s house Harris, James confronted Donnise another Dwayne Wright gun where he hid witness, Taylor urged her to murder given the murder. Little commit (no falsely appellant Harris testify Harris) to Donnise had not relation been In- Obstruction Y. Justice —Witness involved incident. Manipulation timidation Developments Procedural VI. incidents, In sev- the aftermath of these members, crimi- grand jury investigating A these appellants, gang other eral of 22nd Street .prevent nal activities in the area approached witnesses efforts original down its indictment cooperation their law enforcement. handed with grand jury first-degree premeditated A fol- was September 2007. second convicted superseding Laquanda while armed of lowed with indictment murder Johnson February superseding The indict- conspiracy ADW Keisha Frost on a conspiring charged appellants ment theory of -liability pursuant to Pinkerton v. and kill justice “to assault obstruct 328 U.S. 66 S.Ct. anyone contrary interests were whose (1946). 90 L.Ed. He was also con associates,” [appellants] and their those jus victed two counts of obstruction of to that and numerous crimes related over- tice Johnson related sisters and inclúding all conspiracy, involvement several weapons Rushing offenses. four described above.' murders first-degree premeditated convicted of against all six general returned verdicts Johnson, Laquanda murder while armed of finding guilty each appellants, conspira- Frost, ADW of Keisha obstruction addition, cy.1 appellant' each was c'on- justice weapons offenses related-'to counts, multiple other as follows: victéd shooting. con Finally;' Amette was first-degree second-degree victed of Tanri was convicted 'murder while pre- *22 Jones, robbery murder while armed2 of armed of meditated both Terrence armed Taylor, James Queen, Leslie Jones and second- weapons offenses of..Richard degree while armed'3 of murder Terrence related that incident. Jones, robbery4 and assault armed ' Appellants appeals. followed with these (“AWIKWA”) to kill while armed5 intent In our discussion their manifold claims Queen, Richard AWIKWA Bernard error, analyze we first the claims relat- Mackey; jus- two counts of obstruction of ing to sufficiency government’s tice,6 threatening person,7 a one count- Next, procedural evidence. we deal with weapons a and host of offenses8 related evidentiary by issues the al- affected Harris underlying these crimes. was con- leged conspiracy from' flowing áppel- first-degree premeditated victed of murder Then, joint pre- lants’ address trial. we Taylor,

while armed of James AWIKWA . trial not directly trial and matters tied into Mackey, of Bernard several related and. or conspiracy appellants’ joinder. We weapons offenses. Beaver was convicted merger analysis with our in- conclude first-degree while premeditated murder upon structions to trial court remand. Johnson, of Laquanda armed assault with (“ADW”) dangerous weapon9 a of Keisha Concerning Sufficien- Claims VII. Frost, of justice, carrying and obstruction cy of Evidence license,, pistol posses- a without a unlawful sion of a with that firearm connection Conspiracy A. also of an He was convicted addi- event. Appellants argue that the evidence justice

tional count of obstruction of relat- membership in prior failed to establish their attempts ed influence the single testimony Cooper conspiracy charged supersed- of the Johnson sisters. (2012 (2012 § Repl.). Repl.). § 1. 6. D.C.Code 22-722 D.C.Code 22-1805a 22-2101, (2012 Repl.). §§ -4502 D.C.Code (2012 Repl.). § 7. D.C.Code 22-1810 22-2103, (2012 Repl.). §§ -4502 3. D.C.Code 22-4504(a), (b) (20.12 Repl). § 8. D.C.Code 22-2801, (2012 Repl.). §§ -4502 4. D.C.Code . (2012 Repl.) § 9. D.C.Code 22-402 22-401, (2012 Repl,).. §§ 5. D.C.Code -4502 omitted). contend, Instead,- they quotation marks alterations ing indictment.10 best, established, membership circumstantial merely Gang may be the evidence con only several and discrete of con- probative short-term the offense in fail spiracies, judge and the trial erred (citing spiracy. Id. Perez United judgment of ing grant (D.C.2009)). their motions for States, 968 A.2d 82-83 ' (“MJOA”) acquittal conspiracy to the “In the evi whether determining count. /‘The .which we review standard finding single of a con supports a dence novo, we, like a denial of a MJOA is de whether the spiracy, the looks at court, the evi the trial whether determine any goal, a shared common defendants dence, most light favorable viewed alleged par interdependence between sqch a reason government, al ticipants any overlap among the juror guilt .beyond able could rea find. leged McCullough v. Unit participants.” .(Vashon) Howard v. sonable. doubt.” (D.C.2003). ed (D.C. conspiracy single “The existence 2005) (internal quotation marks and altera conspiracies ques multiple primarily omitted). tions Hairston, 905 jury.” tion of fact prove gov conspiracy, “To (quoting v. Tar A.2d at 784 United States agree must that an ernment establish (D.C.Cir. antino, 846 F.2d people or more ment between two existed 1988)). offense; to commit criminal the de superseding indictment voluntarily par knowingly and fendant's] ticipated charged April July that between 2003 and intending agreement, *23 conspired as appellants and others that, in objective; a criminal and commit follows: during conspiracy, and furtherance of ... Cooper N. Lannell {Defendants one co-conspirator, a committed at least Gray Stephen R. ... Michael D. Tann overt act.” Hairston v. United) D. ... L. Saquawn ... Antonio (internal Arnette (D.C.2006 Robert ... Bri omitted). Harris ... J. Foreman quotation conspirato marks “A ... Dwayne Wright an K. Gilliam ... A. from cir agreement may rial be inferred n ... Rushing Dajuan E. D. [and James cumstances conduct include the Beaver],[11] persons and whose carrying in other mutually defendants out are both identities known and unknown illegal purpose, common the nature of the done, grand jury, knowingly to the and relationship parties act of the did confederate, combine, alleged conspira willfully conspire, and the interests of the together justice tors.” Castillo-Campos agree v. United and to obstruct (D.C.2010) (internal anyone to assault whose and' kill dictment, challenge sufficiency appellants 10. All but were not included the su- showing single conspiracy. perseding February indictment issued Only specific argu- case, and Amette Tann make govern- Prior to trial in 2008. membership conspir- ments about their in the rejoin other ment moved Beaver acy. comprehensive In order to ensure a granted appellants by the and the motion was claims, appellants' review of we will consider Dwayne against trial court. The cases sufficiency of the evidence as to the mem- Gilliam, Foreman, Wright, Robert Brian bership single con- each defendant Stephen Gray, alleged coconspirators all spiracy charged by indictment. allies, Crew or were 22nd Street members joint voluntarily appellants’ trial severed from charges against appellant Beaver were government. by the original September in- included contrary drugs. were those It’s commitment. interests It’s like a associates, in way their viola of life. defendants and 401, 402, tion of 22 D.G.Code Sections Appellants and gang other members 722, 2101, protect used territory violence their thirty- to list proceeded The indictment against silence retaliate those who acts, twenty-seven of discrete overt three were believed threaten the business jury, alleged which went security gang operations. and its charged or committed at least one been Devin Evans testified that an “outsider” coconspirator.- uncharged somebody “considered that’s from way Because the indictment your neighborhood, somebody that’s not alleged the suffi- conspiracy,-we review who would [by] welcomed” be “dealt with ciency of the. evidence to examine whether acts of violence” if caught acting way in a appellant properly established each adverse business interests of the knowingly participated agreement explained: crew. Andre- further McDuffie any- or to or kill justice, assault obstruct had to “[W]e enforce that no one can come contrary to one whose those interests were try into our area to take over our coconspira- of the defendants and their territory; no can one come there and tors,12 act and whether least one overt drugs sell having [because] we wasn’t it.” by a coeonspirator. was committed At If an outsider tried to move in on the trial, testimony offered market, gang’s drug stated, McDuffie operations of about the structure and -problem have a “[The outsider] would - through gang Street Crew several 22nd may up losing end Don- [and] [his life.]” cooperating who wit- “insiders” testified ald similarly. Matthews testified When gang nesses: former members Andre what if happen people asked would from McDuffie, Evans, Matthews, Devin Donald city part up another to set “decided testimony Alphonce Little. Their Street, shop drugs” on and sell Mat- 22nd gang to demonstrate tended “[t]hey replied long” thews wouldn’t last 22nd geographical territory around Street gang because them “[r]un members would only per- members where authorized *24 away” using “[violence.” illegal drugs. to mitted sell order.be “snitches,” gang The members treated enjoy of and part the 22nd Street Crew meaning “cooperating, telling those au- with that privileges the associated memr -... about the of thorities activities our bership, right partake such as to the the way. organization,” the same McDuffie of profits gang’s drug trafficking the busi- cooperate that if someone was to testified ness, to willing members had to further government, with the “there would be vio- goals gang through the of common the the lence inflicted.” usé McDuffie that to of'violence. testified drugs sell as a of the 22nd Street member gang members played The different Crew: operation according roles the to the violence; respect”

You have to commit acts of and rank[s] levelfs] “different another; to you stay loyal have to one that members had earned over time other, got you through if to you help loyalty each need demonstrations of the anything you gang. or if that the guns need more Donald Matthews testified [like] may 12. See White the conviction be affirmed if the evidence v. United (D.C.1998) ("Since n. the support theory.”). returned was sufficient to either charge guilty a-general verdict of on the .. “insiders,” gang. gang to. Devin assigned gang members Two other different roles Little, drugs, also storing money, Evans-and-Alphonce testified selling included that a cars, “committing] Arnette stealing acts was member the 22nd and. neighbor- Street Little testified Arnette protect the Crew. violence order to However, drugs 22nd Andre McDuffie also Street sometimes hood.” sold enforcer,” “everyone carried -a gun. police was an Several also officers testified with Arnette traf willing they “rival[s] a “beef’ in testified observed handle ficking cooperating drugs presence also the illegal The witnesses street. other .areas gang members and in known how 22nd Street Crew members revealed belong'to 22nd Grew. warned each about Street weapons, shared other police gang’s, activity provided in the leading Arnette role in the played also a members were in gang who assistance attack on Jones and Richard Terrence jail- r Queen. about this The incident reasonably perceived Arnette sufficiently testimony

Such showed showed Queen played no that Terrence Jones and affronted par- what role was matter time, given territory- of the 22nd Street Crew gang ticular member gang fellow member confronting 22nd Donald required Street Crew members were turf. gang’s Matthews on support the violence in Arnette use order Jones goals maintaining then out Terrence and Rich- advance the called overall Street, Queen “faking” stability reputation organi- 22nd ard zation, territory, illegal drug Cooper and its identified two outsiders to its (who leading testimony also Arnette knew was member business. This established gang), of the that Coo- operated that the as a unit recommended gang cohesive with, (albeit coordinated), loosely per “bring his hammer” to deal with the a rank > configuration situation. the facts showed leadership And that Coo- bound (and Tann) gang together. per responded accordingly, in representations, reliance on re- Arnette’s testimony backdrop This sulting in a chain events that led which, jury- participation examined Queen’s Terrence Jones’s death shoot- charged of appellants conspiracy ing. facts the murders this case. and. in. Although Cooper may following subsections detail evi- Arnette. been mistaken about whether Terrence specifically dence that more demonstrated Queen Jones Richard true threat knowing appellants in participation Crew, 22nd conspiracy alleged. Street interests evidence was sufficient show that *25 1. Antonio Arnette Arnette Cooper and believed that the out- siders, appel- they thought testified that “faking” by Donald Matthews who were Matthews, lant Antonio Arnette was challenging member Donald territo- Matthews, According 22nd aspirations Crew. to rial to the Street adverse interests spent appellants Arnette considerable time with their 22nd Street as- ap- and Crew pellants Cooper, Rushing, gang surrounding and fellow sociates. The evidence Little, incident, Alphonce on member 22nd Street. in the context of Ar- especially membership thát in Matthews testified was also nette’s the 22nd Arnette active activities, illegal with other 22nd Street Crew its was Street Crew and involved packaging selling illegal knowing in and his par- members sufficient to demonstrate drugs commonly by ticipation agreement Cooper in areas an with used in gang illegal other “to and in drug members assault involved -the on trade 22nd goals contrary to Cooper kill” whose were Street. in principal those was a gang. those of the murder of for perceived Terrence Jones to gang’s reputation threats and terri- Dajuan 2. Beaver tory on 22nd And Street. he was the- by Appellant was identified De- Beaver instigator, of attempts a series of to ob- Evans, Matthews, Al- vin Donald justice regard coopera- struct with to the phonce Little as the 22nd member tion the Johnson gov- sisters with the illegal Crew substances Street who sold in his prosecution attempts ernment — gang with other members on 22nd Street. which ultimately were La- connected to Alphonce Little also that he testified quanda- Alphonce Johnson’s by murder weapons shared with Beaver and Bea- Clearly, Little. the evidence was sufficient a gun. carried ver knowing show his in participation an played Beaver also in crimes a role agreement with other members sisters, against the Johnson who were 22nd Street crew to commit obstruction of by govern- known gang members justice possess- and murder of individuals cooperators. in ment Beaver was involved ing conflicting with those of interests assisting Cooper attempt with his to alter gang.

Kyara’s testimony leading up period 4.Saquawn Harris Moreover, to his trial. a key Beaver player Laquanda Johnson’s murder. Alphonce Little appellant testified that Beaver found the Johnson sisters 22nd Harris was a member 22nd Street murder, evening Street con- Crew, although he was a newer member of Alphonce vinced Little to them murder gang who had been introduced cooperation retaliation their with the gang encouraged drugs sell 22nd trial, Cooper’s 2006 Street influential Eric gang member assisted him by helping put. then Little Dreher. Little further stated that he sold together disguise shooting before the illegal drugs Harris weap- with and shared covering up the crime afterward. The him. testimony ons with of several evidence clear that Beaver was moti- police testimony officers Little’s bolstered vated to in this aid crime because about Harris’s to the 22nd connection membership in the 22nd Street Crew and by establishing Street Crew that Harris objectives his belief that the of the mem- Tann, Beaver, regularly was seen with Ar- bership contrary of “snitch- those nette, Rushing gang'members and other Thus, es.” evidence was sufficient on 22nd Street. show' knowing participation Beaver’s light relationships, of these the James gang conspiracy other in a members .Taylor-Bernard Mackey pro- incident was “obstruct-justice assault kill” and to participation bative of Harris’s persons with aims contrary to those his. of that conspiracy. The facts incident codefendants. Harris, Tann, many showed that other Lannqll Cooper members, gang -responded insult an outsider, Harrison, that ap- Alphonce Government witnesses testified Omar *26 Cooper pellant long-standing girlfriend was a and Little’s 22nd Street —in high-ranking organization gang’s Har- territory member heart to—and by 2004 everybody girlfriend who “could rison’s instruction to to [in tell Little’s gang] get your babyt’s] Harris and deeply “go what do.” He was also father.” the 22nd -Street relationship ing’s with in the Omar fire direction opened

Tann members, the evidence re- its sequence events that Grew and in a Harrison Taylor- partic- knowing show his in the James sulted death sufficient ..Mackey. Like “to kill or as- wounding conspiracy of Bernard in ipation Queen inci- (such Jones-Richard Laquanda) the Terrence whose as persons sault” in an dent, participation Harris’s active aligned with'those of interests were per-. to a violently reacted where he event Rushing or his associates. gang reputation threat to the

ceived Michael Tann (and gang of a fellow girlfriend member) of his was sufficient evidence “insider” wit government’s All agreement “to in an knowing participation (McDuffie, Evans, Matthews, and nesses kill” interests those whose assault and Little), Tracey Tann (appellant as as well gang of his associ- contrary ran those wife), that Tann was a Tann’s testified ates. member of high-ranking well-known and Lit Rushing Crew! Matthews

5. James the 22nd Street testimony about Tann’s provided also tle appellant McDuffie testified Andre in gang members participation other of the 22nd Rushing had been member gang’s trade. drug 1990’s; early since the Crew Street gang member McDuffie was senior appellant, Tann any than other More entry gang, Rushing’s time of into the closely-involved was also the acts responsible teaching McDuffie challenged who against outsiders violence Rushing gang-related skills. McDuffie repu- territory and the 22nd Street Crew’s Rushing sell also testified that he saw key player in- tation.. Tann was a on 22nd regular on a basis crack cocaine Jones, Jones, and James Leslie Terrence testimony additionally Street. Matthews’s Moreover, the facts Taylor murders. Rushing’s provided supporting evidence repeated of threats point to Tann’s use mem- drug trafficking activities with other witnesses, against potential who violence gang. bers of the testify against coconspirators; his might ,to Beaver, Rushing played a critical Like justice. obstruct These circum- order murder, Laquanda Johnson role sufficient to establish stances were of his which was evidence involvement acting alongside other Tann —sometimes Knowing that Little in- conspiracy. commit acts of violence gang members to tended murder the Johnson sisters be- (including Ter- against perceived rivals cooperation gov- of their with the cause Harrison) rence Jones and Omar —know- ernment, Rushing agreed to act Little’s ingly agree- in an joined participated getaway Rushing drove Little and driver. or kill” justice ment “to or assault obstruct Beaver from the scene of the crime after ran persons whose interests counter Laquanda wounded Kei- Little killed gang. those of the up helped sha Frost. He also Little cover instructing to discard- the crime him sum, was sufficient to the clothing, by driving Little Bea- all appellants, show that members Maryland house in where

ver’s mother’s Crew, agrees into an 22nd Street entered weapon. Beaver stashed the murder Giv- threatening or justice ment to obstruct Laquan- Rushing’s participation en witnesses, or murder, manipulating assault killing of da Johnson a known kill interests were at odds government cooperator, light persons of Rush- whose

429 theirs, or cooperating provided such as even when assistance by rivals cocon- witnesses, knowingly voluntarily spirators minimal”); to each “fairly other is Hairston, agreement. that participated in Richerson, see also United States v. 833 Moreover, twenty- at 905 A.2d 784. 1147, (5th Cir.1987) (“Parties F.2d conspiracy overt acts of the that seven knowingly participate who with' core con- jury, many supported by went were spirators to goal achieve a common may be evidence, at some sufficient least were members of an conspiracy.”). overall supported by overwhelming evidence.13 events of the Terrence Jones murder-Rich- Lumpkin v. United See Queen Tann, ard (involving Cooper assault n (D.C.1991). Arnette), Taylor the James murder- Tann, Mackey Bemard assault arguments (involving appellant’s As to Harris, members), single conspir gang at trial other and La- proof did show a acy, appellants quanda showed that but instead Johnson murder-Keisha Frost as- merely engaged projects, (involving “discrete Rushing), sault Beaver and are general within a happened which communi examples of such coordinated actions all ethos,” ty and that “indictment was so appellants to goals achieve the con- , meaningless and unlimited to be . broad spiracy. context”, in a criminal una we find them First,

vailing. the evidence was sufficient Finally, agree we with the United appellants engaged were show of Appeals States Court for the District of pur demonstrating actions common core Columbia Circuit that “a conspiracy’s pur pose, namely to inflict or threaten violence pose not be should defined too narrow (real perceived) govern on rivals or specific Gatling, terms.” F.3d cooperators. See States v. ment 1520. Our case law demonstrates Graham, (D.C.Cir. 83 F.3d 1471-72 Hairston, principle. same See 905 A.2d at 1996) (concluding single there was (conspirators’ aim was to re “seek[ ] conspiracy “no doubt where the venge against the 1400 [of block faction evidence was sufficient [the] members]”); gang Castillo-Campos, rival juror appel reasonable conclude (conspiracy’s objective 987 A.2d at 483 goal lants and others shared the common “to kill or ‘get’ gang the rival otherwise profit” crack distributing cocaine for members”). Here, although conspira multiple despite drug-dealing cy to justice “obstruct and to assault and “cliques” operating in a particular territo anyone kill contrary” whose interests were ry). gang was indeed .a broadly, stated objectivé, criminal have not cit

Moreover," appellants appellants it is clear that any authority demonstrating ed gang together, and other members acted other, conspiracy charged legally count as relied each and often coordinated Romero, efforts, United States v. deficient. effectively their in order to more Cf. (2d Cir.1990) (or 897 51-52 F.2d goal inflicting (affirming achieve their common conviction for to kill a conspiring federal threatening) opposed violence those conspiracy officer where “was defendants’ gang. the interests See United plan agreed the result of a Gatling, all the States F.3d (D.C.Cir.1996) (finding “interdependence” anyone posing defendants to kill a threat business”). conspiracy existing purposes single to them or [their narcotics] example, Laquanda For the facts that went to Overt of Frost, Johnson and assault of Keisha 28-30, dispute.- Acts which described Little’s murder *28 430 concerning the argument

Instead, adequately Tann’s count conspiracy (the principal was the which he offenses of the elements appellants apprised robbery Queen, of Richard AWIK armed which frame within offense- and the time Queen, weapons of of and related WA existed, appel such conspiracy fenses) government’s evidence is that the their defenses properly prepare could lants solely on it rested insufficient because was jeopar against double protected and were Donald Mat incredible witness: single, a Roman, F.2d States dy. See United However, single testimony of a thews. - (indictment Cir.1984) (7th 846, 863-54 . conviction, a to sustain witness sufficient conspiracy where al charged properly wit other even where contradicted statute leged conspiracy, the. criminal v. United nesses evidence. Gibson violated,- of con the time frame (D.C.2002). States, 792 A.2d Therefore,- grant no relief to we spiracy). perfect not a wit was Although Matthews claims re on the basis their appellants ness, testimony and jurors credited his on, sufficiency of the evidence garding the so.14 for them to do We permissible it was of, conspiracy charges. legality or the their credibility determination jury’s afford appellate on review. substantial deference Queen States, (Steven) B. Terrence Jones-Richard Robinson v. United (D.C.2007). Incident A.2d Second-Degree 1. Tann’s Convictions: Tann’s claims involve other Murder Armed of While crimes of which he convicted Terrence those Robbery Jones, theory liability AWIK- aiding-and-abetting. Armed an , Queen, (second-degree murder Terrence Jones of Richard WA Posses- he, offenses). During PFCV Because sion of a Com- Firearm related second-degree murder was convicted of a Crime mission Violence shooting of abetting Cooper’s (“PFCV”) aiding and Jones, was re Terrence sufficien- Appellant Tann' makes several - had, mini prove Tann at a quired cy regarding claims his Terrence Jones- mum, regard “depraved heart” Queen convictions. Em- Richard related Perez, 968 A.2d Jones’s death. Terrence testimony of phasizing heavily the Richard murder, (“For second-degree at 102 credibility Queen the lack of of Donald intent, malice, which can required is Matthews, challenges Tann the identifica- proven by specific intent evidence jury tion that the relied for his kill, bodily specific to inflict intent serious involvement in the entire incident. Fur- harm, disregard or wanton and willful thermore, that, if argues even found to he human an risk—also known unreasonable event, he have been involved did murder.”). ‘depraved as heart’ “[W]here required possess the state mind for the of a crimi specific mens rea is an element aiding-and- jury to him under an convict offense, a have had nal defendant must abetting theory liability for the second- guilty of rea himself to be mens offense, degree charged prin while armed Terrence murder whether he is or as an abettor.” cipal counts of actor aider and Jones and related PFCV. Queen, ably who was attacked to counter Matthews 14. Tann’s best evidence concluded victim, surviving during extremely situ- -testimony of the from behind chaotic was the ation, Queen, identify simply Tann was unable view Richard who testified that powerful who among While all of the men were involved his attackers. counterevidence, could have reason- attack. articulated) verbally 356 not designed Kitt v. venture (D.C.2006); also v. United Tann gang see and his allow fellow Coleman mem- (D.C.2008) tactically 552-53 bers to divide their victims *29 subdue, aider (extending the doctrine that the and rob, eventually order better and in rea of Moreover, abettor must share the mens shoot both of jury them. murder). second-degree principal to easily could have inferred fi’om the close proximity of the assaults that as Tann attack portrays Tann on Richard (a Queen, Cooper by attacked he man saw distinct from Queen separate as and Coo- reputation known a history to have of vio- per’s attack on Terrence and Arnette’s lence) striking point- Jones and Terrence Jones; further, Tann that was claims there ing gun at him. go- he Cooper no that knew was evidence ing to shoot or that he Terrence Jones circumstances, these it Given was rea shooting. with the To helped Cooper jury sonable for the to have found'that sure, pre- no of any was evidence there displayed a “wanton and willful Tann dis or coordination between discussion attack regard of an unreasonable human risk” to Tann, in Cooper, and Arnette which the the life' of Terrence Jones when he isolat gang explicitly identified Ter- members ed, neutralized, robbed, ultimately ahd a goal. as rence Jones’s death posi shot the man who he knew was in a

However, government powerful tion to come Terrence Jones’s aid: effort, a joint evidence of and coordinated (Darion) Queen. Ingram Richard See heart,” “depraved through and of Tann’s (D.C. A.3d 900-01 testimony attack escalat- was 2012); Perez, at 102. 968 A.2d Arnette, Tann, ing, Cooper ordered Analyzing Tann’s PFCV offenses

others, to rob Terrence Jones and Richard Cooper’s associated of Ter murder Queen by which was carried out with order —an Jones, our rence case instructs law recipients. its This was done Coo- when government aiding an “[w]hen the relies on per nig- directed his cohorts “Pat them PFCV, abetting.theory prove it is gers’ pockets.” per- The evidence enough show the defendant clear to this order was fectly whom issued participated ‘in “larger scheme” Cooper precisely when said it States,, [crime].’” Fox v. United 11 A.3d events; however, interpre- course fair (D.C.2011) (quoting Lancaster suggests tation of the that was (D.C. v. United (who by Cooper to both made Arnette 2009)). “Rather, government must Jones) (in- covering Terrence men prove part act on some the defendant’s Tann) cluding attacking Queen. who were [principals] pos in their assisted understanding This of the evidence was ” Fox, of firearms.... session by testimony bolstered in- Cooper’s (internal quotation empha marks and immediately structions were carried out omitted). distinguish sis Tann’s case Tann, Arnette, others,- regard with from eases such as Fox and able Lancaster Queen. both Terrence Jones and Richard insuffi where found PFCV offenses we proximity The close the attack on Ter- aiding-and-abetting context. cient Queen, attack on rence Jones and the By according complying Cooper’s with directive to approximately ten matter feet witnesses, conjunction Queen, rob Richard rob- could have these instructions, bery sufficiently proved Cooper that Tann main- found assisted (if knowingly organized taining possession (by preventing Queen attacks for his friend) required Ter- mens rea elements of his coming from to the aid Queen as- murder-Riehard rence Jones using he was course firearm that sault convictions. related facts of Terrence Jones. The the murder of the counts the indict- pursued each steps affirmative Tann took show that to this inci- related against ment Arnette of his firearm keep possession help Cooper aiding-and-abetting theory dent under Queen ways: in a number subduing liability. (1) Queen’s pockets Cooper’s patting —at (3) direction; (2) robbing striking Queen; ini- that Arnette Kyara Johnson testified (4) Queen; ultimately shooting Queen by calling Cooper the attack tiated safety he could have as he ran for where him confront Terrence Jones and *30 telling to Fur help Jones. called for Terrence armed, i.e., his Queen with Richard while thermore, Jones the fact that Terrence that Ar- Kyara also testified “hammer.” suggested him Cooper by hitting resisted at pockets, Jones’s patted nette Terrence Queen that actions toward were Tann’s command, him Cooper’s and struck with Queen not helpful in that could ensuring Cooper gun had his drawn. his hands while interfering in with Coo aid Jones further believed, this amount to Certainly, if would weapon. Dang v. per’s possession of the in assault on Ter- participation active (D.C. 1039, 1043 741 A.2d However, does, Tann Ar- as rence Jones. 1999). in argues his involvement nette necessary offense did demonstrate Dang, where we found The facts second-degree murder state of mind for to show that the evidence was sufficient no reason to believe because he had his appellant abetted codefen- aided and Also Cooper shoot Terrence Jones. would firearms, possession in of their dants Tann, fact that like relies on the Arnette very similar to the facts here. are previous was no conversation there pos- Dang, although the defendant did intending to kill Cooper about Terrence weapon, sess a evidence demonstrated any did Jones or evidence Arnette in concert with code- [his that he “worked encourage Cooper to so. anything to do things, blocking by, among other fendants] Instead, argues shooting that the he door, point- guarding [one victim] “spontaneous by Cooper” to Ter- reaction Here, ing a knife at second Id. [a victim].” unexpected resistance rence Jones’s to helped Cooper in Dang, like Tann maintain attack. possession weapons through his ac- his tions, those of working argues in concert with that the Arnette further attenuated, Cooper, Queen. to neutralize Richard and therefore even more insufficient, regarding also his convictions Therefore, entirety in reject we their in aiding abetting Tann the armed arguments challenging Tann’s the suffi- robbery Queen. He claims that Richard ciency for his convictions of the evidence to there is no reasonable inference Terrence Jones-Richard related from his actions toward Terrence drawn Queen incident. (patting pockets hitting Jones his and/or him) Arnette’s Convictions: Second-De- notion that supports he gree Murder Armed of Ter- While Queen. rob Tann’s intent to shared Jones, Robbery rence Armed against ap- witnesses The Queen, Richard and PFCV pellant often inconsistent Arnette were Tann, appellant argues exculpatory their testi- Like Arnette sometimes However, question here is mony. that the evidence was insufficient as to the whether, light Cooper bring gun instructed viewing the evidence con s Ar- front Terrence -Jone government, and Richard most favorable Queen obviously demonstrating the req the “de- conduct demonstrated nette’s — knowledge uisite awareness (if Coo criminally not a more

praved heart” Then, per’s use of a firearm. took Arnette required for the culpable) of mind state Jones, steps Cooper maintaining pos assist murder Terrence second-degree during at Cooper’s session the firearm rob- specific intent to commit armed Fox, tack on Terrence Jones. See 11 A.3d knowledge of bery Queen, Cooper’s 1287; Lancaster, 175; 975 A.2d at firearms, as well and Tann’s use as Dang, at 1043. in main- Cooper and Tann assistance firearms, taining possession of those For robbery conviction required by associated PFCV offenses. Tann, accomplice which Arnette was facts, involving key as to the offenses government was required show victims, (1) instigated were: Arnette both specific intent to aid Arnette by identifying event Terrence the entire robbery abet Tann of Richard Queen Cooper and Richard Jones Queen. Lattimore v. United him telling that the two 22nd .men *31 357, (D.C.1996). Certainly, A.2d 359-60 (2) “faking”; Arnette instructed Street pre-attack was no evidence of a there dis hammer,” “bring meaning his Cooper to robbery outlining goal cussion as a of the in- gun, thereby anticipating Cooper’s govern attack which would have made the (3) violence; complied citing Arnette clearcut. a ment’s case Arnette relies on Cooper’s pat Terrence Jones’s order case, Virginia McMorris Common (4) hit Arnette Terrence Jones pockets; wealth, 500, 348, Va. 666 S.E.2d 352 attack; (5) violently of the Tann the course (2008), “[r]obbery for the proposition Queen less than ten away assaulted feet incidental, consequence not an probable Cooper’s from Arnette’s and attack assault; robbery a requires of an com Jones; (6) Cooper phrased Terrence pletely different type wrongdoing: “robbery” plural, so his instruction Indeed, stealing.” joint plus a assault that there were Arnette would have known proximity robbery close a codefendant’s jointly victims to be controlled and two specific may be insufficient show intent attackers. subdued robbery aiding-and- an commit under liability. abetting theory of But the facts As offenses Ar which here are not so limited. (second- Cooper abetted nette aided and discussed, already As we between degree murder and associated PFCV of stages first attack and Tann’s fenses), against Arnette was evidence (parion) robbery Queen, clearly Ingram, subsequent of Richard sufficient. See Perez, 900-01; Cooper robbery issued his instructions. at 968 A.2d at 102. A.3d instructions in instigation Cooper phrased violent And his Arnette’s attack plural: niggers’ “Pat them pockets.” his assis on Terrence Jones and active by Ar- instructions were followed during undertaking its demonstrat These tance ed, minimum, patting pock- Jones’s and willful nette’s of Terrence at a a “wanton ets, reasonably human risk.” which could have been disregard of an unreasonable Moreover, by Ar- Perez, interpreted robbery attempt as a 968 A.2d at on Jones. The fact that Arnette underlying the Terrence nette convictions PFCV heard, instructions Cooper’s also on suffi and executed Jones based offenses- that Arnette knew ex- strongly implied himself given evidence that Arnette cient judgment a support such (one recipi- insufficient actly of the other what Tann instructions) aiding-and-abetting conviction was under an Cooper’s simi- ents Queen, liability. and Arnette larly doing theory intentionally aiding abetting the. rob- requir to convict an offense order through his actions bery Queen con- by principal, ing use of a firearm taining subduing Terrence Jones. aider and prove must jury for the Again, it was reasonable advance that his associate abettor knew in (including entire attack have viewed the gun enabling de was armed with — venture robbery) coordinated (and indeed, the relevant fendant to “make Tann, Arnette, oth- Cooper, among moral) an armed to aid and abet choice” ers, worked gang members which — v. United Rosemond offense. direction, Cooper’s to make together, -, U.S. 184 S.Ct. suc- attack on victims more their both ' (2014) (“[A]n accom unarmed L.Ed.2d 248 through efforts. See cessful combined a [PFCV-type] abet plice cannot aid and Downing v. United foreknowledge that has violation unless he (D.C.2007) (defendant’s presence at offense will commit the confederate which plus scene of a crime conduct firearm.”) (internal quotation marks with a supports an inference facilitates crime omitted); (Leon) Robinson v. United abettor). So guilt as an aider (D.C.2014) (“Á States, 100 viewed, legally suffi- evidence of cannot to aid armed person intend to find that Arnette cient if a weapon fense she is will be unaware necessary possessed the state of mind involved.”). Here,' was insufficient there second-degree murder Ter- for the that Arnette had advance knowl Jones, robbery of Richard rence *32 during the edge that armed Tann was associat- Queen, and the PFCV offenses Queen. robbery Richard Cooper’s with of Jones. ed murder However, as to analysis different circumstances, mere Under these component of the Arnette the “armed” proximity to Tann was of Arnette robbery Queen Richard and related knowledge. enough to infer The evi such Cooper’s robbery PFCV offense. Unlike picked up a dence showed that Tann fire instructions, put which Arnette on notice arm and it to rob and Richard shoot used robbed, Queen was to be about there of the Queen quite late the timeline was no similar mechanism which Ar- incident, no meaningful no giving Arnette Queen put was nette notice (if all) going any that Tann was to tice of a to be robbed use firearm. about to his attack on gun use the effectuate is no that Tann was in There evidence Rosemond, Queen. at 1250 n. 134 S.Ct. Cf. point possession weapon prior of a to the (“Of course, to if a defendant continues pick up when Matthews saw Tann Donald gun participate a crime after a during gun ground from the the melee confederate, by a displayed or used immediately shoot Queen. and use from his failure can infer permissibly Although arguably should- have Arnette that he such or withdraw object -that Tann anticipated foreseen would knowledge.”). weapon, especially light of Ar- use from some Had been evidence Cooper there Cooper nette’s statement could drawn that which the be bring weapon, should his recent case law inference Court, Tann knowledge that Supreme from the Arnette had advance as well as this court, carry robbery, foreseeability using gun teaches that alone is was out as Arnette assisted convictions Taylor well evidence that on the James as based maintaining possession Tann in the fire Bernard Mackey incident. Fundamental- arm, ly, in their proceed with claims turn on how the and decided his law aiding on Terrence Jones is to abetting applied volvement attack be to the Queen, our would differ facts this conclusion event. addition their However, insufficient sufficiency arguments, ent. we see evi appellants two raise record. See Rivas v. claims, this dence based on related one aiding- regarding (D.C. and-abetting given jury, to the instruction 2001) (en banc) (“[I]f evidence, when regarding another the trial court’s light most viewed favorable closing arguments. “curtailment” their government, ju is such that a reasonable all arguments Since turn on these must ror have a doubt as to reasonable court properly whether decided the any existence of of :the essential elements legal theory issue liability, related crime, -is then evidence insuffi they all are addressed here. (internal so.”) quo say cient and we must government argued that there were omitted). tation marks group gang, three shooters within the Therefore, judgment as to we vacate members toward Harri- who raced Omar component the “armed” of Arnette’s rob- Alphonee son dispute after Little’s bery conviction and his conviction PFCV girlfriend, Ashley Tyndle, from different robbery. with the The lesser- associated appellants directions Tann 22nd Street: robbery, offense of included unarmed Harris,. shooter, as a third well all of Arhette’s other convictions related junior member Robert Foreman. gang incident are affirmed.15 But presented gang members were shoot- additional Taylor-Bernard Mackey C. James , ing as well. Latina Anderson testified Incident men, that she saw between five and ten Tann, Harris, Appellants including gang Tann challenge and Harris members Little, sufficiency emerge from Blaylock, the evidence their nearby. (Leon) Robinson, (per- gree 15. See 100 A.3d at murder and associated PFCV offenses *33 mitting government weapon), "accept[ entry Cooper’s on a' was ] to based usé of judgment of for As did in- [the] lesser-included unarmed affected. (Leon). id. at 112-14. we Cf. Robinson, holding robbery offense” after of unarmed we conclude that there that the trial court committed instructional “no unfairness we discern reduc .can error, ing concluding but lesser [Amette’s] that the error did not conviction to in [the] jury’s findings affect the elements cluded “had full offense[]” of because Arnette Here, offense). potential liability has notice of [his] the lesser-included there the lesser been no claim error with re- and there is no that de of instructional indication crime[] gard jury concerning, presentation altered if instruction fense would have been charges required state of mind of PFCV the armed at the conviction been dismissed theory government’s aiding-and-abetting end of the if trial under of liabili- case or an Therefore, ty. despite insufficiency of the court had instructed the on the lesser- (internal component quo offense[ on the of Ar- (cid:127)included Id. at 112 ].’’ evidence armed omitted) robbery (quoting nette’s conviction the associated tation marks Allison Unit and offense, (D.C.Cir.1969)). possi- F.2d PFCV there was no reasonable ed bility jury’s permissible finding that the See of the also Jackson v. United ‘ (D.C.2008) (remanding the elements of Amette’s offense case to lesser-included Queen, judg robbery of of the trial with instructions enter unarmed Richard or of to of his Terrence Jones offenses ment” of conviction on a lesser-included fense). murder-related (resulting in for second-de- convictions three to at some evidence There least was' at Harrison.16 Christina and shoot “cuts” testimony of show, through the primarily jury that she saw grand Anderson told Little, Taylor James was Alphonce shooting. Donnise Blaylock Tann and out gun Harris’s ran until after killed Tann, Harris, and “a'lot Harris saw stopped firing at Omar bullets and he Thus, if shooting. running and people” on his statements Harrison. Based credited, testimony of several wit- members, ap- Robert Foreman gang fellow num- established there were nesses believe, to be- or want others peared at the Crew members of 22nd ber Street lieve, Taylor. hit that his-shot moving toward Omar of the crime scene of limited val- forensic was The evidence shooting. manner and in a hostile Harrison Tay- that James Although was clear ue. Furthermore, was evi- there testimonial gunshot wound lor had been killed really disputed appeal— dence—not head, through passed fatal bullet and Tann that Harris tending show in- during the was not identified him and intent opened fire on 22nd Street with Therefore, no link vestigation. there was they and that each to shoot Harrison particular fatal and a bullet between presence at the timé of each other’s aware shooter; forensic evi- or additional gun shooting. Anderson testified identifying weight was of minimal dence standing within some other shooters were killer, es- government and the the actual they steps Tann and Harris while sentially a few this at trial. The evi- conceded addi- shooting, permitting regard clear all were thus dence was even less with pre- was Mackey. No evidence Tann were Bernard that Harris and tional inference grazed linking the bullet sented participation and presence aware Mackey any particular shooter. with However, gang-member shooters. other been no evidence appears there government charged The Harris or was Harris Tann suggest that either premeditated Tann with the murder partic- specific presence aware of the Taylor AWIKWA Bernard James they until after the incident could con- ipation Mackey. jury' Foreman It told the shooting Taylor’s murder was Harris Tann of complete. was Foreman vict intent) Mackey’s (using transferred position from a on 22nd Street different or on an principals either as based assault testimony Tann. than either Harris or The theory liability. aiding-and-abetting Tann that Foreman saw and heard Harrison, com- firing Harris felt Because did know attack, pelled join and started shot, also hot who did fired the fatal am- shooting as well. knowingly Harris and Tann contend shooters, biguous to which of the Har- intentionally themselves associated else, ris, Tann, Foreman, or actu- someone particular at the time Robert Foreman *34 that, regard- shots that hit Janies it ally argued fired the shot or of the shooting,17 less, liability Mackey. aiding-and-abetting rendered Taylor and Bernard did, however, government government Hon- 17. The- remind the 16. Little witness Travis and showed, esty shooting,-but that Little was Little "this denied court of that that shooting if testified he have been would know Mr. that where Mr. Harris didn’t situation (cid:127) gun at time. Firearms he- had. a the these two There is evidence that Foreman. Harvey that there examiner testified Robert together, and that Mr. Fore- guns men shared of for [he] kn[e]w were "three firearms that conspiracy.” was member of the man sure[,]"- agreed could "[t]here but that have . been more[.]” . “ responsible you for the criminally one don’t who ‘[i]f each know the shooter is or they they if all the present, you others’ actions aided are possibly can’t be that by firing commission of the offense at working together in a coordinated effort’ ”18 Omar Harrison. ‘can’t and be an aider and abettor.’ contended that accom- Harris and Tann issue, On we find con- ourselves proof that the defen- plice liability requires very fronted with a fact pattern. unusual “consciously person helping dant the was is no jurisdiction There case in this that (whom, argue, principal” they the ,the has legal viability addressed of an aid- jury could found to be Robert the ing-and-abetting theory of liability ap- as Foreman). According appellants’ brief plied to a actually defendant whose actions Harris Tann of appeal, to convict and principal, aided the and possessed who the crime, aiding abetting Foreman’s the same criminal intent the but as principal, jury required “beyond to find a rea- unaware of presence who was the [appellants were] sonable doubt that aware participation of at principal the the time presence of Mr. Foreman’s and aware the criminal offense occurred. Because first, by firing they would Mr. Fore- cause challenging issue, of this nature we man to commit the acts that would result pause arguments flesh out in the death.” decedent’s parties fully which we accept. —neither issue, litigating trial After “you if agreed government with the Argument 1. The Government’s person can show that the and abet- aided government’s argument is itself[,] you’ve ted the crime solved the there are two manners which a Accordingly, judge intent problem.” jurisdiction in this can defendant guilty gave pattern aiding instruction aiding abetting. way One is to aid abetting, which does not reference inten- principal or abet offender in his principal. tional with the association way her commission The other crime. part, relevant the instruction reads: “To “advise,” “incite,” is to or “connive” at the defendant, find that a aided abetted itself, regardless offense of “intentional as crime, committing you must find between and the principal' sociation” knowingly defendant associated himself aider and abettor. The em crime, commission with the that he phasizes plain aiding- of the' language participated something as he crime statute, § and-abetting D.C.Code -22-1805 about, to bring wished and that he intend- (2012 Repl.), which reads: by his ed actions make succeed.” In prosecutions any criminal offense Jury Criminal for the District Instructions all (5th rev.2013). persons advising, inciting, or conniv- Columbia, No. 3.2 ed. or ing offense, or aiding abetting During closing arguments, judge the trial offender, charged shall be principal jury further that there are informed accessories, not as principals and you “if “types” aiding abetting: two all being intent this section that as to knowingly [principal] aid and assist you knowingly ... if accessories before the fact the and abet the [or] aid law.here- addition, applicable crime.” In the trial court tofore cases of misdemean- instruct- crimes, only ed that it is “not to all apply the law” shall whatev- *35 Nevertheless, argued committihg you’re 18. Harris’s crime if counsel to unawáre that, "you jury help the person a crime that is can’t is there." occurring person because some unknown is 438 (D.C.2008) States, 629, [Emphasis A.2d punishment may the be. 637

er 942 (“[T]he may aiding of added.]19 [ ] convict and is abetting in cases where the evidence “or” that the government argues The who, disputed as between the as defen- disjunctive, and the makes there- statute else, principal, and someone was the dant categories aiders fore creates these two is long so as there evidence that the defen- position The government’s and abettors. or capacity of the one the guilty participated dant Tann and Harris were is that —in which abetting, and the to commis- aiding “first” form other—in events that led advise, they crime.”); Rosemond, if in- accomplices holds liable sion of the see also cite, offense,” regardless “at or connive (“So purposes at 134 S.Ct. 1249 any, relationship, if between law, abetting aiding person who and Therefore, accomplice principal. and the participates actively scheme criminal contends, because Tann government knowing its extent intends and character by shooting Harris incited crime and . commission.”). that scheme’s Harrison, causing Foreman also at Omar fire, open Tann Harris need Appellants’ Argument “intentionally with Fore- have associated” argument aiding is Appellants’ guilty man in order tó crimes abetting historically required has the aider (assuming principal). Foreman was the “intentionally associate” and abettor attempts to bolster this The . particular or herself individ himself with eases, citing argument by to a series liability principal, ual who court, in which particularly from this attaching only if accomplice “know[s] is aiding-and-abetting standard articulated presence criminal principal’s offense, without de- with'reference Appellants ar intentions.” cite authorities relationship on a pendence between ticulating aiding-and-abetting standards See, eg., accomplice principal. principal specifically reference the States, 46, 52 English v. United 25 A.3d See, Kitt, e.g., formulations. 904 their (D.C.2011) (“To be aider and guilty (“[T]he n. 10 require 356 basic charged abettor of a offense ... the defen- universally accepted ment ... now almost dant be shown to have assisted must accomplice that] the be shown to [is participated guilty in that crime with (internal principal intended that the com knowledge.”) quotation marks succeed omitted); offense.”) (citation Tyree emphasis charged v. United mitting the purpose object § 19. The 22-1805 was D.C.Code and the section was aforesaid offenders.”). principals "abolish the distinction between persons principal make all such princi and accessories them all and render "merely statute doctrine [the] extended (alterations Perez, pals.” at 93 omit 968 A.2d responsibility vicarious classes to additional ted); States, see v. United 447 also Standefer treating principals." of offenders them as 10, 1999, 19-20, 100 U.S. L.Ed.2d S.Ct. States, 280, v. United 283 n. 9 Hazel (1980) similarly-worded (interpreting (D.C. 1976). purpose That narrow notwith statute, aiding-and-abetting federal 18 U.S.C. not, be, standing, prac “it is cannot our 2(a) (2014); § participants in "all conduct language unqualified tice of a to restrict violating ‘princi a federal statute áre criminal Congress particular evil that statute ”). (Edward) pals’ Thompson United ttying remedy assuming that it —even (D.C,Cir.1908) App.D.C. ("By possible identify something that evil from command, law, persons common all who ad the text Bro other than itself.” statute vise, instigate, or of an incite commission gan v. United U.S. offense, though present personally at its (1998). S.Ct. 139 L.Ed.2d 830 commission, fact, before the are accessories

439 Wilson-Bey 3, omitted) (quoting Analysis quotations internal States, 818, . United 903 A.2d v Fundamentally, the elements (en (D.C.2006) banc)); United States 831 aiding “(a) and , abetting are that a crime 983, (Dwayne) Washington v. 106 F.3d (b) by someone; was committed the ac (D.C.Cir.1997) (elements aiding 1004 cused or assisted participated its com specific abetting include “the intent to (c) mission; and his participation was with commission of a crime an by facilitate the guilty knowledge.” v. Hawthorne United Wayne other”); see also LaFave, R. Crimi (D.C.2003).20 829 952 A.2d “A 13.2(b) (5th 2010) (“General § ed. nal Law culpable per aider and need abett[o]r ly, may accomplice liability it be said offense, form the need not substantive accomplice intentionally exists when the details, know its and need not even be assists, encourages or that his sense present, long so as the offense committed encourage is to or purpose assist another by principal the was in furtherance of the as to which commission crime design.”. common United States v. Sam requisite has accomplice mental (D.C.Cir.1980) (cita pol, 636 F.2d 676 state.”). extrapolate “in- Appellants omitted). is tions not essential that “[I]t is, with the principal tentionab association” principal operation be identified been, always required aiding- and has long so as-someone has that Gay status.” liability. and-abetting den v. United Appellants argue gov- on the based l (D.C.1990) (interna quotation marks and evidence, jury could have ernment’s omitted). alteration prin- found that Foreman Robert Taylor cipal the James Be- Wilson-Bey, murder. wedealt with first- cause, appellants argue, they degree premeditated prosecution no murder knowledge § Foreman’s involvement under 22-1805 D.C.Code and held that help the incident and no intent to or charged en- “whether the as a defendant courage principal abettor, Foreman commit criminal or ac- as an or aider tivities, they government prove could must all of the elements aided. offense, him in his Although abetted crimes. of the including premeditation, de liberation, ambiguous as to who was ac- and intent-to kill.” 903 A.2d at tually so, principal in both the In doing adopted murder and 822. we rule' AWIKWA, Peoni, appellants (2d argue that the States v. 100 F.2d 401 , Cir.1938), they rejected court’s ensured that would the “natural and instruction convicted, jury probable even if found that consequences” approach to ac principal complice Foreman was the appel- liability “impermissibly because knowledge lants had no of his presence relieved the the burden of participation' showing accomplice time the crime that the had the mens (which certainly required guilty would reason- rea have been to be of the offense.” do). D.N., (D.C.2013); able In re 8n. Moore, (Matthew) Staten, F.2d 878, See also United States v. ed States 886-87 F.3d 639, (5th Cir.2013) (elements (“the (D.C.Cir.1978) elements of the offense (1) aiding abetting are: the substantive (1) aiding abetting guilty knowledge are: (2) offense occurred the defendant associated (2) accused; part on the that an offense venture; (3) - the criminal the defendant someone; (3) was committed that the de purposely participated in the ven criminal participated in fendant assisted or the com ture; (4) sought defendant offense”) (alterations omitted). mission successful); actions make the venture Unit- *37 440 case, States, in this we must do What Nye & Nissen United

see also Wilson-Bey be not do in did 613, 618-19, which we 69 S.Ct. 93 U.S. 386 is presented, was not question cause the (1949) (“In abet order to aid and 919 L.Ed. and abettor the aider determine whether necessary a crime it is commit another to requires, the acts, Wilsmk-Bey with as who associate ‘in some sort that defendant principal as the intent purpose same and venture, partici that he himself with the “intentionally with associate” must also something he wishes in it as in that pate pointedly, More principal. specific that about, by that seek his action bring he the aider and here whether question is Peoni, (quoting 100 make succeed.’” presence of the and must know abettor 402)). and that an aider at We held F.2d principal and form specific conduct rea re act with the mens must abettor or her with the help him the intent crime by specific with which quired crime, opposed or her commission in charged and “be associate principal is (with simply whoever shared the to share Wilson-Bey, 903 crime.”21 guilt that mens purpose) in the aider abettor’s omitted) (quoting (emphasis at 831 A.2d itself.22 to commit the crime required rea States, 1098, 1104 Roy v. United tri disputed at Although the evidence (D.C.1995)). Wilson-Bey, explained We al, purposes for the assume we however, that, nothing opinion Foreman who that it was Robert opinion in propriety [an] “casts doubt Taylor that hit James fired the bullets jury may that a ... to the effect struction therefore, was the Mackey, and Bernard natural person . that a intends the infer against crimes committed principal in the probable consequences of his or her assume, because here it them. alsoWe omit knowingly knowingly or acts done record that the evidence appears from the (original n. 903 A.2d at 839 38 ted.” that Tann and Harris undisputed, omitted). a presumption, brackets Such presence dur unaware of Foreman’s observed, distinguish not be we “does ing the attack. accomplices, nor does principals tween § is not of of D.C.Code 22-1805 expand liability language it' of one but oii its terms that describe other.” silent whether Id. (“Every States Court of Wilson-Bey's holding 831 United Circuit 21. was extended AWIKWA, specific adopted requirement offense of also a intent Appeals has Peoni's crime, requiring specific and to offenses not accomplice shown to have intended be See McCrae v. A.2d intent. committing principal succeed (D.C.2009); Perry v. Unit see also added). ....”) charged (emphasis offense (D.C.2011) ("We ed opinions of be said for other The same could Wilson-Bey now made clear that English, Compare 25 A.3d at 52 this court. crimes.”) (inter specific limited to intent ("To guilty abettor of a be as an aider and omitted). quotation nal marks charged ... must be offense defendant participated or in that shown have assisted parties attempt language to use the Both (internal knowledge.”) quo- guilty with crime argu- Wilson-Bey support their and Peoni omitted) ("The key at 53 tation marks with id. Indeed, language there is cuts ment. (cid:127) accomplice] ... in- question [the is whether ways opinions. Compare both in those Wil- tentionally principal’s of- participated [the ("[T]he son-Bey, A.2d at 840 Peoni, only he not wanted [him] and that prove, conformity fense] must with he also took concrete accomplice in himself succeed ... but that some sort associated venture, participated reality.”). hope with he in it as to make his It seems action about, cases, something bring that, he wished to judicial say in all these fair to sought that he his action to make it suc- we not focused on issue now mind was ceed.”) quota- (emphasis added internal confront. omitted) tion marks and alterations with id. only conniv- is there advising, inciting, nothing to show accomplice’s abetting principal ing, Stanley appellant’s was interested in aiding are to in the criminal offender venture evasion arrest but there is successful “intentional association infused no evidence to show what prompted *38 is principal of whom the defendant with in Stanley firing the shot at Scott. requirement by appel- advanced aware” any Whether he had other and different law is also silent on this lants. Our case disclosed, reason for firing at him is not case, In the normal unlike specific point. is no appellant and there evidence here, question about is little there advised, counseled, or incited him fire of alleged accomplice’s awareness the role in any way, that shot or that a word had every of principal not aware —if spoken any way been between them in in principal’s about the involvement detail to, prior just during, or at the time issue, accomplice is at the crime at difficulty. presence his or and least aware of her purpose intent or in appellant participation. firing apparent, at is but Scott there is statute, Because our like its federal lack may which it from counterpart, incorporates common Stanley surmised that in firing his shot law,23 look to cases with analo we must shared or purpose the intent with vihich gous interpreting facts common law in his, appellant or in had what fired fact theory appellant’s order to test purpose was. possibility recognizing aiding and abet (italics added). concluding Id. at 1102 In ting pre on unusual facts such as those properly Whitt could not be be con- in sented this case was unknown to the abettor, law, recognizing common victed as an aider and such liability liability in this case would create reasoned: See

where did exist before. Outlaw case we have the which intent (D.C. 408, 411 v. United prompted appellant commit of- 1993) (interpreting elements him, fenses committed but there is a 22-1806, § District of Co D.C.Code lack evidence to show that he shared statute, accessory-after-the-fact lumbia any purpose criminal intent or light the common law in the absence prompted Stanley which fire fatal definitions). statutory discloses, as this So record shot. far Commonwealth, begin with We Whitt Stanley may have had some criminal (1927). Ky. In that S.W. totally foreign intent disconnect- case, firing appellant while Whitt at prompted ap- ed intent which from (a law enforcement officer who Scott words, pellant; Stanley may in other him), attempting third-party, arrest upon opportunity seized thus Stanley, fatally appeared Officer shot to him to presented up even old score The court Scott. observed: with which was to- appellant \vith Scott disconnected, tally and with which crimi- appellant It in resisting clear that arrest, Scott, nal firing at intent he had no connection and no was at- arrest, tempting sympathy. to do so to evade (Edward) Thompson, App.D.C. See at 46. 364; Rosemond, see also 134 S.Ct. at 1245- testimony, Here, to Little’s added).24 according (italics The court’s >1103 Id. at in clos- highlighted which the had there strongly implies that reasoning ing argument, Stanley interested “was evidence that been arrest,” Ashley [Tyndle] evasion appellant’s successful said he seen [Foreman] ... the intent Stanley thus arguing [Harrison] “shared some dude his” fired start got with which out his car and purpose [Whitt] he So he said shot, purpose [ap- and that shared Whitt and he seen walking towards there Stanley firing the shot com- somebody-else “prompted which pellant Harris] said, man, Scott,” have re- court would corner. he ing around the So abetting convic- aiding versed towards they got it. he went So back Whitt’s gun- tion. 'heard a [but then] his house .... *39 around turn[ed] ... then [so he] shot' of v. Common- reasoning Landrum The shooting. and start wealth, 472, (1906), is Ky. 96 S.W. 123 587 There, group (in of of conjunction similar that Whitt. with testi- other words In men, and or less drunk” motivated Harris’s “more about by other witnesses mony inter-family quarrel, involved them- by an hearing actions after about and Tann’s affray” the de- shooting in “a near Tyndle), selves Harrison and argument between (1) de- Id:'at 587-88. The fendant’s house. that testimony Little’s established fendant, shooting sleep by from roused for the Harrison same Foreman shot at Harrison, appar- also or less while and “more drunk” Harris Tann shot at reason Harris, of the ently Foreman, unaware of the motivations that (2) and Tann families, warring third-party unasso- saw a prompted that Fore- purpose shared the feuding groups “staggering ciated with the avenge Har- the fatal man fire shot: to Id, at The opened about” and fire. 587. the woman rison’s hostile conduct toward third-party defendant’s bullets struck the girlfriend of 22nd (Tyndle). who was the superficially. him merely but wounded Little. crew member Street Meanwhile, by someone oth- a bullet fired shared or Regarding what constitutes a hit than the also the third- er defendant purpose” or in intent common “criminal party, killing him. Id. at 587-88. There accomplice may be situations where was no that evidence defendant presence of of particular unaware charged man who was acquainted with the of cases principal, we three identified killing. in Id. at 588. principal Ochoa, 589, 41 N.M. note. In State v. 72 court, concluding the defen- The that 609, part of a P.2d two defendants were aiding guilty dant be could not people 100 that attacked the crowd over killer, abetting the found that actual in an attempt sheriff free county or may purpose have been the “whatever custody. in the sheriffs Shots prisoner ... [other shooters] motive there exchanged were between mob and proof appellant was not a scintilla of at None the shots were police. Id. 617. any of it or it Id. knew shared extent.” defendants, but fired one at 588. sheriff. defendants shots killed the The deputies, of the sheriffs type missing that was several

The assaulted coming to sher- preventing them from present Landrum is here. Whitt and 589, Ochoa, there both. In such circumstances 24. 41 72 P.2d assault State v. N.M. Cf. (The 609, (1937) may wanting sharing 616 accused of criminal intent independent held for the act another even aiding abetting.”). proof essential to person though be the victim of an the same iffs tavern “[t]he aid. The Ochoa court held vestibule. The up “ran defendant fact en- [the defendants] thus the front of the tavern and [his] fired upon depu- in-a gaged gun vicious assault through window, striking- [the the [tavern] ty], jury’s province ... left it within leg.” [the victim] Id. 192 Ill.Dec. fit, infer, 405, if it saw alone these 625 N.E.2d at 367. “The arm of an slay- defendants shared the intent of the unidentified individual then stuck a shot er, they but also that aided and abetted gun through door, the tavern it and fired (cit- undertaking.” him his Id. unlawful once, striking [the victim] the stomach State, 277, v. ing 50 Ohio St. Woolweaver killing him.” Id. 192 Ill.Dec. (1893)). here, 34 N.E. Pertinent person N.E.2d at 367-68. The to whom though appears court so held even belonged “the arm” was never identified. there was no evidence that the defendants Id. 192 Ill.Dec. N.E.2d (or else) anyone particularity knew with argued Cooks on appeal that “the State presence participation of the sher- solicited, aided, failed to prove that' he iffs actual or particular killer took notice or agreed attempted abetted or to aid the everyone populated who the mob. unknown, unidentified person who shot Kukis, State 65 Utah P. [the killed victim].” Id. Illinois (1925), an mob 65 to 100 armed promote stated “intent to *40 striking laborers, defendant, including the facilitate the commission of a crime can be on a car containing manage- fired railroad by shown evidence that the defendant bullets, representatives. ment One principal shared criminal intent of the mob, fired an member unknown or that design there was a common or struck a railcar and him. worker killed community of purpose.” unlawful Id. 192 The court held that there was: 405, Ill.Dec. 625 N.E.2d at 368. The court just every

[A] inference that one of the concluded that “the evidence ... suffi ... crowd was for a common and ciently a design common demonstrated] there purpose, unlawful participated and or community purpose and a of unlawful be aided and abetted assault.... tween the and the second un defendant There thus justify individual,” is evidence find- 405, identified id. 192 Ill.Dec. ing of confederacy combination or or logical 625 N.E.2d at that it and was of action of concert this armed crowd or to conclude that the aided defendant mob ... that all or were members who “by second shooter virtue unidentified part of such or . i. or first, crowd mob aided shooting thereby the victim mak therein; though abetted and the evi- ing prone [the more and victim] vulnerable dence does show not was whether to a second attack.”. Id. 192 Ill.Dec. not was the bullet shot by the defendant 625 N.E.2d at 369. The held that byor another of the mob which' shot “[defendant's first facilitated the member jury killed the ... and, therefore, deceased was by the [shot second “arm”] justified in finding guilty..... him Id. the offense.” Id. at 479. Ochoa, reasoning The Kukis and Cooks, here, People

In v. Ill.App.3d Cooks is relevant there was because (1993), Ill.Dec. N.E.2d 365 evidence from which the could infer victim belonged murder and defendant to that Harris Tann were aware that enemy members, too, gangs. argument gang shooting at Following be other were an Harrison, gangs, prompted by tween members the de the altercation be- two Tyndle- fendant followed victim as he entered a tween Harrison and Under for”) (i.e., cases, crew “sending if 22nd even Tann and Street rationale these (who, above, presence were Harris were aware members discussed one 22nd participation of each “to participants conspiracy in an overall shooters did not' crew-member Street anyone assault kill whose interests shot, they could know who fired the fatal [appellants] those of contrary were liable as aiders and abettors be held support their and' come |associates”) shooter— whichever other crew-member (2) efforts; Tann’s Harris’s and including principal Foreman —was knew' the fatal Harris and Tann before (whose action facilitated- and encour- shot that other 22nd crew was fired Street actions). aged by own Harris’s and Tann’s joining affray fact members (even Commonwealth, though no there was

Haynes 515 S.W.2d they in particular knew that Foreman (Ky.1974), a case discussed our participants). our one of dissenting colleague, helpful is also .to in that analysis. question addressed words, contrary our other dissent- was, does, what case “under circumstances ing Kentucky colleague’s argument, affray person in an engaged become Haynes court’s under- decision does of another aider and abettor who inter our Harris argument cut Tann and uninvited, assuming they venes even guilty of abet- aiding could be found purpose’’’ ‘share the criminal intent or shooting Taylor. ting James Foreman’s Whitt). (quoting “ap were that The facts Given that all three individuals shared the' pellants John Robert and Tounsel rea shoot and the same mens Harrison in ... a ‘shoot Haynes[ engaged ] were that Tann and evidence" demonstrated fa out’ with William Caudill” when their reasonably Harris knew that actions their ther, “appellant Haynes[,] Joe armed him would 22nd mem- incite other Street crew rifle, went the scene of the self *41 aid, to their bers come we think the Caudill.”, affray, shot and killed and analogous situation is more to those here Hayneses, at three 240-241. All S.W.2d Kuhis, in Ochoa where courts conclud- and and guilty were indicted for murder found in ed a participating an individual voluntary Id. manslaughter. at 241. guilty criminal be mob could found aid- Kentucky of Appeals The Court held ing abetting and of a mur- the commission justify that the evidence did not the sons’ mob, by der k of the if member even act, conviction of father’s reasoning exactly aider not who from the did know that there was “no evidence from which it fact, killing. mob did even the actual may ... reasonably be inferred that either that, our colleague in dissenting agrees of the sons for the father” and “no "sent mob, person of a criminal instances who even Robert evidence that John "knew he large to a “knowingly attaches himself killing.” arrived Id. until after reasoned, group” may Further, to have be considered aided “the fact group of the may and abetted other members provoked Tounsel encoun may illegal amount to commit acts even “he though ter” “would not itself assistance Here, contrast, encouragement.” by group in Id. know who is or who merely principal the evidence that Harris in it are.” offenders provoked and Tann Foreman’s encounter Rather, case law Taylor Mackey.

with We believe theré following propositions supports was evidence from which it could in rooted (1) in our- incorporated ferred that Harris’s Tann’s action common law (1) shooting in at an aiding-and-abetting Harrison was invitation the aider statute: Applying and abettor must have the mens rea of principles these the facts actor, Wilson-Bey, principal case, see 903 A.2d this we think it is clear that appellant “purposive at and must have the atti Tann, Harris, appellant and Robert Fore towards” criminal tude venture de possessed man all the same criminal state Peoni, (2) 402; in 100 F.2d at scribed premeditated of mind: intent to kill responsible defendant is not for the actions Omar Harrison. This intent shifted who, wholly a third-party unassociated killing of Taylor, James and the assault of ' ' independent defendant, of the Mackey, Bernard under theory into a is no com enters crime when there recognized transferred intent as in orn- munity of purpose between the defendant (Wes ease law and hot in dispute here. Landrum, third-party, and the 96 S.W. at ) ley Williams v. United 881 A.2d (3) 588;25 however, the defendant need not 557, (D.C.2005); O’Connor v. United presence every know of the participant (D.C.1979). 399 A.2d in a group (including principal) crime The evidence also established a “commu- in guilty order to be found under aid nity purpose” Tann, Harris, between Ochoa, ing-and-abetting theory liability, Foreman, and Robert reflecting a uniform (4) 617; 72 P.2d where the criteria common design among the three (1) above are met and the evidence at shooters. When word of the confrontation proves trial that the defendants their Alphonce girlfriend between Little’s action, (and thus, foreseeably the factfin- Omar Harrison spread through conclude, 22nd may intentionally)26 der incited Street, Tann, Harris, and Little rushed party action a third who shared then- gang with other toward Harrison members community purpose, aiding-and-abetting anticipation of a Cooks, confrontation. The liability may be found. 192 Ill.Dec. Kukis, 369-70; supported finding appel- 625 N.E.2d at 237 P. lants were well aware that principles satisfy gang at 479. These crimi other required nal intent members by aiding-and- part element the area and abetting liability and do not afoul of that was general run crowd involved Wilson-Bey or Peoni.27 appellants attack. Both past knew from State, Hopewell Md.App. holding See also that our is that one' can be an aid- 207; (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1998) by being an "inadvertent accom- er/abettor (relying authority plice.” defendant to "inadvertently” cannot One aid or *42 accomplice, when, be liable an must be principal there abet a he or she shares the community "concert of or purpose action principal reasonably mens rea of the and it of existing at the time of the commission ah certain that Or her actions will incite the added)) (overruled, (emphasis offense” on other principal to action because of their shared State, 426, grounds, Fleming 373 Md. mob) membership group (e.g., gang in a or 4(2003)). n. purpose. that has a communal Our dissent- colleague ing “community also that our states "A man is held to intend purpose” the foreseeable "may formulation exist in the consequences Dory, of his any agreement, conduct.” In re understanding, absence of (D.C.1989) J., (Schwelb, cooperation principal ‘puta- [the between and concurring) (quoting Radio accomplice] respect Union v. tive’ with to the crime in Officers’ N.L.R.B., 17, 45, 347 U.S. question." emphasize 74 S.Ct. "community We that a (1954)). L.Ed. 455 purpose” necessarily implies that ex- there tacit,' always explicit, agree- ists if some understanding .holding part ment or 27. Because our rests in between all fore- involved (and (such conduct), seeability intentionality the inference of as code even if is no there it), may agreement specific be drawn from it is not accurate to commit a crime. See say, dissenting colleague complains, as our n. 28. infra and the principal the trial whether Crew the 22nd experience while in Street “totally different could have committing acts they began that once aider/abettor And, in killing Mr. Harrison.” join motives violence, coconspirators would other the he decries appeal, Harris’s brief among fact, conspiracy In the them. limiting factor” of a “relational Crew included absence 22nd Street members liability. abetting aiding and to,commit against agreement violence Harrison, outsiders, to af- who failed like argued in tri parties also its gang and proper respect ford the of the foresee about the relevance al court con- were territory, whose “interests” and For ability actions. ex principal’s surprising- Not trary gang. to that of the with the colloquy the course of ample, in happened when exactly what ly, this is liability in accomplice trial court about (who the princi- assume was Foreman we counsel, structions, joined Harris’s incident) in response fire pal opened in this counsel, argued that for such liabili Tann’s coconspirators engaged seeing his fellow to be ty, “it would have reasonable response as their in an Harrison attack' on that, doing “if some you’re foreseeable Tyndle.28 toward hostility to Harrison’s person ... would re thing,” “an unknown Judge Glickman agree cannot We Further, Har by shooting.” while spond that, foreseeability to by looking did argued ris’s counsel will his criminal conduct defendant abetting instruc aiding support acting party a third participation by incite way no Mr. “[t]here’s tion because Harris community purpose, we to a pursuant somebody across have known could aiding expanded have the doctrine was. he know street didn’t who[m] affording the liability' “without abetting suddenly joined in on ... have there would to address” the parties opportunity explicitly understood shooting,” he thereby “expansion],” that we say government “keeps trying to that the parties.” Both the “unfair to the well, been yeah, he’s on 22nd Street.” because that, “community of words, factor to as we refer counsel understood other foreseeability are factors purpose” gov being advanced argument, one debated parties shooting whose relevance that because the ernment was example, outset. For turf— place trial court took on 22nd-Street-crew from argued that the aider and was for members Harris’s counsel where the ethos crew anyone kill together “a connection with the “to assault abettor must have work contrary be “an asso- to those of that there must whose were principal” and interests associates”— people each members] ciation their helping [crew between other,” every to ex- discussed with the and Tann had reason Counsel also Harris Nevertheless, 766). agreement here U.S at S.Ct. 28. We need not find an actual specific conspiracy to commit crime between a broader fact that there way gang various members we among kill the 22nd Street Crew "outsiders” finding guilt predicated would if the- purpose community informs members *43 liability. “Aiding, . conspiracy matter, Pinkerton that, was a factual shared between as abetting, counseling not terms which and are Harris, Tann, and Foreman at the time of th agreement. presuppose of an the existence e conspiracy shooting. of the existence application, Those terms have a broader mak- and was what made it foreseeable to' Harris ing principal he con- a when defendant other Street crew members in Tann that 22nd act, regardless sciously shares in a criminal them, including, unbeknownst area — conspiracy.” v. of a Pereira existence respond by joining in the Foreman —would 1, 11, 74 S.Ct. 347 U.S. effort to shoot Omar Harrison. Nissen, (1954) (citing Nye & L.Ed. 435 they shooting, exactly oth- pect that started “did [defendants] when what had every (4) happened do”; in reason .to er crew who would [he] members believe that, arpa in shooting light of membership start as well. De- Foreman’s in would conspiracy a argued protect that that “will ... fense counsel Foreman made their costs,” members at all completely independent certainly “a decision to was “[i]t start foreseeable that when Harris shooting” way [and Tann] that there was no Har- ..., began shooting co-conspirators, other ris “could that anticipate and Tann some- [they] may who, exactly not have known was., present one he didn’t know even Thus, would assist in efforts.” [their] anything, would less start shoot- do much say express fair to theory- that one ing. They this an- argument made while prosecution that was Harris and Tann ticipating government that “the may argue (and foreseéably thus intentionally, that should [the defendants] have know[n] find) encouraged could an attack on person at a shooting act of who [their] group Omar Harrison a that included assaulting pregnant had woman been Foreman.32 [Tyndle] would have others to shoot incited fact, And, in government as well. did Moreover, regarding in a "memorandum Harris’s, argue, opposing in motion for instructions, proposed jury Harris’s coun- (1) judgment acquittal. that because sel told "the court that the defense had , Harris, Tann, Foreman were “all looked for but and. had been “unable to find a charged conspiracy,” members of the there case,” fact pattern matching the one legitimate argument “no make jurisdictions” but found cases “across (pur- [they] acting independently of one portedly) joint liability, requiring, “that another”;29 (2) that because there was an knowledge the defendant the other “over-arching conspiracy,”30 crew mem- principal Having involved the event.” “immediately search, bers knew what to appellants do31 undertaken such a can- court, way protect in a girlfriend surprised too, reacted not be "that this has (3) co-conspirator”; of their accomplice Foreman scoured common-law cases (which Contrary Judge liability suggestion, 29. Glickman’s requires a rea mens that Pink not). support finding Wilson-Bey, the evidence did not erton See does A.2d at join shooting Foreman’s decision to 840-41. Rather than conflation theories of liability, analysis recognition "independent our criminal act of reflects another “[tjypically, sup the same evidence will intentionally that the defendant[s] did en- port conspiracy aiding courage both and an way.” According assist some Vasquez, evidence, Foreman, Harris, Tann, abetting conviction." United States (5th Cir.2012) (inter F.3d joined other 22nd Street crew members who 6 nal omitted). quotation marks shooting "independently” in the act did not each other. closing argument, 31. prosecutor con- n - n tinued that theme: notes, Judge 30. As . Glickman rely did not on the doctrine of Pinkerton liabil- Now, you? what does Robert Foreman tell ity in Harris and for the Tann prosecuting ... I hear shots. So what do I do?’ These incident, but, Taylor Mackey the mate- as around, my boys. are I I turn start shows, quoted rely rial the text did on the shooting." ... I hear the shots. I don’t' ' charged conspiracy existence of to estab- around; I I even have to think. turn start why lish it was foreseeable to Harris and shooting. Tann that Foreman and other 22nd Street did, respond they Again, rely crew members would principle we on the Harris joining shooting. This did not amount and Tann could be found to have intended (and amount) analysis reasonably consequences our does not to conflat- foreseeable their *44 ing liability aiding-and-abetting supra and acts. See note 26.' Pinkerton

448 Harrison, participated in it as against that has on factors liability and relied about, bring to recognized something The that as relevant. he wished these cases succeed, equally his action to make it sought law herein' case discussed' their parties part purposive towards displayed and available attitude ’ ' it, aiding and abet- requires research. as Peoni its liability. Wilson-Bey and ting What foregoing that examples All show is and abet- progeny require that the aider opportunity had de- parties ample thé it principal; mens of the tor rea share bate, debate, of the the relevance did and liabil- enough aiding abetting and holding. rely on we for our factors which have ity reasonably defendant could suggests that Judge analysis Glickman’s do. principal would' foreseen what Wilson-Bey, Harris after Peoni and Here, dispute no evidence there is may not liable for the fore Tann be found Tann to show that Harris and sufficed shooting inspired. their actions seeable to kill Harrison. shared Foreman’s intent Peoni is that “the But what established whether, in- sharing that question is result would probability that forbidden tent, may they be held liable under upon accessory’s follow conduct” does initiating a aiding abetting theory for suffice; rather, aiding to incur they reason shooting incident that had liability, must “in abetting the defendant (and cause) cause did other foresee would sort associate himself with the ven some join shooting. in the gang members ture, something participate ... in it as Wilson-Bey requires nor us Peoni Neither about, ... bring wishes seek he question negative.34 answer that sueceed[,]” to make it his action have conclusion “purposive it.” 100 F.2d would reach a different attitude towards We establishing no amply sup at 402.33 The evidence at trial there been Tann, finding community purpose Har- ported a that Harris and Tann between Foreman, ris, each associated vendetta Robert and if the evi- himself with the that, Judge aiding abetting liability] 33. Glickman observes of the that the ac [for also to, five we cases that cite four decided complice be shown to have intended that Peoni, and before one was under a decided committing charged principal succeed ” juris no counterpart státute that has in this offense’ and further stated in Little v. United diction, regard pre-Peoni With four 1096, (D.C.2010), cases, Kentucky, does not matter that the knowingly or abettor the "aider must have Mexico, New cases were decided Utah person with the intent that the aided the other because con beforehand those cases do not charged person other commit crime.” It principal holding. flict with Peoni’s In none Wilson-Bey us is consistent with and Little for dispute any cited four cases is there specifically to hold more here that the aid that the shared same mens aider/abettor prin must "have intended that er/abettor that of the rea as unknown or inadvertent (whoever, cipal among his associates who regard principle. With to the Illinois case reasonably participate expected be could Cooks, design community “common or pursuant purpose to a common present if purpose” proving unlawful doctrine of an in scene, be) principal might turn out to promote tention “to a crime” is facilitate committing charged offense" succeed law, found in rooted the common and not knowingly' the other and "must aided Cooks, See the statute. 192 Ill.Dec. (whoever, person among who his associates 368-69; Foster, People N.E.2d see also reasonably expected participate could Ill.App.3d 145 Ill.Dec. pursuant purpose present to a common if (1990). N.E.2d be), scene, person might turn out to Judge person intent Glickman “de- with the that the other commit notes that this court Wilson-Bey ‘requirement charged clared in that it is crime.” *45 as an supported dence had not an inference is authorized develop- incremental Harris Tann law, and knew'that fellow 22nd ment the common from reasoning joining in the Street crew members implicit is the decades-old cases we assault and that it was foreseeable Har- have cited.35 The fact that there seems to any ris and Tann that fellow crew mem- reported no that has case articulated If bers who were the area would do so. theory precisely hardly as we have is Landrum, the facts were such’as those because, surprising trial as the court and there of a where was commu- no-evidence parties agreed, all the facts this case nity purpose between defendant aid- “very And, are odd” and “rare.” however principal, then er abettor.and imprecise be, may the rule we announce it be insufficient. But evidence would to, is application anchored limited Foreman, a gang evidence mem- by, the and unusual facts of this detailed lived ber who around 22nd Street and was case. acquainted guns with Harris and shared him, step respond with was about to Accordingly,, for the foregoing Harrison-Tyndle altercation until he reasons, deny we appellants’ claims related it,” perceived “got that Harris and others sufficiency to the of the evidence. We also joined shooting then “get- in the when deny appellants’ claims related the cur ting purpose it”—the common and de- closing arguments of their tailment when And, sign to that as in level. —escalated judge prevented the trial from argu them Cooks, Tann’s Harris’s initi- actions of ing that aiding-and-abetting liability re ating shooting, rendering the tar- quired prove that the vulnerable, get more facilitated and en- accomplice a help intended known and couraged joining gunfire Foreman’s in the particular principal commit charged help his 22nd Crew cohorts. 192 Street 369-70;- In this respect, judge offense. the trial 405, 625 N.E.2d at Ill.Dec. correctly prevented acted because he fact that Tann and Harris were unaware of Foreman’s until See presence after Foreman misstatement law. Gaines, (11th v. (presumably) the fatal shot not States fired does F.2d government’s Cir.1982) .legally (no make the error trial where the “court . insufficient. properly prevented from defense counsel arguing legal proposi false reasoning The dissent derides as a our tion”); Hager see also v. United theory of devising.” [our] “novel own We (D.C.2002) (trial court above, think the cases discussed decided properly acts ... (and, instance, where it “exclude[s] century) decades in one ago, misrepresent show that at all those statements theory our the ev law”). devising, novel. of our own Rather.than idence highest jurisdiction, ty presented As the of this we on facts such as those here: "power[ respon- principal particular of course presence ] [and have the whose was not defendants, who, sibility] develop the common law for the known to the but because of Columbia,” membership over-arching conspira- District Williams v. Walker- in an Co., defendants, cy foreseeably Thomas Furniture 350 F.2d incit- (D.C.Cir.1965), join "as new ed to circumstances defendants’ criminal conduct. own, patterns present Rogers question fact We themselves.” must answer the on our n Tennessee, 451, 461, way 532 U.S. 121 S.Ct. and we do so in a that we believe is (2001). pronouncements 149 L.Ed.2d 697 As far as we can consistent with the in aid- tell, law, reported opinion ing-and-abetting no other has considered in all case their varia- aiding abetting whether there can liabili- tions. *46 and (cid:127) April or about tri Between on However, that conclude the we 11, 2006, the July error on or within instructional judge al committed about Columbia, Cooper can N. jury that Lannell he told the a.defendant District when .., “if abettor an aider and Dajuan liable as D. be found ... D. Tann Michael crime abet[s] the and [he] aid[s] ... rknowingly Brian Gilliam ... K.. Beaver it,” doing knowing who else without to and endeavored corruptly persuaded, jury also that the find requiring without Johnson, induce, Laquanda cause or princi purpose between community to influ- persuade to with the her intent Nevertheless, us accomplice. pal and. ence, the truthful delay,' prevent error, conclude ing any 'test we Johnson, sister, Kyara testimony her not harmed. appellants were to proceeding, in an official a witness Tann and Harris Count convicted both wit, Cooper ... v. Lannell United States indictment, ap alleged that which of the Superior in the Court pending then con a criminal pellants were involved in District Columbia. 22nd spiracy other members with appellant appeal, On Beaver makes as Omar persons, kill such Crew to Street although there was testimo- argument that Harrison, contrary whose “interests” were trial he was involved ny at coconspirators. that of Count sisters in the run- for both search Johnson coconspira as a named included Foreman Cooper’s 2006 trial an up appellant finding on the con jury’s tor. Given count, their testimo- unlawfully effort influence given the other evi spiracy regarding behavior was insufficient evi- presented ny separately, there dence Tann, Foreman, Harris, and other that he committed prove Robert dence admitted shooting time of the gang members at alleged Count particular actions Mackey, we Taylor of James and Bernard i.e., Laquanda as attempted use that he possibility, is no reasonable that there find Kyara’s testi- to influence instrument was jury found that Foreman even substance, Bea- against Cooper. mony Taylor-Bernard principal in the James was at charged was alleges that what ver incident, Mackey that it would have failed elicited at with the evidence trial. variance Harris, Tann, Foreman to find that that, shortly af- Alphonce testified Little group of a shared com part 30, 2004, April on Cooper ter confined design mon Omar purpose murder murder, Beaver Jones for the Terrence Tann Harrison and that Harris and intend cooper- Kyara Johnson was told Little crew any ed to aid of their fellow members Moreover, government. ating participating do present who were him also told Little that Beaver stated States, 979 ing so.36 Fortson v. United See members Brian Gilliam gang 17th Street (D.C.2009); Tyree, 942 A.2d Tyrell Hargraves, close friends 638-40; Wilson-Bey, at at cf. Crew, Cooper the 22nd Street and allies Therefore, appellants 844-45. are entitled with re- “handling the situation” would to no relief. Kyara. that he gard to Little also testified Obstruction D. Beaver’s Conviction: and Har- saw meet with Gilliam Beaver of Justice Street after graves multiple times 22nd (cid:127) time, Cooper Around this was arrested. superseding 25 of Count indictment opinion to Little his expressed also in this as follows: Beaver case read not intend to aid disagree-with "did respectfully our dissent- Harris and Tann 36. We (other themselves)!.]” anyone ing colleague’s suggestion appellants abet than snitching prevent the witnesses who were both sisters in order truth- jail, Cooper testimony ful “[s]hould be dead.” While least one them. Bea- phone that a Cooper told Little over the complaint ver’s is that the criminal offense coming of his to 22nd Street friend not happen way alleged did identify Kyara for him. and Little should indictment —that he attempt did con- day Alphonce the same Little’s On persuade Laquanda Kyara’s to influence *47 to Cooper, versation came the Gilliam testimony. in

neighborhood parking and met Little a Two kinds of when problems arise there gun in a car with a lot. Gilliam was seated is a deviation An. from an indictment. lap in his and asked Little “Where that amendment the occurs indictment of. “point [Kyara bitch and to at[?]” Johnson] charging when the terms the indict- .of out.” ment are A altered.... variance occurs Furthermore, charging when the gang ally Dewey Chappell terms the indict- unaltered, ment are left but that Beaver him both of the evidence told testified materially offered at trial facts “supposed proves the Johnson sisters to be were testifying Chappell for different from government.” the in the in- alleged those twenty 22nd then traveled to Street ten to dictment. in attempt

times to the sisters with find (Terrence) States, Ingram 592 v. United marijuana to the intent offer them 992, (D.C.1991) (emphasis omit A.2d 1005 money testify” “change “to not or to their ted). A “constructive amendment of the Chappell statement.” Because did not , if, if, only indictment can the occur like, what Beaver know the sisters looked prosecution complex relies at trial a the help him tried find them. of facts distinctly different from which testimony grand jury at about There was also trial set forth the indictment.” States, 988, relationship v. nature between the Baker United 999 867 A.2d (D.C.2005) omitted) Johnson, Laquanda sisters. (emphasis (quoting the older sister, States, 300, known be “a sort of middle- Carter v. United 826 A.2d “gatekeeper” (D.C.2003)). Kyara variance, proof man” between I a at n her, persons for seeking access at least distinctly trial differ does not show such a who facts,” members 22nd Street Crew proof “complex ent nor does the looking Kyara the aftermath differ from the elements” “essential investiga- the Terrence Jones murder. An Mar charged offense the indictment. assigned Cooper’s tor team for defense States, 699, v. shall United 15 A.3d 710 2006 trial for the murder of Terrence (D.C.2011). “In contrast with an amend during Jones the instant testified case ment, a dismissal variance will warrant speak [Kyara] his “best chance to except upon showing prejudice.” through [Laquanda].” (in (Terrence) Ingram, 592 A.2d at 1006 omitted). “A vari quotation ternal marks Although styles his Beaver is prejudicial deprives ance if it either sufficiency claim as one attacking the adequate of an opportunity defendant evidence, argu better cast as an him prepare exposes ... or defense alleging a ment fatal variance between prosecution.” the risk of another Zacari proof pleadings. (Royce) See (D.C. as v. A.2d 87 United Robinson v. United 697 A.2d 2005). (D.C.1997). not dis 788-89 Beaver does Here, dis pute purported suffi government presented that the because at looking crepancy proof elicited trial cient evidence that Beaver was between the (4) error that a failure correct not show and 25 did language Count and the fairnéss, integri-' seriously distinctly would affect different “complex of facts judicial proceed ty, 'or-public reputation grand jury set forth from- which (internal Marshall, 15 at 710 po ings.” indictment,” is one of issue the' omitted) emphasis quotation A" construc marks and prejudicial variance. tential Olano, U.S. (citing States is not where amendment found tive 732-36, L.Ed.2d facts as same S.Ct. proof trial reflects (1993)). regarding indictment alleged those individuals, time, core criminal place, First, are plain we find no error. We Carter, at 306-07. behavior. See commit-, the trial convinced that by failing to ted “clear” or “obvious” error at trial and the Both the evidence variance identify, sponte, sua that the be- events that occurred reflected indictment in- *48 the (between government’s proof of and the date tween the same time at the The evidence was material. for Jones dictment was the Terrence Cooper’s arrest conviction), attémpted, on be- repeatedly in that Cooper’s 2006 Beaver murder and Kyara and La- location, identify by Cooper, the same half general the same members, gang for members and (22nd quanda Crew Johnson individuals Street allies), justice. obstruct looking to Beaver, gang and allies were including other who victim, in the context Considering this evidence the same ultimate targeting community reputation in the Laquanda’s at Addition Kyara See id. 306. Johnson. seeking for “gatekeeper” persons the the ally, as both the indictment (and jury) Kyara, the court the same overall substan access at trial showed the reasonably inferred: that' attempt by Bea could have an tive criminal behavior: focus, that al Kyara primary the was Beaver’s to commit offense ver and others finding Laquañda was fu- his interest‘in leged by grand intimidate —to give by Kyara would purposes affecting for eled his concern Kyara Johnson testimony Cooper, testimony Cooper’s unfavorable her and the outcome Baker, Laquanda influ- 999. wanted trial. 867 A.2d at Beaver to use 2006 See Marshall, testimony. 15 Kyara’s See disparity indict ence possible between the (variance plain 711 error where the evidence was manner A.3d at ment and govern- theory by only. pursued the factual the offense divergent entirely at trial hot ment “was Moreover, as Beaver did raise from proffered 'that issue of constructive amendment either trial”). before trial, must or variance at we prejudicial Moreover, assuming any er- even plain claim error review his under obvious, or Beaver has not ror was clear plain error doc standard.37 “Under (1) variance resulted in trine, identified how the appellant must establish (2) notice, error; risk of surprise, lack double trial court committed (3) i.e., obvious; way or in which jeopardy, or other his plain, was clear some error Carter, impacted. rights; rights substantial that the error affected substantial States, error.”); Peay 924 plain v. United if we were to find a constructive Even 37. cf. (D.C.2007) ("If here, A.2d 1027 has our review would still be there- amendment amendment- plain O’Brien 962 been ment, constructive indict- for error. v. United ("Since pre- (D.C.2008) properly been appellant issue has A.2d appeal, per is re- served se reversal her claim of constructive amend- did not raise court, quired.”). ... ment in the trial our review (“A may prej planned that Beaver shoot Laquan- variance would- Johnson, ... so sur Kyara if ... the accused was udicial da arid and that Beaver - unable to prised by proof that he was it[;] going declared that “he whs to do he (internal adequately.”) prepare defense his kill going -to them” because “they [the was omitted); marks Pace v. United quotation got go.” Johnson sisters] (“A (D.C.1998) However, eventually persuaded Beaver may prejudice a such variance defendant Alphonce carry out shootings Little (1) adequate pre depriving him weap- instead. Little obtained a different charge trial notice of the details on, “.45,”38 kill Laquan- which he used to defend, (2) he must against which and/or Frost, da Johnson shoot Keisha Fol- protection him of depriving against re- Little, Beaver, lowing shooting, Nor does he contend that prosecution.”). Rushing, Maryland traveled where Bea- defense, testimony which was that weapon, ver took murder and the j Dewey Chappell Alphonce Little and wearing, that Little hoodie had been untrue, if was would have been different porch hid these items near the his moth- Zacarias, no variance. there had been pistol 9mm er’s house.39 The that Beaver Finally, A.2d at we confident are. carrying evening earlier seriously no af that there was error by investigators. never recovered fairness, integrity, public fected judicial proceedings, espe reputation of argues Beaver that his CPWL conviction *49 cially that given Beaver now concedes on was based insufficient because evidence that was sufficient that he evidence evidence, was no there direct or circum did, fact, justice regard that, obstruct to stantial, pistol 9mm was operable his of Mar both the Johnson See sisters. of required by the law at the time shall, 15 A.3d at 711. R.S., 854, (D.C. In re 6 A.3d trial.40 2010). specifically contends that Beaver Carrying E. Beaver’s Conviction: a by was no govern there demonstration License Pistol Without a weap ment his “active reliance” on (“CPWL”) might on which constitute circumstantial superseding Count 47 in .the operability. evidence 11, charged July that on or dictment about one, In such as this where cases 2006, day Laquanda Johnson’s mur is no there that defendant evidence der, a li pistol carried without a Beaver firearm, may operability its fired Alphonce cense. Little testified that evidence, in established circumstantial shortly Laquanda, before he killed he saw (the cluding “affirmatively dem evidence that agree with “á parties Beaver nine” that onstrated belief [the defendant’s] that this referred a 9mm semi-automatic Id. operable.” was at 860. This pistol) possession. his Little further in In that that initially that he and Beaver held re evidence testified R-S- States, Although clearly bia. See 899 A.2d articulated in testimo- Joiner-Die v. United 762, (D.C.2006) ny, only (Superior reasonable inference was that the juris- Court 765-66 handgun. to a term ‘‘.45” .45 referred diction limited to acts which occur within the Columbia). boundaries of the District of government argue 39. The does not that the supported CPWL conviction can be based on longer an 40.Operability is no element possession handgun Beaver’s be- .45 States, CPWL.See 68 A.3d Snell United v. pos- cause there was no evidence that Beaver (D.C.2013). 692 n. weapon in the Colum- sessed the District of 2002) (evidence support insufficient pur was displayed a firearm for the defendant held a defendant threatening a CPWL conviction’where pose of victim—conduct companions threats accompanied at his while weapon was verbal his side here,, “(1) you see step, “if out you effect that victim shot killed- their because to demon I sufficient got” what never testified Price the witnesses —was op- reliance strate the defendant’s (2) anyone; and he pointed weapon his Similarly, Id. erability of the firearm. on his own to control the was never left other cases court has held of his co victim without the assistance operability was sufficient one where: horts, clearly operable weap who gun” “waving while defendant Price, ons.”). case, In this like in “[t]he gun into [the “stuck second defendant simply present evi failed back”; a defendant seen victim’s] establishing [Beaver] either dence up his gun to back de “displaying a it, or weapon, pointed fired his otherwise ¡and mands”; was identified defendant affirmatively displayed a belief that his shotgun in “wield[ing a me a] sawed-off operablé[, and] the evidence weapon was manner, knocking on the car win nacing dispel the notion that [Bea here tends Pe waving it at [the victims].” dow and Therefore, Id. weapon could fire.” ver’s] States, 657 A.2d terson v. United judgment of we vacate Beaver’s CPWL (D.C.1995); Bartley v. United conviction. (D.C.1987); Morrison 693-94 (D.C. Laquanda Cooper’s F. Conviction: 1980). Pinkerton Murder Johnson Under cases, the as- those the inference weapons’ opera- sailants’ reliance on their Cooper multi-pronged attack on makes that, through bility reasoning rested premeditated his conviction for the murder display weapons, their assailants Johnson under a Pinkerton Laquanda “intended that their victims believe[ ] First, liability. argues theory he *50 weapons capable being the dis- were pris- while he the murder occurred was in charged.” Bartley, 530 A.2d at 698. no control or influence on and that he had is no such in this case. There evidence directly actions of over the those involved. During period of the time when Beaver Therefore, reasonably was not the murder per- commit supposed was to the murders required to him as for Pinker- foreseeable sonally, he that he never indicated would Second, liability. argues ton he that the persuaded use his 9mm. And once Beaver liability form of application was Alphonce carry shootings, Little to the out him, process to violated due unfair his Beaver did not Littlé the use of his offer rights case, on the of this because “it facts 9mm; instead, by Lit- Beaver stood while charged ‘conspiracy’ on a based that [was] Dwayne Wright tle and retrieved a differ- support applica- far too to the broad [was] 41 gun Wright’s ent from inside house. liability Fi- theory.” tion of vicarious nally, implicitly argues that sup This does not he set of circumstances brief prosecution v. from selective with port operability. an inference Price suffered (D.C. regard particular charge.42 A.2d to this 813 173 overbroad, argu- Cooper argu- conspiracy charge 41. connects this claim to his itself was supra. rejected ments which we single conspiracy ments that evidence Of a the charged legally insufficient and the Considering prosecution argu- his selective ment, Cooper we that has met conclude

455 whether co- determining (particularly Kyara) In sisters change their may statements conspirator be held liable for com and some of these efforts con- templated the use of : mission a substantive offense the force. that commit, directly did the defendant Moreover, there was to show government prove agree must “that an that conspiracy justice to obstruct existed, ment that substantive crime prevent the Johnson from doing sistérs co-conspirator fur was committed further damage to the 22nd Street Crew agreement, therance that and that the did not end after Cooper’s 2006 Conviction. a reasonably substantive crime was fore Alphonce Little testified that he murdered agreement consequence seeable be Laquanda, Kyara, and intended murder conspirators.” tween the Unit Collins they might because testify in the future (D.C.2013). ed A.3d against “[a]nybody Street, it around 22nd “required is not estab could me.” [be] Little that stated because co-conspirator lish that actually aided murder[, sisters t]hey “told on a could perpetrator commission selling told me drugs whatev- [or] crime, only but substantive crime er.” Because in this case appellants had conspiracy.” furtherance of committed yet charged with conspiracy, and t on-Bey, a 840 Wils appellants other than Cooper yet-to be Pinkerton, 646-47, (citing U.S. at 66 charged for the Terrence Jones murder- 1180). S.Ct. assault, Queen Richard it was foreseeable continue, the Johnson sisters would Here, conspiracy among Coo conviction, notwithstanding Cooper’s per and other members 22nd Street potential have the to harm gang.43 Crew 2003 and 2006 between included the Furthermore, agreement justice, to obstruct and the conspiracy charged evi coconspirators pur encompassed dence showed this case goal also during period goal killing sued time “snitches” whose actions demon- leading up Cooper’s trial. The strated “interests contrary [that] Cooper personally that. their ap record shows those the defendants and associ- proached Laquanda Johnson overarching unsuc átés.” accordance with and. cessfully drugs her with money “rule” the 22nd Crew bribed Street enforced attempt Kyara in an influence Johnson’s violence was to be inflicted “snitch- es,” testimony at that trial. The evidence also was foreseeable the Johnson sisters, Cooper by cooperating govern- revealed that multiple contacted *51 ment, gang persuade subject members order the would be to retaliation "(1) Kyara, helped by "heavy sup- his burden” to establish -her oth- threát that sister’s prosecuted, similarly ers were not situated port, posed to 22nd Street members the (2) prosecution being and the selective com- coconspirators Crew and the in this case. i.e., motivated, plained improperly of was it impermissible was based on an consideration gang 44.' Former member Andre McDuffie tes- prevent such as race on a desire to the cooperate tified that someone "[i]f was to rights.” exercise of constitutional Fedorov v. government]” [with that "there would be States, (D.C.1991) United 600 A.2d Alphonce violence inflicted.” Little testified omitted).' (emphasis that an "automatic” of the crew was rule snitch,” which with the terri- ”[d]on’t "[came] example, Kyara’s testimony 43. For in the in- tory game,” nobody of the and that who the appellant appel- stant case about Tann's and gang knew to be a snitch ever came back to lant Arnette’s involvement the Terrence continuing Jones 22nd murder demonstrated Street. testifying against the Kyara, from da and 22nd Street Crew who members Crew, by retaliating with and charged conspiracy. into the 22nd entered Street had Beaver, Little, 22nd and fellow who collaborated against persons When violence dis Dwayne Wright against gang; government member Crew with the Street 982-84; to Collins, Roberson v. the sisters returned at covered that 73 A.3d determined, Street, (D.C. accor they 22nd Gatlin, con retaliatory goal of the 2008); dance with at 600. fur 925 A.2d We should be killed spiracy, sisters nothing about ther that there conclude gov cooperation with the because conspiracy them or nature breadth ernment. Pinkerton liability un charged that made Cooper. fair to jail was in at the Cooper'

The fact that murder does Laquanda time of Johnson’s Evidentiary Is- Procedural VIII. Pinker- liability not relieve him under Conspiracy to the sues Related v. United ton. Gatlin Appellants’ Trial Joint (D.C.2007) provides useful framework Gatlin, claim. analyzing Cooper’s Cooper’s A. Prior Convictions defendant, at who was incarcerated arguments in- several Appellants make government of a wit- time murder Cooper’s volving the admission challenged coconspirator, his ness for the Terrence Jones mur- convictions admissibility of the murdered witness’s First, Tann Queen assault. der-Richard testimony grand jury under the forfeiture- contend that the trial Arnette by-wrongdoing doctrine.45 We held trials to sever their erred when refused “[ijt'Was reasonably that intim- foreseeable Cooper’s apparent it became from after idation and threats to witnesses could Cooper government that both the in- in the murder of a witness.” Id. result at Cooper’s prior put evidence tended facts of Gatlin showed that the 600. Second, jury. in front of the convictions defendant, while communicated prison, Tann, Arnette, Cooper make the evi- disposing of about associates wit- dentiary argument prior that the convic- and, much of this nesses like facts not have been admitted tions should case, pressuring government cooperators government against of them. The each Id. at change story.” “to their evidentiary as to Tann and admits error together, pertaining Taken the evidence Arnette. coconspirator’s goals obstructing trial, Before indicated justice inflicting upon violence snitch- its intent to admit the convictions because persons contrary with interests es— they provide as to the con- would those of 22nd Street Crew members— (1) spiracy count of the Terrence Jones Laquanda Johnson’s demonstrated assault, murder and Richard which reasonably Queen murder was foreseeable to represented in a series of overt acts Cooper, despite jail fact that was in he indictment, (2) partial listed in murdering act of the time. Little’s Laquanda murder of John- *52 Laquanda scope within the of the con- motive the was coconspirator, Alphonce son spiracy justice by- preventing appellants’ to obstruct Little, sought revenge against government'cooperators, Laquan- such as who the analyzed forfeiture-by-wrongdoing same issue son is 45. The infra. applied by Laquanda as to statements John- cooperation in approximately for with the stand his defense six sisters their Johnson . later. Cooper’s in 2006 trial government months the imprisonment. to his conviction led During Cooper’s testimony, govern- the convictions in evidence Cooper wanted the impeached prior ment him con- with explained supra, because, a victions, as we including to those related against part of his defense significant Queen Jones murder-Richard Terrence charge gave jury assault. The court a stan- Laquanda Johnson murder was prior instruction that dard convictions fact that he had been convict- based credibility to pur- were be considered for sentenced the Terrence ed only. poses jail in at the and was Jones murder Therefore, killing.

time of her he intended instructions,- final jury In after consulta- argue jury to that he had known parties, tion' with the further about, jury no nothing and had involvement instructed that: with, her death. considering [Cooper’s addition to Ter- rence Jones murder when as- conviction] pointed pretrial out Tann and Arnette sessing Cooper’s credibility Mr. a wit- hearings that this was feature testi- trial ness, you may properly also consider mony from some of the same witnesses government in determining whether the Cooper’s 2006 trial. that had testified proof respect has met its burden with argued found They jury when out charged act [the overt the indict- convictions, it Cooper’s would neces- about pertaining ment the Terrence Jones sarily government’s wit- conclude that the required You not are murder].... in this case credible because nesses Cooper’s prior the fact that Mr. accept jury them so. The previous had found conviction for this conclusive offense con- disagreed appellants’ trial court with government evidence that has met and found that instruction tention instead, but, you proof, its burden of jury be sufficient ensure would it[,] may give every piece like other proper evidence, you of the convictions. weight made use feel whatever it’s Moreover, may you receive. entitled Arnette, government, Cooper, and The not conviction as es- prior consider Cooper’s 2006 conviction mentioned any of tablishing the truthfulness of during opening murder Terrence Jones prior who testified in the trial. witnesses informed statements. The distinguish trial court between did conviction the context of evi- describing when how this appellants explaining why Tann were Arnette and During jury. dence could used charged to the Ter- with crimes related government briefly closing arguments, the Queen Jones murder-Richard as- rence convictions, prior again as about the talked sault, Cooper not. men- Cooper but jury why Cooper a reminder conviction, but indicated that tioned the murder, charged Jones’s Terrence was “incorrect.” Arnette prior verdict argue not use the convictions but did person obviously ref- stated that another — guilt. already erencing Cooper con- been —had Admitting Cooper’s Error in that-there were victed the murder and Against Convictions Tann trial had testi- Cooper’s who witnesses Arnette anything” do dur- fied Arnette “didn’t Cooper’s incident. No mention was The admission conviction ing the further Cooper for appellants other than against took Cooper of the convictions until made *53 458 rational that a asserted, beyond a doubt proof as reasonable the matters

the truth of defendants] found the conspiracy would have of an overt act (Eric) they charged, Gardner guilty was constitution the error.” which absent (D.C. States, 55, by case long recognized as law al error v. 999 A.2d 58 United Evi commentary (Edwin) Rules of 2010) to Federal Smith v. United (quoting 803(22), hearsay excep the federal (D.C.2009)). 367, dence 391 prior judgments tion for of conviction.46 poten- error We note had also 59, 19 over Kirby, 174 at S.Ct. 574 U.S. claims. appellants’ severance tial effect ago, Supreme held ¡century Court argu- plausible, Tann While and Arnette’s prior may conviction one defendant’s convictions would en- prior ment that the against be evidence .his admitted credibility government’s hance the cases followed Numerous codefendants. force, practical at least witnesses little .See, recognizing holding. e.g., government’s at of trial. The the outset Vandetti, 1144, 1148(6th v. States 623 F.2d give about witnesses called Cir.1980) Clause (finding Confrontation participation in Ter- Tann’s and Arnette’s 110, violation); Tollardo, 275 v. P.3d State Queen’s rence Jones’s and Richard murder (N.M.2012) (same); 116 Bisaccia v. .cf occa- assault often inconsistent and gave N.J., 307, Attorney 311- 623 F.2d Gen. of testimony Tann sionally exculpatory about (3d Cir.1980) (finding process 12 a due Queen violation). at both trials. testified conflicting and Arnette Although there is involve- no authority type as to both trials Tann had whether this error Clause,47 or offends the Confrontation or the of Ter- his assault murder ment fundamental whether the error affronts Similarly, Shaunta Arm- Jones. rence is process,48 notions of or it due whether strong present attested Arnette both,49 clearly violation the error nothing in crime but scene did constitutional dimension.- Queen. attack on-Terrence Jones gave testimony that was Donald Matthews Therefore, evidentiary error very (identifying him as damaging to Tann analyzed must under constitutional shooter), highly exculpatory but Queen’s error standard as articulated in harmless in- (indicating that he was not Arnette 18, Chapman California, v. U.S. 87 attack). joint volved 824, 17 (1967). may S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 705 We Therefore, alone, standing the admis- only government affirm if “the we find that against convictions Coo- guilt,” Cooper’s sion presented overwhelming evidence-of here, per impact importantly or more if fit is would had little clear id., 803(22) advisory 48. See at 311-12. Fed.R.Evid. committee's F.2d exception note: does include evi “[T]he d person, ence of a third the conviction Crispin, 49. See United States 757 F.2d against offered the' accused in a criminal 803(22) 1985) (“Violation of 613 n. 1 Cir. (5th, prosecution any prove fact essential sus important threatens two constitutional inter judgment contrary tain the A conviction. First, judgment extent that the ests. position clearly would seem to violate jury’s ... conviction reflects another verdict right (citing Kirby v. United confrontation.” right upon process trenches a defendant’s due S.Ct. 43 L.Ed. U.S. prove every to have the element (1899)). charged.... of the offense with which he is upon Second ... --it trenches a defendant’s Bisaccia, J., (Seitz, at 314 See F.2d accusers.”). right to confront his concurring).

459 However, Queen largeT rence incident when the Jones-Richard appellants.50 other ly of the counts mur substantive by allowing mirrored trial court erred admission assault, der, robbery with which Tann purposes for substantive the convictions relating to charged the Arnette, Arnette it also revital against Tann and event, Cooper same of which admitted severance appellants’ that arguments ized pretend that To he been had convicted. Cooper’s required. Conse from trial danger jury there was no the analyzing the quentially, addition Cooper’s considered conviction could have Chapman evidentiary under error as to count conspiracy both harmlessness, must si we standard ignore reality counts substantive is multaneously look to see whether that instructions effective. are always Cooper with joinder of Tann and Arnette States, 211, See Battle v. 630 United A.2d compelling preju most resulted “the (D.C.1993) gymnas (requiring 225 “mental er reversible dice” would constitute tics” of jury may be “troublesome well States, 15 v. United ror. Workman (Oliver) circumstances”); in some Clark v. (D.C.2011) Bailey v. 264, (quoting States, (D.C. United 593 A.2d (D.C. States, 10 A.3d United 1991) (“Jurors course, are, presumed 2010)). instructions, obey the court’s but we have limits, recognized 2. Harmlessness that this its doctrine has conscientious, no no'juror, how matter First, court’s instruc the trial (citations omitted), impossible.”) can do the jury’s consideration tion limited conspira to the overt act in the convictions so, closely examining Even after Jones cy describing count the Terrence the error in the context the evidence potential murder. The effect prejudicial case, that it presented in this we find reduced, greatly if limited to the error was beyond harmless a reasonable doubt under thirty-three act. First, that overt There were court’s Chapman. while the trial count, conspiracy overt acts listed it was flawed in that violated instruction many easily Kirby, clearly of which were sub inform that -it proven did evidence, only conviction as prior stantial one which was not to “consider any establishing of the by single the truthfulness have committed needed been trial,” prior witnesses who testified proven beyond a reasonable defendant and appellate principal which is our on concern conspiracy. in order to doubt establish review, worry appellants’ was the 80 A.3d Gilliam v. (and again ap throughout the trial (D.C.2013). we re We as have recognize, peal) regard prior convictions. jurors peatedly done in the are past, presumed to follow instructions. See Jor importantly, More because dan v. United govern testimony nature (D.C.2011). about the ment’s witnesses who testified

However, incident, Queen the overt acts listed Terrence Jones-Richard Cooper’s convictions count are conspiracy pertained Ter- we convinced simply admitted appellants separate- viction would not have been Even if been had tried against appellants very likely ly, Cooper’s convictions still would substantive Alphonce Cooper is also what should other than (and have as evidence of been admitted —which would) presumably occurred partial Laquanda motive to kill John- Little’s judge to catch the not failed conspiracy count and the trial had the trial son for both the from his in- that flowed involving murder. If constitutional error substantive counts her trials, properly separate struction. handled con- jury appears fact that the impact appellants view the prejudicial no *55 compli through the carefully parsed clear that It was Tann or Arnette. acquitting trials, cated testimonial at both while who testified witnesses evidence— the most serious Tann and both of Arnette testimony very damaging giving generally felony charges arising first-degree murder given highly contradicto- Cooper, as say can out of the there incident —we favorable, testimony as to ry, and often that the possibility is no “reasonable Arnette,51 .evi Therefore, no we see Tann and might have contribut complained dence way jury could have considered convictions. to Tann’s ed” and Arnette’s in a manner harmful Cooper’s convictions 23, 87 824. Chapman, 386 U.S. S.Ct. Arnette, proof than as to Tann and other Instead, guilty are that “the we confident act, ignored of the overt even had in this trial actually rendered verdict[s] credibility portion of misunderstood the to the error.” surely unattributable [were] court’s instruction. the trial 1042, 1049 States, Ellis v. United 941 A.2d is bolstering our conclusion Further omitted) (D.C.2008) (quoting (emphasis that, repeatedly mentioning despite fact 279, Louisiana, 275, v. 508 U.S. Sullivan convictions in the context of Cooper’s prior (1993)). 2078, 124 182 113 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d prosecutorial explaining charging its reasons, that Tann For the same we find argued for strategy, the never “manifestly preju not and Arnette were guilt any appellant on the basis by.their joinder throughout diced” States, Paige v. United those convictions. States, 515 trial. See McAdoo v. United (D.C.2011) 74, (weighing “the 25 A.3d 84 412, (D.C.1986).52 A.2d 420 way in no prosecution fact that ad- Against Cooper 3. Admission ap- as evidence [the conviction] vanced assessing trial pellant’s guilt” prejudice). argues when that the Cooper circumstances, him evidentiary against error light these committed Harris, reasons, government’s Appellants Rushing, 51. and Béaver do For the same Cooper's prior not raise claims related to "overwhelming” was as to Tann and case not However, Queen similarly they were sit conviction. the Terrence Jones-Richard Arnette on the extent that uated with Tann and Arnette to Although related offenses. we have found they charged conspiracy count beyond a reasonable error harmless doubt of the Terrence Jones- that listed events government’s where the evidence was other Queen as overt acts of-the Richard incident see, (James) “overwhelming,” e.g., Hill wise conspiracy. the trial court’s instruction And States, (D.C. v. United 858 A.2d permitted prior Cooper’s to consider be, 2004), necessary- it is not that the evidence against convictions each of them as well as every so in case is unwarrant where reversal Therefore, evidentiary Tann and Arnette. ed, significance if the of the error is sufficient cases, error extended to their we invoke ly satisfy minimal so as constitutional impact our of that review discretion States, 952 standard. See Fields v. United 205-06; See, Gilliam, e.g., error. 80 A.3d at (D.C.2008) (reversing where A.2d States, 982 A.2d Walker United say the court could not the constitutional Nevertheless, (D.C-2009). any argument error did not "contribute” to verdict be Harris, prejudice Rushing, or about Beaver ' materiality cause of the error and way Cooper’s’ prior of the admission of guilt where the evidence of defendant’s is for Tann conviction even weaker than it overwhelming); McDonald v. Harris, Rushing, and Arnette because (examin (D.C.2006) charged were not with the substantive Beaver ing "centrality” both the of the error and the arising Queen of the Terrence Jones- offenses out overwhelming strength” gov "less than Consequently,- the Richard incident. Chapman performing clearly ernment’s case when appellants harm error as to those was- analysis). beyond less doubt. reasonable case, admitting prior judgment conspiracy convic- latitude is wide allowed evidence, tion into evidence for the truth of the presenting it is within the exception against matter as an to the rule discretion of the trial court to admit evi hearsay. yet have not We addressed the remotely dence which even tends to estab adopting Fed.R.Evid. propriety lish conspiracy charged.” Id. (quoting 803(22).53 any Cooper Because error (Kelvin) Holmes v. United harmless, clearly as he was 1259, 1268(D.C.1990)). charged with un- the substantive offenses

derlying the Terrence Jones-Richard Obviously, there was extensive Queen incident, we need not reach that testimony and presented evidence at trial question here. about the 22nd Street conspira Crew and cy count charged indictment; Argument

B. Tann’s Severance Un- however, directly much of it also involved’ Cooper’s related to Prior Convic- Tann. The evidence showed that he was tion among the leaders most active mem Appellant separate Tann makes ar- bers of the 22nd Tann Street Crew. gument, for appeal, the first time on illegal involved in the heavily drug traffick by severance was warranted the size ing that was the bulk of uncharged “spillover” case and the amount of evi- government offenses elicited dence that it impossible jury made for the directly in involved three of the four mur “not to have been influenced the sheer ders. volume and interrelatedness of the testi- As in Castillo-Campos, it cannot be said mony.” argument is rooted Tanris majority appellants’ of other “bad claim that much of the evidence "of his pertain acts” did not to Tann or had an codefendants’ “bad acts” not would have improper “spillover disposi effect” on the been sepa- admissible he been tried tion of his assuming case. And even rately. might some of the evidence have been general rule “The is defen independently separate in a tri admissible charged jointly committing dants with Tann, against al would not have severance McAdoo, together.” crime are to be tried required. been See Johnson v. United 515 A.2d at 420. Our decision Castillo- States, 980, 987 (“An (D.C.1991) Campos is instructive considering when appellant not suffer -preju does [manifest] Castillo-Campos, Tanris claim here. merely significant portion dice because concluded that because all three government’s of the admitted evidence at charged conspiracy, defendants were with applicable only trial to his codefen- they “incorrect in arguing that evi dants.”) (internal' quotation marks omit pertaining dence to their co-defendants did ted). pertain only them or'had an improp Likewise, spillover

er effect.” 987 A.2d at 493. We Tanris claim that the evidence unwieldy recited the established rule that a was jury keep “[i]ri too (Tenn.2005) Many ("Allowing'the state courts have prosecution had occasion to to use Flood, See, adopt e.g., rule. federal a final conviction as in [a criminal] 62, Corp., Southland 416 616 Mass. N.E.2d trial is [the state and federal consistent (1993) ("Substantially hearsay exceptions] than reality more as well as with the adopted one-half of may the States have rules conviction is final and 803(22).”); value.”) probative (citing evidence similar to Fed.R.Evid. United States v. Pe gullo, (3d Cir.1994)). Scarbrough, State v. 181 S.W.3d 14 F.3d Laquanda, up L.J.? likely grouped had said “What’s jury straight, or that together up just nigger actions ... I did street.” codefendants’ the various support no decision-making, finds in its ruling on motions to In the course opening statements Before the record. the trial court suppress, found that these deliberations, in the court prior to fit forfeiture-by- within the statements offense to consider each structed the theory admissibility wrongdoing because separately. See Mitchell v. murdered, (1) Laquanda Johnson was (D.C.2009). In addi appellants’ coconspirator Al- part, because tion, length jurors deliberated Laquan- Little phonce wanted eliminate charges, actions Tann of several acquitted witness, (2) aas future her da analysis of which demonstrated careful scope was within killing further- charge. merits of each See Castillo- (3) conspiracy, Little’s ance (noting Campos, 987 A.2d at 493 reasonably action was foreseeable all jury acquitted several defendants Cooper, despite appellants, including finding that it able charges when *57 of jail that he at the time her fact inwas the process understand and evidence killing for being murder after convicted codefendant). short, Tann against each Jones. Terrence no of has provided, “manifest required sever would have prejudice” forfeiture-by- the “Under . trial Accordingly, of the his case. ance doctrine, wrongdoing a defendant forfeits error, plain let alone commit did right to be confront Sixth Amendment error. him, against by a witness as well as his ed Laquanda C. Johnson’s Statements objection hearsay, to the if introduction Forfeiture-by- Under a

Admitted wrongfully procured unavailability he Wrongdoing Theory purpose pre of that witness with the venting testifying.” the witness from Ro Beaver, and Appellants Cooper, berson, 1095; A.2d v. 961 at Devonshire by Tann claim that erred the trial court (D.C. 691 168 United A.2d by Laquanda admitting several statements 1997). course, theory Of limited forfeiture-by-wrongdoing Johnson under person to situations where the defendant theory. Laquanda made Specifically, ally made witness unavailable. “[I]f sister, number statements to her Shaun- conspired the defendant with another to mother, Armstrong, ta Karen her testifying, prevent the from witness forfei Bolling, regarding Kyara her desire ture whether it was the ensues defendant testify Cooper out against Johnson not co-eonspirator himself another who by 22nd fear retaliation Street long witness so made the as unavailable Bolling Laquanda testified that re Crew. the actor’s within misconduct ‘was ported to her the of a contents conversa scope conspiracy reasonably in which Cooper tion that she had with ” Roberson, foreseeable the defendant.’ money to Cooper drugs offered her Further, (quoting 961 A.2d at 1095 United States v. keep Kyara off La the stand. Carson, (D.C.Cir.2006)); quanda F.3d told that Tann her mother had made, also Jenkins see approached her and veiled threats A.3d (D.C.2013). Kyara if 994-95 review happen about what would her We rulings admissibility on testified. La court’s under Bolling réported also quanda immediately theory fol forfeiture-by-wrongdoing her that informed abuse murder, Jenkins, lowing Cooper at of discretion. Jones 989. Terrence foreseeably no been govern find abuse We discretion admitted handling against court’s of this issue. The ment in a future trial appellants trial on justi- conspiracy principles law conspiracy same justice obstruction of liability offenses, use Pinkerton hold appellant yet fied which.no of- Cooper accountable for the substantive charged as.of been time of Cooper’s a, simi- Laquanda Johnson’s murder fense 2006 conviction. As consequence, La- larly evidentiary the trial court’s validated quanda’s reasonably murder was foresee finding here. The evidence showed part to appellants able as conspira their by Alphonce Lit- Laquanda murdered cy persons, to inflict violence as such course, furtherance, during and in tle witnesses, government .with con interests justice conspiracy obstruct Collins, 982; trary to theirs. 73 A.3d at such from prevent Laquanda witnesses Roberson, Gatlin, 1096-97; testifying against Crew. the 22nd Street Therefore, A.2d at no we find abuse of discretion trial court.55

Laquanda significant Johnson had value witness, even as a after Finding D. The Trial Court’s of a Cooper had of Terrence been convicted Conspiracy Predicate As Little testi Jones’s murder in 2006. fied, Arnette. va illegal dispute she about ac had information Tann. lidity of trial court’s determination that by the Street tivities 22nd Street 22nd Furthermore, predicate conspiracy been Laquan- estab had. Crew.members.54 justify lished to admission of Cooper’s eoconspirator statements da’s about Tann’s justice, in to influ statements in furtherance of conspira efforts to order obstruct *58 trial, testimony cy. given her and At the of ence sister’s therefore outset the num Cooper’s trial could of uncharged) coconspir- the outcome of ber and (charged cross-examination, objec On Cooper's hearsay 54. defense both Confrontation Clause and attempted to elicit from admissibility. counsel Little that tions to to Dreher's statements only Laquanda "the reason” was killed Laquanda were admissible under the cocon- cooperation past was retaliation for her exception hearsay spirator to statement the government, .any opposed with the fu- as found, judge rule. trial was As the there disagreed gang. ture threat to the Little with independent, nonhearsay sufficient premise Cooper’s the of defense counsel’s presented that Dreher was a member of the questions and testified was that the murder a 22nd Street Crew and member of con the also because could have "[the sisters] been charged spiracy in this case. This evidence telling somebody gang], telling [in the on testimony by gang form of came the former thing.” any other Matthews, McDuffie, Andre Donald members Evans, Honesty, Alphonce Travis Devin Cooper’s argument brief makes the related high-ranking gang Little that Dreher was a Laquanda another of Johnson’s state- appellant member who recruited Harris and ments admitted into evidence under the for- crew, drugs feiture-by-wrongdoing theory inadmissi- others to be members sold members, Laquanda hearsay. because it was ble double with 22nd Street other Crew sister; Armstrong, her told Shaunta that 22nd gang was influential because Crew member Eric stated to Street Dreher willingness engage in "acts of violence” Laquanda "get Kyara she off should Additionally, behalf crew. of the Dreher’s 22nd Street and never come back” because reasonably statements could have been Cooper looking "goons had there” out furthering conspiracy’s goal viewed as Although Cooper her. correct justice by wrongfully obstruction discour testimony by hearsay, Shaunta was double aging Laquanda testifying Cooper’s from at hearsay exceptions there were both levels. States, 481 v. United trial. See Butler supra, Laquanda’s As discussed statements to A.2d 431, (D.C.1984). Shaunta were admissible because of forfei- ture-by-wrongdoing, which acts as waiver to pur- been established had alleged conspiracy to have government ators that hearsay issue. of the poses of the 22nd in the activities participated charged conspiracy, Crew and Street trial court found: concerned, Specifically, justifi- judge trial controlling cation, tightly the admis- about among other conspiracy, awas [There] But- coconspirator statements. See sion package [resell] things, purchase, judge ler, (holding the trial at 439 narcotics, vio weapons and to use illegal determining the admissibil- responsible for conspiracy safeguard lence in order coconspirators’ statements ity of those who are against retaliate jury might danger that the “the avoid and who conspiracy[] members of these statements on the basis convict conspiracy’s to invade the attempted had admissibility dealing with the first

without reputation turf, promote question”). its members conspiracy and showing monitor the to better order neighborhood.[56] 22nd Street or- conspiracy, the court predicate of a court’s decision “The trial to “bifurcate” its government dered testimony as nonhear coconspirator “conspira- admit opening with a case-in-chief absent an abuse say upheld be ruling from the will followed cy” phase, States, 76 Harrison v. United discretion.” as whether (D.C.2013). coconspira “[A] establishing predicate burden of met its may be admit assertions cocon- tor’s out-of-court the identities conspiracy and only judge if the finds it their truth government moved ted for before the spirators, (1) conspiracy not that likely more than phase of its case into a “substantive” (2) existed, had a connection defendant coconspirator statements could wherein (3) coconspir conspiracy, and hearing from with the After admitted evidence. during the ator the statements made gang previously discussed “insiders” con Matthews, (Andre McDuffie, of and in furtherance Devin course Donald Jenkins, 989-90. Little), 80 A.3d at Evans, spiracy.” Alphonce police *59 the trial court’s rul Appellants challenge illegal drug testified about personnel who prongs of the cocon ing first two court as to the activity involving appellants, the spirator rule. predicate of a statement that the existence found conspiracy its members protect the and judge of a ... The trial found the existence similar, charges, conspiracy but not and predicate for criminal ... from conviction charged in 1 of the to one Count against anyone identical the who assisted law to retaliate indictment, i.e„ appellants and others investigation into officials enforcement justice agreed obstruct and to assault "to conspiracy of the prosecution of members anyone contrary whose interests were to kill The trial court did and their associates.” and their associates.” those the defendants taking approach findings. to his err in found, Instead, judge appears to the trial conspiracy forms the basis ad "The issue, evidentiary purposes that the of the mitting coconspirators’ statements need not goals predicate conspiracy tracked of the conspiracy for which the defen be same the "Objects Conspiracy” closely the of the Arce, v. is indicted.” United States dant page supersed- second of the as listed on the Indeed, Cir.1993). (5th F.2d ing for acts of vio- indictment: to “retaliate conspiracy may of a in furtherance statements conspiracy perpetrated against lence the conspiracy is no where there admissible profits generat- protect illicit its members ... charged in indictment at all. the by conspiracy’s ed the involvement the (6th Ayotte, F.2d Cir. States involving in acts ... members and associates 1984). trafficking ... and in controlled substances ruling the came before items made in Because court’s were furtherance of a con- put its “substantive” government spiracy against appel- the and admissible all case, judge the did not have the benefit lants. now Appellants appeal ruling. that went to the murder the facts required After court government the the Nevertheless, judge made charges.57 the extensive redactions to make the mate- findings appellant as to each detailed CD, rap rial on government played membership conspiracy his in a that are approximately twelve minutes of Rush- by by the facts and not shown supported ing-Smith songs. According testimony, clearly Tann Arnette to be erroneous. songs being were sold played (accepting findings of Id. the factual openly lyrics on 22nd song Street. The they clearly the trial unless are erro Deuce,” made reference “The “Deuce reviewing an abuse of neous when under Mob,” Gunz,” “Young and the all names standard). judge trial The discretion affiliated with the 22nd Street The Crew. goals conspirators found lyrics also gang referred nicknames accomplished through the establish “were Beaver, of Rushing, Cooper, and Arnette. ment of adherence to and enforce [and] Furthermore, lyrics glorify tended to group by of rules both-threats ment criminal activities that part were findings suffi judge’s and violence.” The members, lifestyle of the 22nd Street Crew ciently established associational con drug including dealing, killing government appellants, between the nection different informants, killing rivals. joint support drug traf and their wife, government also Tann’s called Crew, activities of ficking the 22nd Street Tracey, give lyrics rap evidence about including the of its base of maintenance According written Tann. that were violence, through acts of such operations lyrics Tracey, part pro- of a rap was no that there abuse of discretion his ject for Tann aspi- which had commercial predicate on the con ruling existence of lyrics rations. Tann’s included references spiracy.- 22nd Street Crew’s nickname “D.E.U.C.E.,” drug dealing, and violent Lyrics Rap Webpage E. and Beaver’s against lyrics crime “snitches.” Tann’s trial, government At introduced the arguably specific also made references (1) following against appellants: evidence the details Leslie Jones murder containing songs performed by CD rap on by government in its were relied coconspirator, Rushing and an unindicted closing argument culpa- of his Smith; (2) rap lyrics written Michael bility.58 Tann which were found and read wife, (3) Tracey; Finally, jury by put the con- on evidence *60 a webpage webpage stip- of that had of “Black Planet” tents been created a that was by published ruled ulated to have been created posted and Beaver. The court and by pic- webpage that within these the statements contained Beaver. featured opinion, he with 57. In our this evidence would -Jonesmurder where murdered Jones strengthened already significantly down, gun an alleyway then ran an near a and well-rea- ruling. soned known, "Dog Alley.” Tyrone 22nd as Street witness, Curry, government testified that he a lyrics 58. Tann’s read-: "Screamin’ D.E.U.C.E. running a man who looked like Tann saw Allday I Death Val- Southsidef] hail from shooting of from the scene the Leslie Jones Bang dog Alley." my pistol deep ley[.] first dog alley on 23rd "toward the Street.” closing argument, government arguéd the the Leslie these words Tann described that Here, “surrounding circum the making signs hand of Beaver affiliat- tures that adoption” are stances the claimed ed 22nd Crew and mes- the Street sang lyrics the Rushing Smith and Michael describing himself sage Beaver from recording rap purpose songs to for im- Beaver “DEUCEDEUCEBANGA” purchase that and CD was available ready he plied webpage that was on the no publicly. There was played any against “dudes” commit violence Rushing actually or or wrote Smith he found to be “snitchin.” songs., to the produced lyrics of the attack admission Appellants lyrics Appellants were argue Rushing rap lyrics sung by and Michael “artistic, solely created entertainment (1) grounds: there Smith on several a truthful not as recitation purposes,” and or that either Smith insufficient evidence or of events on 22nd the attitudes Street (2) lyrics; Rushing authored the Smith or singers. the producers either While proven coconspirator, there- was not a may certainly have been -a songs these singing of the performance fore persons form artistic entertainment song lyrics not have reflected state- could Street, listening some entertain- on 22nd conspira- course of ments made ment and some is is fictional intended (3) cy; songs lyrics to the themselves of true and actual events. retelling conspiracy; not in furtherance were lyrics song may well be intend- any And (4) admissible, if otherwise even eyes of the relay ed the truth unfairly prejudicial. Ap- song lyrics were out, singer. points As the pellants’ complaint about Tann’s primary songs, lyrics primarily in these were “the lyrics webpage individuals, Beaver’s is that first-person and described places, specifically made in furtherance related statements and activities We find these 22nd Street Crew.” conspiracy. upon which

facts were sufficient foundation Authorship Rap 1. an unambigu- establish “there was

Lyrics on the CD Rushing assent” ous Michael Smith in the lyrics contained statements “A an party may make admis Blackson v. they sang. See United by adopting sion acquiescing (D.C.2009). 979 A.2d party statement Whether another.' Whether, 2. Michael Smith has is a adopted the another statement Coconspirator, was a preliminary question fact trial for the judge, by considering which determined as a Michael Smith was identified surrounding and the context circum aby member Crew 22nd Street .of adoption.” Harris stances claimed number of witnesses: government’s the. 116-17 Matthews, Evans, Alphonce Donald Devin (D.C.2003) (citations, quotation internal Little, Tann, Travis-Honesty, Tracey omitted). marks, alterations While Darryl Honesty and Travers tes Travers. require explicit rule “does tified that a “hustler” who sold Smith was f adoption,” require o statement does from until narcotics on 22nd Street of a party’s “some manifestation intent testimony reasonably 2007 or This *61 statements, or of adopt another’s evidence in membership a con established Smith’s minimum, the the truth party’s spiracy, among belief in of the state of at a members Clark, illegal Bridges ments.” v. to sell narcot Street Crew the 22nd (D.C.2013). testimony was ics. that Smith Matthews’s group “coming of a of the part songs, men who were statements in the in rap up” organization, lyrics, no later than Tann’s and on Beaver’s webpage, Beaver, with other members such as crew Crew, made reference the 22nd Street from also established reasonable basis the members 22nd Street Crew who judge which the trial could infer Smith’s part charged conspiracy, of the were agreement support with and of the more “the structure of the conspiracy and the within aspects activity (cid:127)violent of criminal importance [the] members’ continued testimony of 22nd Street Crew. The the participation loyalty.” of the core gang acting gov- former as the members government’s argument “in furtherance” in- ernment was members witnesses is: organization in creased their influence the (1) [G]iven the CD was sold on 22nd against ri- by committing acts of violence by Street and was conspira- listened vals, snitches, persons and other at odds (2) alike, tors non-conspirators the organization. the interests of the page was'open public web the view government Once the showed that Mi internet, (3) aspired Tann predi was a chael member the Smith produce rap a commercial CD with his conspiracy purposes hear cate the lyrics, statements the at' issue could be say exception, required it to show promoting viewed as reputation conspira that he was of the still a member stature of the in conspiracy the commu- cy later See time. United States nity by spreading conspiracy’s mes- Moore, (D.C.Cir. (Rodney) 651 F.3d sage of violence and intolerance 2011) (“[0]nce a becomes a defendant challenge it. those who would [Citations conspiracy, member of a he remains and alterations omitted.] affirmatively until member he withdraws argument persuasive We find this line Therefore, conspiracy or the once ends. essence, supported by In case law. one government proves that a defendant message by coconspirators’ announced an ongoing was a member conspiracy, statements was internal and one was ex- proven has the defendant’s continuous ternal; message the internal furthered membership in that unless and conspiracy conspiracy by boosting the morale and withdraws.”) (citation until the defendant reputation through coconspirators omitted). There no of with evidence activities, glorification Its while by drawal Smith. there Consequently, message external the likelihood reduced reasonably was sufficient show cocon- outsiders with the interference sang CD rap lyrics Smith spirators’ affairs. during predicate his involvement (Brian) We held Williams v. United conspiracy. (D.C.1995), that if

3. Statements in Furtherance reasonably interpret statement “can be Conspiracy of the as encouraging person] ed ad [another conspiracy or vance serve to enhance

Appellants’ argument third is that conspiracy, person’s usefulness lyrics purportedly “the authored Bea then, statement is furtherance sung by Rushing ver and Tann and those (internal conspiracy may and Michael be admitted.” Smith were inadmissible be omitted); quotation they cause there is no marks see also Car evidence that (“[I]f son, sung the state written or 455 F.3d at 366-67 furtherance charged countering reasonably interpreted ments can conspiracy.” argument, emphasizes per- other encouraging co-conspirator

468 Cir.2011) 480, (11th (concluding or en F.3d 493 conspiracy, to advance the as

son at trial was person’s playing of a hancing co-conspirator rap or other that the video a lyrics then the conspiracy, “heavily prejudicial” “[t]he because' usefulness are conspiracy and of unfair danger statements further the a substantial presented violence, those admissible. statements include they Such because contained prejudice co[-]conspirator’s a con ... motivate sex, misogyny promiscuity, and profanity, (internal quotation participation.”) tinued reasonably could understood omitted). Further citations marks and lifestyle” a violent and unlawful promoting (‘not more, held numerous courts have clearly probative [the defen while in warnings by coconspirators threats and Cheeseboro, 346 guilt”); v. dant’s] State tending message potential send (find (2001) 526, 300, 552 S.E.2d 313 S.C. they penalized witnesses would be value” ing probative that the “minimal with the are cooperating ad rap containing a document the defendant’s missible under the coconspirator statement “far its unfair lyrics outweighed was See, e.g., United v. rule. States Westmore impact appel prejudicial as evidence land, 302, (7th Cir.2002) 312 F.3d 309-10 character”). bad lant’s (statements making admissible because in lyrics may “rap in mind that Keeping coconspirators pre them the intended metaphor, and other employ exaggeration, conspiracy by frightening poten serve the can abstract [ ] artistic devices involve witnesses). Similarly, that the tial we find ubiquitous representations of events (contained in both the internal statements State, (Deyundrea) storylines,” Holmes message lyrics) appellants’ and external 415, Op. 129 Adv. P.3d Nev. 306 419 coconspirators made and introduced (internal (2013) quotation cita marks and advanced, in fur into evidence and were omitted), proba tion we must consider of, conspiracy. therance juris tive value of other evidence. Prejudice 4. Unfair dictions, question turned has specificity lyrics with describe

Appellants’ final contention which offense(s) surrounding facts rap lyrics “sub songs that the were charged.59 Similarly, we endeavor de stantially prejudicial probative” more than (as rap lyrics to what extent the particularly because the content termine was be con shocking webpage) and violent. has nev well as should This court Beaver’s s of vio prejudicial “autobiographical er discussed the effect sidered statement rap lyrics, Stuckey, have. though lent other courts acts relevant case.” 253 See, e.g., Gamory, Fed.Appx. so as to avoid States v. at 483. This is where, blankets, (no alley), Compare body dumping at 417-20 error it in an id. issue, Cheeseboro, (error rap lyrics defendant-authored 552 S.E.2d at "jackfing]” described defendant someone pool leaving in a where references to bpdies wearing parking in a their necklace while lot vague fingerprints blood without were "too mask, a ski defendant was accused support context to the admission” accosting parking two men in steal lot and rap lyrics lyrics "gen because the contained ing wearing one man’s chain necklace while only); glorifying see eral references violence” mask), Stuckey, ski United States v. Hanson, Wash.App. also State v. (6th Cir.2007) Fed.Appx. (unpub 482-83 (error (1987) where the P.2d n. 7 (no lished) rapped error where defendant logi writings defendant’s fictional ‘snitches,’ that he "kills holes, fills bodies with their attempt cally no relevant when "[t]here blankets, wraps dumps them about [the show wrote defendant] ... them in the road” and the defendant charged”). an incident so to the crime similar man, shooting wrapping accused of *63 “being partial the undue risk' the statements against announced verdicts the re- maining pro appellants, or misused criminal two misunderstood Harris and Ar- jury pensity (Deyun act nette. The found bad evidence.” Harris and Arnette drea) Holmes, (internal guilty conspiracy and told the 306 P.3d at 418 court that omitted). deliberations were continuing quotation marks their re- maining counts.- Here, the statements were autobio- Once Tann heard that jury convicted they graphical that- discussed the 22nd him of the three murders with 'which he by its membership, living Street Crew and- charged, was Tann up stood and ex- required by gang, selling code claimed: snitches, drugs, killing killing rivals. I don’t I see how can get guilty, found that appellants’ conspiracy charge

Given type and what of court is of'them, this? I wasn’t hotly was contested each there_ near_ [Njowhere even I probative value of the of this content evi- get guilty found I’m innocent. God also, dence was Considering substantial. with, going challenge y’aHfor this. I’ll see CD, regard lyrics to the on the y’all in heaven.... I’m innocent. How the trial carefully court reviewed each get the fuck I guilty? found ... That’s track of unfairly preju- the CD avoid an fucking crazy. (such songs dicial effect that 45 —that’s minutes minutes, were reduced more than 30 While Tann making was these state- and some tracks were in their eliminated ments, thé court attempted unsuccessfully entirety), we believe that the court did not for call order. The marshals escorted abuse its discretion when it-found out Tann courtroom and into the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not holding judge cell. As dismissing substantially outiveigh probative its jurors, val- he they told them that should Legette ue.60 See A.3d understand that the courtroom could be (D.C.2013). Therefore, place, 388-89 we re- they emotional were not to let (cid:127) ject appellants’ claims. anything just happened that -had impact their remaining deliberations. Harris and F. Tann’s Outburst Arnette-immediately moved a mistrial arguing that preju- Tann’s outburst would Appellants appeal Harris and Arnette jury against dice the them,'especially since denial their motions for a mistrial jury already found Harris and by appellant based an “outburst” Tann guilty, Arnette conspiracy rooted following Approximately his verdict. two. justice obstruction of against violence deliberations, weeks beginning after the participants legal process. The trial jury against ap- returned full verdicts court denied their motions. pellants Rushing jury and Beaver. The full against appellant announced its verdict following dáy, jury while Cooper following day. days Eight la- deliberations, the court held a more exten- ter, a partial returned verdict hearing sive oh surrounding the facts Tann,. against including verdicts on his Tann’s outburst.- The indicated time, charges. murder At the same it up, had observed Tann speak loud- stand probative 60. While there is no of discretion on abuse Evidence doubles value. as- record, easily we could envision a case type confusing of art will often be a mixture lyrics, poetry, where or other statements in a Therefore, of truth fabrication. trial and. traditionally form understood to artistic very carefully courts must scrutinize such ma- expression sufficiently specific were not prejudice. terials statements unfair charged important crime so as to have such jurors” expressly stated that shirt number of ly and untuck his using profanity, Furthermore, they escorting tie. Prior to concerned. loosening while *64 courtroom, they that asso- jurors indicated one marshal none the Tann the out of with ciated Tann’s statements the other Tann but not fire. at pointed his Taser did defendants. Tann’s conduct was The court found that threatening jury de- not or violent This court reviews .the denial the Fur- spite afterlife. his reference to a mistrial and the trial óf a motion for- ther, from no court observed reaction the exposure jury into to investigation court’s significant con- constituted jury the that for an abuse of dis evidence unadmitted incident, the Throughout cern. Arnette. States, v. 932 cretion. United Ransom seated and did Harris remained 510, (D.C.2007); v. A.2d 517 Al-Mahdi react. States, 1011, A.2d 867 1018-20 United hearing, At both Harris and the motions (D.C.2005). to exposure A jury’s unadmit their concerns Arnette reiterated about implicates ted Sixth a defendant’s requested prejudice, that the and Harris impartial jury. to an right Amendment jurors dire. made available voir States, Medrano-Quiroz United 705 See v. request to specifically declined (D.C.1997). Arnette A.2d 649 voir The court denied Harris’s re- dire. here, “Where, the impartial as quest reasoning danger that the of voir ity jury] plausibly has been called [the might prob- dire create was that more question, responsibility into it is the safety triggering lems than it solved hearing to judge trial a hold determine jurors in the the court concerns did has allegation of bias merit.” whether the not believe that they had. claim, “it is the Upon govern Id. such a later, jury days the Several returned ment’s to demonstrate that burden Tann, involving of its verdicts remainder [jury’s] with extraneous informa contact jury acquitted charges him several non-prejudicial.” tion was or harmless In and convicted him of several others. States, (David) Hill v. United subsequent days, jury sepa- returned (D.C.1993). evidence of “[T]he against Harris rate verdicts and Arnette. high degree justify record must of confi Harris; acquitted Unlike Arnette juror partiality dence that the likelihood charges against number of him. Al-Mahdi, has been 867 A.2d rebutted.” Otherwise, trial, is obliged for a post-trial

In a motion new “the alleged spoke grant other adequate Harris’s counsel she declare mistrial” jurors with all of relief. Parker v. United 757 A.2d after verdicts had (D.C.2000). motion, According Although hearing been rendered. jurors they required, type stated that believed Tann extent “the against investigation trial into improper made a court’s death threat contact they outburst- and other- are the courts course confided discre only -for consistently-threaten wise Tann tion abuse.” observed reviewable .and Leeper throughout course of the witnesses . (D.C.1990) per

trial. is “no response, noted There se rule that jurors juror speak questioning that not all of the individual of each is al remained required,” trial attorneys ways judge with and not all of “the has those ' speak fix the expressed proce did the same view.' broad discretion to exact While threat,” by balancing a few the need to make a a “death dures referred jurors against the concern that inquiry were not worried —some chuckled sufficient discussing prejudicial Tann’s “a inquiry when statement and create effects by unduly magnifying importance willingness of an reach out the court with Al-Mahdi, insignificant questions occurrence.” Finally, concerns. the court (citations A.2d at 1019 n. 13 properly and alterations considered the risk that further omitted). investigation would turn. insignificant jurors’ matter in the signifi- minds into a Harris And Arnette argue cant possibility within .that well oner—a jurors might have Tann’s viewed state- his discretion to take into account.63 Al- against ments a threat paired them and Mahdi, 867 A.2d at 1019 n. 13. government’s statement alle- otherwise,, In arguing appellants rely on gations coconspirators agreed that the *65 decisions, of this several court’s none avail against anyone to retaliate who under- ing. they The cases allega cite .involved so, conspiracy. doing mined the appel- juror tions of that bias turned on facts that argue jury might lants that the have con- court way trial had no of learning sidered Tann’s outburst direct evidence as about questioning jurors. without See (associ- guilt of their of the violent offenses Al-Mahdi, (juror 867 A.2d at 1021 contact ated with the Terrence Jones-Richard Ransom, with party), third A.2d Queen Taylor-Bernard Mackey and James (extraneous 515-20 jury information in incidents)-of they which not yet had been room); Parker, (juror 757 A.2d at 1285-87 Furthermore, jury convicted. may contact with party); third Artisst v. Unit Arnette, have feared that Harris if (D.C.1989) ed 330-32 acquitted, carry would out Tann’s threat (juror dishonesty pretrial in voir dire . against : them. defendant). acquaintance about It is taking jury’s Even disputed here, contrast,' crucial the trial post-trial 'they statements for all are judge actually observed Tann’s outburst worth,61 trial court did not abuse its thereof) (or its and viewed effect lack denying discretion in the motioñ'for a mis jury determining when the correct trial questioning jurors. without course of action. find no We abuse of impli Tann’s statements did not’expressly discretion in his choice.' any cate his in way; codefendáhts the trial gave instruction, court prompt curative IX. Pretrial Trial Issues Unrelated taking even care to sponte do so sua Conspiracy or Joint Trial jury linking avoid the Tann’s comments to Evidentiary A. Issues codefendants;62 either of his jury and the 1. Search of Beaver’s Jail Cell not judge did contact the about the out or register any burst sort- of anxiety, Approximately even year one trial in before though previously it had demonstrated its this cáse was begin, Cooper about to regarding juror's post-trial juiy’s presence, 61.The rule 62. state- Chitof the the Court added "inquiry ments: is allowed]'into the [is deliberately gave its instruction "in a existence conditions or the occurrence of way coming that didn’t look-like it was' as a events,” but, “inquiry thought into the counsel, request . from but from me.” processes jurors.” of the Fortune v. United (D.C.2013). Applied Notably, Arnette’s counsel that he stated case, the Fortune- rule means that agreed with the trial decision to not court's jurors' may challenge be used to statements voir dire for the reasons articulated judge’s the trial determination that Tann’s , ruling. its threatening statements did constitute a or event, violent but not to show the effect jury’s Tann’s delibera- statements process. tive Beaver, May- authority prison official. Bailey, met Lee another Freddie prison if a cell search inmate, berry requested that three in a while the prison any items taken was to be conducted Bailey holding Cooper asked whether cell. Cooper’s by prison from officials Beaver floor housed on same as several he application be for a war- pending cell held government cooperators known on the af- According rant. Mayberry, inquired Cooper further wheth- this case. 24, 2008, Ashmeade ternoon of December assaulting Bailey would interested er him that he a search conducted informed witnesses various government’s and took items from Beaver’s various .cell. Bailey that he testified refused ways. Ashmeade Mayberry reiterated Cooper’s solicitation. pending on to items should hold Subsequently, because Beaver was tem- later, days detectives warrant. Several cooperator, he was porarily ob- prosecution team working with jail part transferred to a where ultimately warrant and tained a search government cooperators, including other came into the letter possession Bailey, were housed. Beaver Freddie Lee can. Beaver’s trash cooperation after his remained there even *66 court, argued before the trial Beaver in case proceedings this started. ended on the again appeal, so that does ongoing, this trial a While was Beaver sent resulting search officials in the by prison Bailey stating that his temporary letter to seizure about “crush- of the second letter merely for cooperation purposes was ing” of his Alphonce Little was in violation government’s Bailey case. disrupting the rights. As factual Fourth a Amendment prison this to offi- reported information matter, that warrantless he contends the cials, a which resulted search of Bea- 23rd, search not on occurred December jail cell the seizure of a second ver’s 24th, on but and at the direction December his can. letter from trash The second For support, the Beaver prosecution. letter contained remarks about Beaver’s sup- points to inconsistencies the between regrets he had Al- “crushed” pression hearing Investiga- testimonies phonce being government Little for a coo- Mayberry. tor Detective Ashmeade and perator. government por- admitted The. inconsistency the primary involved of both letters at trial. tions date of the search. testified Ashmeade During suppression hearing, a .the de- “security” on that he conducted the search the, tails search fleshed out. Bea- up not match 23rd. This did timeline ver’s first to Freddie Lee Bailey letter had testimony who be- Mayberry, official, given to a prison investigator been lieved that the search occurred on Decem- Alphonso On December Ashmeade. 24th, brought ber the first was after letter Ashmeade talked Detective Jef- of the Bea- prosecution. attention frey Mayberry, one detectives work- Ash- ver also makes much of the fact that - case, ing-with on prosecution, he search meade conducted the stated other about letter and threats that had but safety purposes, made no effort by made and Beaver Cooper against- been Bailey Freddie Lee from cell remove Bailey. prosecution ar- When the team block he same floor as where was Bailey following day, facts, meet Cooper. rived Beaver on these Based Mayberry Ashmeade others extrapolates showed Beaver that Ashmeade con- by evidentiary the first letter Beaver. Ash- search written ducted. a warrantless Mayberry that he meeting prosecution meade told would search after with the team security Beaver’s cell for 24th and at pursuant reasons December its direction. However, However, Mayberry both Detective and S.Ct. 3194. in United States v. Cohen, (2d Investigator Cir.1986), Ashmeade testified F.2d while by prison Hudson, search was officials acknowledging holding conducted any prosecution prompting by rep- without Circuit Second held that the narrow court resentatives. The trial found instance prison where a cell search was search, regardless prosecution the date initiated solely to obtain evidence, any testimony, other pretrial inconsistencies a detainee retained there was no evidence to affirmative limited Fourth right priva- Amendment Moreover, contrary. cy found that within his cell challenge “sufficient to prison officials investigatory basis search the search ordered they prosecutor.” cell because had reason believe Id. danger there We need not decide whether jail.

witnesses then housed adopt reasoning Cohen’s because we hold “Our of a court’s that the trial court review trial did abuse its discre in making finding denial of a motion to tion the factual suppress is limited.” that the jail search of Joseph v. United Beaver’s cell was not con (D.C.2007). ducted at prosecution, the direction of the “Our standard of review therefore, necessarily trial ruling on a motion to not a search court’s for purposes of Fourth Amendment. suppress tangible requires See United States Hogan, 539 F.3d the facts and all reasonable inferences (8th Cir.2008) (“Even 923-24 if this court must therefrom be viewed favor of sus adopt ], were to (Robert) apply [Cohen does not taining ruling.” the trial court’s here, as the search of [the *67 cell States, defendant’s] 839, Howard v. United instigated by jail was security officials for (D.C.2006) (alteration omitted). 844 “Es solely reasons and was not to intended sentially, our role is to ensure that trial the case.”). prosecution’s bolster the court had a substantial basis for conclud ing that no constitutional oc violation noted, As the court correctly trial re- curred.” v. United 994 Kaliku gardless whether the search occurred 765, (D.C.2010) (internal quota A.2d 780 24th, bn dispositive December 23rd or the omitted). tion marks fact is that both Mayberry Detective Investigator consistently testi- Ashmeade Palmer, 517, In Hudson v. 468 525- U.S. by that the search was fied conducted 26, 3194, (1984), 104 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d 393 officials, prison any input without Supreme prisoners Court held that prompt prosecution from the team. Ash- protected by Fourth Amend explicitly also that meade stated against ment unreasonable searches in response legiti- search was conducted to prison their cells. The Court concluded regarding mate concerns Freddie Lee Bai- recognition privacy rights that for “[t]he ley’s safety. prisoners in simply their individual cells concept cannot be with the appeal, merely speculates reconciled On Beaver objectives incarceration and needs and between that inconsistencies Detective 526, 104 penal Mayberry institutions.” Id. at Investigator S.Ct. Ashmeade’s Further, testimony, to prison’s 3194. the Court that and the failure move determined cell, “society prisoner’s Bailey insist from his that proved would the search yield at expectation privacy always prosecution’s what conducted behest to was up his paramount sought must be interest and that Ashmeade to cover considered 528, 104 security.” complicity Id. at in the scheme after the fact. institutional 474 nesses, through- mentioned find- who we have the trial court’s

We not overturn will to opinion, long-standing this ties out ings conjecture. The trial on such based Andre McDuffie portions the 22nd Crew. credit of either Street court was free to the first any one of discounting was these witnesses testimony while witness’s government in this Bragdon by witness v. United called inconsistencies. See (D.C.1995) testimony, govern- During (per case. curiam); him he knew Rush- Corp. Bose ment asked whether see also Consumers Union, that he did and he ing. said S.Ct. McDuffie U.S. (“When-the (1984) responsible Rushing’s training was for testimo- L.Ed.2d Rushing a new believed, gang the 1990s was ny trier of when a witness Then, testified that he disregard Normally fact member.- may simply it. McDuffie taught gang-related number of testimony is a Rushing not considered discredited skills, contrary including to kill.” drawing for “how sufficient basis conclusion.”). has no Beaver Accordingly, objected “how appellants Several grounds upon Fourth Amendment which testimony kill” a. in Andre break cell challenge prison search of his eventually McDuffie’s examination discovery led second Appellants’ moved chief mistrial. Thus, . court not err letter. the trial did objection the inference to be was denying suppress. his motion testimony drawn from this Crew, -22nd “get order in” to the Street Misconduct, Uncharged Evidence kill or gang otherwise member Testimony Incarceration, Fear commit There- serious acts violence. Testimony of Andre McDuffie a. fore, all had been labeled appellants, who Tann, Harris, Rushing, Ar- Cooper, government as 22nd Street Crew members, nette claims related the admission make killings committed must have' govern of “other crimes” evidence charged murders. The unrelated to the trial, ment. Prior to in appellants’ trial motions denied put formed the trial court its However, agreed intent mistrial. tes- activity of criminal outside the timony unfairly prejudicial and or- *68 charged conspiracy in time frame of the testimony judge stricken. The dered background order to to the con show gave following then curative instruc- - spiracy relationship and the associational tion: coconspirators. among appellants and their regard Mr. that with McDuffie testified court, trial from reviewing The after cases to Mr. he he him Rushing, said saw jurisdictions, particularly other United every then he he day, and said sold Mathis, (D.C.Cir. v. 216 F.3d 18 States long drugs every This was day.' before 2000) Lokey, and United States v. 945 F.2d And began. this he also conspiracy ever (5th Cir.1991), that per 825 ruled it would taught that said at he Mr. point another government type mit the to elicit this of kill, to how survive. Rushing how to government’s rep on the evidence. Based Now, testimony. that striking I’m resentations, court there found testimony, I When means strike demonstrating to purpose was a relevant you You can’t disregard are told to it. joint appellants criminal of activities it, about you consider can’t think it as others, prejudice. risk of minimal with partic- you-deliberate case. in this And ularly testimony to government’s type regard for this vehicle (cid:127) teaching Rushing Mr. of about to allegedly evidence several “insider” wit- kill, government (Zolton) 26 (quoting both the -the de- United States v. agree they Williams, no (2d fense know of evi- 205 F.3d 33-34. Cir. they aware dence have never been 2000)). Moreover, is latitude al “wide any of witness ever this evidence evidence, in presenting lowed and it is So, taught Rushing Mr. how kill. it is within the discretion the trial court to extremely important you strike it. admit remotely which evidence even tends is There no basis for this testimo- .known conspiracy charged.” establish Cas ny, consequently you are tillo-Campos, at 987 A.2d 493. ,you in any consider it are not way, it discuss when comes time delib- if the Even other in this case. erate crimes is- for purposes admissible of estaba Appellants now the denial appeal their lishing conspiracy, question “the next motions mistrial. is probative whether [its] value is substan tially outweighed by prejudice.” undue “We review the decision ; Lokey, 945 at deny F.2d a mistrial United States motion abuse discre 835 Morton, (Ronald) States, (D.C.2012) Wynn tion.” v. United (D.C.2013). (“[E]ven Drew[64] 80 A.3d -if “This evidence falls outside will not overturn the trial court’s decision or within a- Drew exception thus is deny a ap [to mistrial it. motion] unless admissible,, otherwise it must be excluded unreasonable, irrational, pears unfair, if the trial court determines that its probar or unless the situation is so extreme that tive value is substantially outweighed by the failure to result reverse would (internal the danger of unfair prejudice.”) miscarriage justice.” Lee v. United quotation omitted). marks and alteration (D.C.1989) (ci 562 A.2d court, The trial apparently finding while omitted). tation testimony may Andre McDuffie’s been relevant to the legitimate prosecuto

“In conspiracy prosecution, goal rial of establishing the associational usually allowed consid relationship between the members leeway erable in offering evidence of other conspiracy, found that the value probative ‘to jury offenses inform the back kill” testimony the “how to was substan ground of conspiracy charged, to com tially outweighed by danger of unfair story plete charged, the crimes explain prejudice.65 great help illegal “[W]e- owe deal how the relationship participants in deference” to the trial court such a between the ” Mathis, Jenkins, developed.’ the crime at finding. F.3d 999. Second, part Drew v. teachings. 331 F.2d 85 of McDuffie's *69 (D.C.Cir.1964) (holding evidence other strongest that the inference to be drawn from prove crimes is to a defendant’s inadmissible testimony McDuffie’s was that when the “lit- disposition charged to commit the crime but taught tle gang Iocs” were the mem- skills may legitimate be admissible for other non- bership, only the was older members disposition purposes). performed According to acts of violence. McDuffie, appear the “little Iocs” to have prejudice appellants 65. We note that the to by go learned observation: "If we had significantly fairly seems to have been less- somebody, make a move on so far [to] as by ened the context of McDuffie’s testi- Andre violence, inflict the act of would [the we take First, mony. McDuffie testified that he little do Iocs] with us and let them see how we "taught” Rushing partici- to kill—not that he it.” joint pated killings Rushing in with or was any Rushing practiced aware of evidence that 476 the denying in discretion great defer not abuse its equally

oweWe for reviewing its motions mistrial. trial court when ence responsive of a remedial measure selection Testimony Darryl Travers b. testimony. Unit problematic See such McLendon, F.3d 378

ed States “other Rushing separate makes a (D.C.Cir.2004) (“[W]e not lose should 1113 testimony argument based on crimes” judge who of the fact that the same sight witness, Darryl government another bal initially weighed 403] the [Fed.R.Evid. direct-examination, Tra During Travers. evidence, of the against ance admission to statements made reference vers subsequently [evi determined that being about Rushing had made him mistrial”). “A not warrant a jail dence] did same of the housed in section’ step to be' remedy is a mistrial severe Gray. Stephen Crew 22nd Street member —a to be possible, cross-examination, and one whenever avoided various’ defendants On manifesting only in a circumstances fact taken out that Travers himself brought v. United necessity Najafi therefor.” in order prison had been released from States, (D.C.2005); investiga government see A.2d assist the with its (Richard) response 639 tion. In to this bias cross-exami Clark v. United also re-direct, nation, elicit (D.C.1993) on (“Assuming, A.2d in from Travers that if he ed remained argument, evidence] con [the sake of concerns prison safety he evidence, would had ‘other we con stituted crimes’ - Appellants -cooperator. as- a government prejudice in so did not [it] clude result objected and moved-for a mistrial as to render trial court’s refusal great if Tra- grounds that the inferencé was that . mistrial an of discre grant a abuse jail, in be harmed vers remained he would tion.”). appellants. trial court one mistrial, it sus to order but declined Here, testimony the offending was objection tained and instructed very brief at the outset of reference was no that Tra jury that there evidence Veney v. extremely lengthy trial. Cf. any safety would have concerns vers (D.C. 828-29 jail. he remained (other harmless, 2007). crimes objectionable testimony ¡find because part, no We abuse discretion based trial). three-day heard on the first day of Darryl judge’s Tra- the trial treatment of. repeated The reference testimony. As to reference vers’ Travers’ witnesses, ar or its and not government, incarceration, tq Rushing’s -of the fact gued closing. gave And the trial Rushing minimal prejudice there was immediate, strong, and cura very almost many jail played of his calls were because stating instruction that there was “no tive jurors jury, at which time taught McDuffie had evidence” Andre Rushing was inevitably became aware McLendon, Rushing to kill. See F.3d during leading up period incarcerated (no denying Moreover, abuse discretion to the trial. neither Travers’ exposure evidence, for mistrial a motion based on testimony, nor linked any other Fed. any to evidence determined violate Rushing’s incarceration brevity of charged 403 because of “the of which he R.Evid. offenses *70 testimony offending clarity case, Laquanda and the particularly murder .the instructions”). Frost, court’s Keisha [curative] district and assault of Johnson Therefore, govern- court did the cehtral we find that the trial which was event (David) Rushing. by made to him a woman against case named' Tamika ment’s Bradshaw, States, Cooper Washington murdering v. United 760 A.2d denied Ter- (D.C.2000) lim- (prejudicial effect rence Jones and testified he first no as to “there was ited where evidence shooting learned about Terrence Jones may appel- what crime resulted girl from “[t]his Tamika.” Coo- name[d] opposed lant’s incarceration” as supposed per’s Cooper defense counsel then asked 'charged situation the crime “the where what Bradshaw had The said him-. same of- prior arrest involve the government objected admissibility omitted). fense”) (internal quotation marks (although Bradshaw’s exact statement it testimony fear of And the about Travers’ specify grounds). not did The trial remaining even if prison, improper, bench, did court tó parties called the thé grant court to require not trial Cooper’s defense counsel stated that Brad- testimony motion for mistrial. a hearsay shaw’s statement was not because very lengthy in a a brief reference trial Cooper’s it was to show offered state by trial court’s fully mitigatéd and was mind and because “it’s [Coo- relevant how . Consequently, curative instruction. we per] found about shooting.” With- out Rushing no relief on the basis of grant explanation, out the trial court sustained claims. v. United these See Chase objection. Cooper’s defense counsel (no (D.C.1995) 1155 n. 8 Cooper then asked he was when he where by deny- abuse discretion trial court “became a aware that there had been ing motion for mistrial where shooting.” Cooper replied that he was testimony attempted to elicit “fear” be- lot ... parking “[in] the from the [a]cress cause denial of motion was not “unreason- court” on 22nd,Street. basketball unfair”). able, irrational Assuming that the trial court should Cooper testify have allowed as to Brad Evidentiary Rulings During shaw’s statement under the state-of-mind Cooper’s Case-in-Chief exception against hearsay, to the rule her Cooper argues that trial vari- court’s very im precise statement was of minimal evidentiary rulings ous erroneous collec- no portance, and there was harm because tively deprived right present him of the Cooper to present was able the substance .complete defense. See Heath United conveyed of what Bradshaw him. See (D.C.2011) 26 280-81 Terry, United States v. 702 F.2d (“[Wjhether an erroneous exclusion de- Cir.1983) (2d (error in suppressing evi fense violates the defendant’s dence harmless where its essence was right present constitutional defense by conveyed jury nonetheless tc>the de- a rea- depends upon whether there exists counsel).' fénse probability that sonable the omitted evi- ... led dence would have en- by Laquanda b. Johnson Statements that did tertain reasonable- doubt Cooper also claims that the exist.”) omitted). Af- (emphasis otherwise admitting in not statements erred claims, examining reject his his ter we allegedly matter made the, truth argument. him in Laquanda Johnson to the course a. Statements Tamika Bradshaw La Cooper conversation between following Terrence Jones Cooper argues quanda trial court effect, were, him, during shooting. The statements prevented. erred when in- Cooper she testimony, repeating from a statement knew *71 Cooper at- prison guard,. Elzie. shooting because she Brandon volved a-parking seen in lot on 22nd Street him tempted to elicit from fact Elzie the that the time. had told he not be in he Elzie that could jail of the part the same as Freddie Lee trial court

Cooper argued to the that government Bailey Bailey cooperating had elicited cer- was a because the because by Laquanda Johnson to tain statements witness, and therefore Elzie escort should forfeiture-by- his*'disadvantage under a part jail. This testi- him another wrongdoing theory, Laquanda’s state- mony by Cooper to show that was offered should, him also be ments favorable to Bailey’s testimony, was that Cooper which registered a government admitted. The him inculpatory statements to while made hearsay objection. agreed trial court The cell, they together in a holding were was government the forfeiture- untrue. hearsay by-wrongdoing exception advantage designed rule was not hearsay objec- government The raised a therefore, wrongdoer; statements tion, arguing Cooper’s “self-serving” for their truth and were admissible being statement offered for the truth they instructed Cooper permitted was not fact purposes only. admissible state-of-mind presence wit- court again admissibility limited the Attempting negotiate accept- ness. Laquanda’s to their effect on statements ground, the trial court able middle asked Cooper’s Cooper state of mind when if Cooper’s counsel he would be defense sought repeat statements her if asking Cooper amenable to Elzie in- another explaining context individu- him “something” that caused formed .al, Williams, Patrick the same overheard Cooper Bailey. Elzie to away take from Laquanda conversation between and. Coo- Although defense counsel stated Cooper’s per after the Terrence Jones murder. “just any he think [didn’t] it[ ] [is] The trial in- its court did not err treat hearsay,” agreed question he to ask the testimony. ment In Sweet v. Unit way proposed by the trial court. ed (D.C.2000), we that “it only party wrong held who Cooper’s counsel then El- defense asked fully procures, a witness’ absence who upon zie what he did “based the informa- right object waives to the adverse Cooper gave you.” tion that Mr. Elzie party’s prior introduction of the witness’ turn, replied, I “In Mr. Coo- then escorted (alterations out-of-court Id. statements.” - per upstairs.” Assuming arguendo back omitted) (quoting United States Houli that the trial court should have admitted han, (1st Cir.1996)). 92 F.3d Cooper’s the contents of statements to El- We explicitly also stated that the forfei mind, zie to Cooper’s any show state ture-by-wrongdoing provides “which rule error trial judge’s was harmless. The objection by for the waiver of party handling testimony of Elzie’s allowed Coo- who causes the witness absence cannot per Bailey’s to rebut logically' strip government of substance its hear Sweet, say objections.”. statements, A.2d at Cooper’s which was purpose (internal omitted). quotation marks Terry, Elzie to stand. calling F.2d at 314. by Cooper

c. Statements Elzie Brandon sum, assuming even error two -of evidentiary, rulings, there no Cooper these Finally, claims that by excluding court erred to a Cooper’s right his statement violation constitutional *72 conspiracy..Id. preju How- -Any complete a defense. present , ever,- a Cooper prosecuted was not under very was minimal because Cooper to dice theory liability conspiracy for the vicarious to elicit evidence permitted was he of count of which the murder Leslie Jones jury. the put defense theories the before Instead, Cooper an overt act. was v. United (Maurice) Morris See conspiracy. as (“even principal tried a Be- 1116, 1128-29 (D.C.1998) if suffered, Cooper little, erred, impacted. judge the defense Tann’s statement the cause conspiracy charge on act of the appellant’s- case overt any prejudice” if because the. which, was not only, a charge prose- he ex “clearly jury” and the before theory liability, of cuted under a vicarious testimony bol “would cluded Akins is inapplicable Cooper’s and case”). Therefore, claim we appellant’s stered meritless. on reject Cooper’s claim these evi- based

dentiary rulings. B. Instructional Issues Videotaped of Tann’s 4. Admission 1. Obstruction Justice Instruction Statement Beaver, Cooper, and Tann Appellants prosecution’s rebuttal During the charged justice with obstruction- case, played government portion a 22-722(a)(2)(A), § D.C.Code under police to videotaped Tann’s statement (a)(6). Appellants challenge the trial to on Leslie Jones matters relevant justice jury instruc- court’s obstruction statement, videotaped murder. allege tion that it amounted to a con- Darryl visiting Tann made references structive amendment the indictment. murder, evening of Travers on the counts, as listed in The relevant testimony of sev conflicted with the which follows; indictment, were as alibi witnesses who liad eral Tanii’s 17, 2004, and April Between on or about Tann'was with them testified that Cooper ... April on or about evening. corruptly persuaded, and endeav- .... any make tape The did not reference induce, John- Laquanda ored cause any Tann. Nor was appellant other than son, official' the sister a witness in an charged Tann with appellant other than wit, investigation into proceeding, (although his Jones murder Leslie . of Terrence April 2004 murder an overt act murder was listed .as Queen ... of Richard Jones and assault only charge). Cooper, ap- conspiracy influence, delay and the-intent liability pellant under vicarious convicted a testimony Kyara truthful prevent mur- theory Laquanda Johnson —for that, ... viola- proceeding Johnson only pursuant-to claim der raises —now 22-722(a)(2)(A) § tion of [D.C.Code Akins A.2d 1017 (a)(6) (2012 Repl.),]. (D.C.1996) on the admission of based 30, 2004, April Between or about videotape. Cooper ... July on or about ... Tann ... Gilliam conspiracy where ... joint trial Beaver “[I]n .... other, op per ... persons corruptly theory of relies vicar , in suaded, cause or liability, may be intro endeavored ious statements duce, Johnson, with the intent Laquanda party [a] under the statements duced influence, delay, and persuade her to against opponent exception to rule testimony of her prevent the truthful hearsay they are ... unless admissible Johnson, sister, in an Kyara witness coconspirators’ statements furtherance manner in wit, potential which describing one proceeding, official United States justice. Cooper appellants ... could have obstructed v. Lannell violation 22-722(a)(2)(A) (a)(6) § trial court so for each obstruction did [D.C.Code *73 41 (2012 count, Tann’s- justice including of Count Repl.) ].[66] Donnise Harris as the which described 1, 2006, and Between on or about June instructions went without victim. These ... Tann ... July on or about 2006 court also written objection. The issued threatening by corruptly persuaded however, jury; to the the writ- instructions communication, letter and endeavored contain the instructions did not “means ten influence, Don- impede intimidate and Instead, the written language. of force” Harris, in pro- a an official nise witness “threats of phrase used the instructions wit, case of States ceeding, the by pattern jury the force” as authorized ... with intent Saquawn Harris the 22-722(a)(6). § instruction for influence, delay, prevent the testimony of Donnise Harris truthful verdicts, prior to but sentenc- After the ... in violation of proceeding ing, a motion for a new trial Cooper, filed 22-722(a)(2)(A) (a)(6) § [D.C.Code instruction alleging that the flawed (2012 Repl.) ]. constructive of to a amendment amounted Cooper’s the indictment. argument instructions, jury gov- Prior final the by instructing jury the could that the trial court use requested ernment jus- of if it found that obstruction convict for jury instruction the “catch- pattern the by a tice been committed “means of justice all” version of obstruction of under force,” jury permitted the court 22-722(a)(6) § 24 and D.C.Code Counts liability on theory ap- which consider involving the Johnson sisters. Criminal Further, pellants not Coo- indicted. the District of Co- Jury Instructions |or pointed per appellants to evi- and other (5th rev.2013). lumbia, Ap- 6.101F ed. No. dence at trial that went toward “force” pellants object, not and the court did theory justice, opposed as obstruction agreed to do so. the instructions When theory' of “persuasion” obstruction given, the elements of Count were justice explicitly charged that was jury, part, court relevant instructed indictment, thereby language of the en- as follows: prejudice hancing the likelihood obstructing elements [T]he essential post-trial instruction. After a result of the are, first, justice count ... under this hearing, appellants’ trial court denied corruptly, by or defendant motions. impeded or force, means obstructed impede to obstruct or endeavored first task.is Our determine e justice any du administration of review of this issue correct standard proceeding Superior official Court applies to error review- appeal. “[P]lain [Emphasis of the"District of Columbia. con a claim that an indictment has been added] objection if has not structively amended (Alexander) trial jury The trial court instructed the been made at level.” States, § 22- accordance with D.C.Code Smith v. United 722(a)(6) instruction, (D.C.2002). pattern except Despite principle, appel inadvertently chánged allege lants their claims should not be phrase (1) subject plain “threats of force” to of force” when error review because “means (cid:127) VII(D)' again clarity. supra. 66. See Count here Section 25 has been included Jury....” 'the ment a Grand U.S. Const. “essentially preserved they were a trial court -post-verdict amend. V. by appellants’ “[W]here ... broadens trial court (2) trial”; grounds govern- possible for conviction add- for a motions new error; (3) ing factual basis to those con- appellants another ment invited indictment, tained within the the court “reasonably judge’s [written] relied on constructively impermissibly— [the instructions which did include —and (4) Wooley amends indictment.” v. Unit- phrase”; “there is force] means (D.C.1997). ed appellants did strong likelihood that Only a grand jury may “broaden” the precise words uttered actually -hear the charges in an indictment. Stirone v. Unit- judge.” 212, 215-16, ed 361 U.S. 80 S.Ct. *74 arguments about Appellants’ 270, (1960). 4 252 L.Ed.2d uripersuasive. of review are the standard Here, essentially claim was argument that the “essen there were two Their preserved” by way post-con of the amendments tially constructive possible (lj trial fail by a new must the viction motions for could have occurred: addition of motions not post-trial such do phrase because the “threats of force” the written thus, (2) “timely objection,” to a amount addition of by instructions the the plain from appellant not save an error will of force” the oral in phrase “means (Tristan) Smith v. United See phrase review. structions. Neither included (D.C.2004) States, 1159, (per 1160 847 A.2d language of the indictment. Howev curiam) by.statute on (superseded other er, turn, addressing each issue in we find (Chevalier) v. grounds); United States on appellants are owed no relief based (D.C.Cir.1994) 671, 673 Thompson, 27 F.3d the, jury phrase inclusion of either the (“[A] a post-verdict motion for new trial is instructions plain under the error stan objection: timely a the not the same as dard. any judge that the delay eliminates chance plain A claim of error based the duplica without a could correct the error phrase “threats of is the force” addition trial, if according review as a

tive by our law that holds case foreclosed virtually objection timely had been raised satisfy the fourth prong cannot appellant by strategic defense invites behavior coun at issue plain error when the indictment ig sel.”). Furthermore, authority no there to a criminal statute includes a citation remaining arguments. The appellants’ in from a trial recites when which oblige of the rule” “point plain-error language if structing jury, a even judge when the defendant to advise track does not otherwise indictment therefore, occurs; the rulé “re mistake wording of Bolanos the cited offense. toes, to be on his quires counsel defense States, 672, (D.C. A.2d v. 938 687 United just judge....” States v. (Alexander-) Smith, 2007); at 801 A.2d 1043, Vonn, 55, 73, 122 152 S.Ct. U.S. Bolanos, In one of defen several 961-62. (2002); v. Davis Unit L.Ed.2d 90 see also charged 'aggravated assault dants (D.C.2009). 1255, 1259 ed 984 A.2d (“AAWA”) by an indictment armed while for a constructive Consequently, we review committed alleged the offense was using plain error standard. amendment causing] serious purposely “knowingly victim; bodily injury pro Fifth Amendment However, instruc jury the Bolanos being to an any person from “held hibits rea, mens included an infamous alternative capital, for a or otherwise tions swer another subsection crime, proper under presentment on a or indict- unless standard, requires that explicitly alleged appel- error which AAWA statute but indictment, is, “that the defendant lants “demonstrate that error affected extreme indifference manifested human rights by showing a rea- [their] substantial knowingly engaging' conduct life it probability prejudicial had a sonable grave bodi- which risk serious created on the outcome [their] trial[s].” effect ly injury.” rejecting appellant’s Id- v. United Comford plain claim of error based a construc- (D.C.2008). First, written in- amendment, tive we held: language structions did not include the both the indictment- failed state While generally People “means of See fofce.” aggravated subsections of assault Wilson, Cal.Rptr.3d Cal.4th ; statute, citation that did include a (2008) (“To 187 P.3d 1069-70 subsections; thus, encompassed both discrepancy exists between extent [appellant] had he be re notice would jury oral written and version instruc- quired against prongs. to defend both tions, provided written instructions [appellant] We find that has failed to control.”). jury Although trial will show that miscarriage justice oc court did not instruct that the curred, in light of the notice he received written in the event instructions controlled through aggravated the citation to the *75 instructions, of a conflict its oral it is with assault included in the statute indictm in phrase doubtful this case that the ent.[67] meaningful “means of force” had a influ- Here, phrase while the “threats of force” upon jury’s the trial ence verdict. The- in jury found the written instructions was court’s were near the of words uttered end indictment, not used the the indictment month seven of a nine-month trial and 22-722(a)(6), § did cite D.C.Code which during period an instructional that lasted phrase describing includes this the of- the of court part better sessions and two Therefore, justice. fense of of obstruction forty-nine relating involved counts to six precedent, under our appellants cannot defendants. A more much reasonable sce- prevail on the basis óf of the inclusion the jurors upon nario is that the relied the phrase of “threats force” the written instructions, written which used the instructions, language, during “threats of force” their Appellants’ argument on based deliberations. extensive language mistakenly of “means force” Second, government argue did during jury read court trial its oral short; appellant’s guilt instructions also falls based on of this time the “means on prong plain theory liability.68 claim fails the third force” Portillo v. See amply supported appellant’s 67. Id. at 687. We came to the same conclu dence conviction (Alexander) aggravated sion where the Smith trial A.2d 960-62. assault.” jury court’s instruction added second means committing aggravated that was not referring 68. assault When to the evidence on Counts 24, 25, explicitly charged language of the in recounted There, testimony dictment. we held “even if we assume asked Donnise Harris Tann Harris; plainly testify favorably appellant instruction indictment, language Cooper approached Laquanda amended the of the Johnson and fairness, there is drugs money no that the integrity risk offered her bribe reputation judicial proceedings Kyara testimony; will influence public Johnson’s be affected' Déwey Chappell working where the indictment included a Bea was with ver, Tann, encompassed citation that both subsections of Gilliam to find the sis and Brian statute, aggravated "change testimony.” assault and the evi ters to their While (D.C. murder, jury the Terrence Jones 2013) (no where, (1) burglary- in a plain charged rendering error one verdicts entry- case, government argued second-degree ap- count for both murder liability as theory (2) pellants felony with-intent-to-steal first-degree two .and charged, as to the additional en opposed charges murder for each. try-with-intent-to-assault theory added instructions, jury final the trial During instructions). Finally, in jury court trial jury could instructed find “any defi appellants have identified appellants guilty both of the lesser-includ- strategy at trial due ciency the defense second-degree ed murder while offense discrepancy between the indictment to the armed, if even reasonable it found doubt relating instructions jury first-degree felony charges. murder charge[s].” justice] [obstruction Id.. Ultimately, jury Tann and Ar- found Therefore, to meet their appellants fail guilty nette each of three counts of second- prong plain third error burden degree while armed: the second- murder claims.69 reject review and we their degree charge that been re- murder Offense Instruc- Lesser-included first-degree premeditated duced from Relationship Felo- Between tion: second-degree murder and two counts of ny Second-Degree Murder murder as lesser-included offenses first-degree felony charges. Arnette murder Appellants Tann and were charged first-degree count of with one pre- argue Appellants now murder armed and two

meditated while n They improperly instructed. first-degree counts of relat- felony murder second-degree murder is not contend that to the death of Jones. The ed Terrence first-degree offense of’ lesser-included alleged underlying two felonies *76 in test felony murder under the “elements” robbery of attempted Terrence Jones and States, 299, Blockburger v. United 284 U.S. Queen. completed robbery of Richard the. 180, (1932) Byrd 52 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed. 306 stage, At the MJOA the United States, (D.C.1991). v. 386 598 A.2d agreed was that there insufficient second-degree claim Their is that murder first-degree premeditation the element of “malice afore requires the element for premeditated of the count both murder in thought” not contained the element appellants. The court that the count ruled —an first-degree felony murder. offense be lesser-included would reduced the However,' foreclos appellants’ argument' is while offense murder -second-degree Therefore, by for our that hold seeond-de- armed of ed decisions Terrence Jones. ap that even if government’s argument proceeding_” how some This means described explained by testimony this efforts co- pellants' "means of force” claims survived conspirators review, of force and involved the threats prong plain our deci third error contemplated the use or means of force (Alexander) in Smith sions Solanos government’s argument not did contend require deny because would them relief us any underlying of acts these obstruction miscarriage of they not "show that could justice counts were executed such a means occurred, light [they] justice notice or use óf force. through citation to obstruc [the received justice] in the indict tion of statute included 25, 69. also note that Counts We ment,” [they] put which on “notice that them 22-722(a)(2)(A), § which cited D.C.Code against” required use- be to defend would knowing "physical makes unlawful the use of Bolanos, of-physical-force theory. 938 A.2d "influence, delay, prevent force” to at 687. testimony person in an official [a] truthful informing them is, fact, honestly opinions held a lesser-included grée murder duty See it was to reach verdicts first-degree felony their murder. offense States, conscientiously A.2d do so. only they Towles v. United if could (en banc). Therefore, (D.C.1987) Accordingly, 656-58 cannot at 974. we no claims afford them basis relief. their or obvi- say it should have clear been court that there was error ous to the trial and Conduct Instruction Attitude event, any appel- the instruction. instructions, During plain final prong cannot three of lants meet con jury an “attitude and clearly issued jury en- error test because appellant objected. No instruction. duct” discerning gaged extensive and deliber- Arnette, argue Tann, Harris now returning Id. at verdicts. ations before fundamentally similar instruction informed (lengthy deliberations in Jones to the instruction deemed flawed could not court’s that Jones determination (D.C.2008), States, v. 946 A.2d 970 United probability” that" the show a “reasonable favoring a collective result over unduly verdict). changed the instruction erroneous jurors. opinions We individual t plain no find error the instruction. Argument Closing C. and Rebuttal Appellants are correct that the instruc argue appellants All the cumulative proble tion an element found contained allegedly improper impact of re- several matic in a statement that the “final Jones: government during its marks made jurors’ service turned their test” arguments requires closing and rebuttal verdicts, opinions. not their earlier How disagree and decline reversal. We ever, the instruction did contain grant appellants relief. have identi “purposive” language that we holding. underlying fied as the Jones See Closing Argument 1. Government’s Lampkins v. United (D.C.2009) (flaw in Jones inform closing argu- beginning of its Near the e , should, ing “purpos its to ex- government attempted ment» support your rather opinion,.but own plain why culpability Laquanda for the truth”); and to declare the see ascertain beyond Al- Johnson murder extended also Grant 85 A3d Little, phonce Crew the 22nd Street mem- *77 (D.C.2014) (error 99-100 in the telling was who shot her and Keisha Frost. The ber that to jury purpose Grant its reach a was government made several statements thereby jurors expressing verdict the government effect that the had re- the preferred genuine that consensus was not to “turn on sponsibility back[]” [its] agreement). ignore larger the crim- community the In problem inal on 22nd the Street. the also Additionally, instant instruction (1). explanation, government of this course the praised McClary in language included briefly (D.C. from “we” statements transitioned single 2010), “you” to a stateinent directed at the jurors explaining purpose not (2) stated, asking you, jury “[We when it pre-announcing opinions, are] contained Jones, point, community what wording approved by similar to at this to do that objected not reminding jurors requires.”70 appellants to surrender their Several killed; argument prosecutor’s Alphonce 70. The was: Johnson was Little arrested; Alphonce pled guilty. just Little you This is not that can a situation not, up Laquanda sum three lines. It’s objections. court sustained their shown and the evidence had was not a criminal- returning gov- from a break After conspiracy by specific defined periods time argument, ernment’s the court instructed goals, merely but ongoing partic- they jurors represent that did not ipation community in a1 attitude that em- essence, and, community they that drug braced a culturé and black market. government’s follow that line of the Furthermore, Cooper argued that gov- argument. against ernment was biased him and had very its,closing argument, At end allowed emotion and preconceived notions government testimony referenced the about appellants’ guilt to bias itself witnesses, Tyrone Curry. of its of one favor of certain witnesses in the case. Under cross-examination about his reasons closing, Harris’s he asserted that some of cooperation government, Cur- government’s witnesses were motivat- ry said that his sister had killed six been to lie prospect ed of relocation months area around 22nd earlier money from the govern- assistance that Street and he had come to the conclu- further, ment. He that noted some wit- “[Ejnough enough. that is How many sion nesses had received thousands of dollars got you say people die before some- from the government. thing?” The referred the to Curry’s testimony back as it concluded government responded The in rebuttal closing argument its and then used Cur- conspiracy the law of designed ry’s quote argue: gentle- “Ladies and n way such a showing concrete men, enough enough. is You need hold ’periods time and single objectives was they’ve these men accountable what required. government , further done.”71 if remarked that up law was set dif- Argument 2. Government’s Rebuttal ferently, prosecuting then organ- criminal izations such “Italian During closing argument, Cooper .Mafia” made case that government’s what the would be too difficult.72 The trial much, hap- -pain- suffering There's much more to what too much to 22nd pened night Laquanda [the on Johnson’s Street.... And it makes me think back to murder]. thing Tyrone Curry the one He said it said. Now, defendants behind me stand, would get on and I want to make sure I very you right stop much like that there. right it because he said it better than I easy just And would been have call it being could have. He was cross-examined case closed.... why finally about it was he for- came required do so have But to would that we ward, said, "My and he sister was killed six eye happen- turn a blind to what had been ago, I months and came to the conclusion ing years. there for We would have had to enough enough. many people How is community. turn our backs We gotta you say something? die before would our to turn backs gentlemen, enough enough. Ladies and *78 entire two-block We area. would had You need to hold these men accountable for ignore to the other victims. added], they’ve [Emphasis what done. asking you, point, 'we’re do And at this to community requires. that We owed it what Mafia,” regard 72. With tó the "Italian the community investigate to to this thor- that prosecutor stated: added], oughly. [Emphasis requirement [in There's no the law of argument The full 71. was as follows: conspiracy] says that has to be a limited it said, period requirement There's no July Like I time.... [it] lit] didn’t start on it just objective.... July didn’t end on that it.has to be oiie 11. The evidence has you requirement only shown the men no it be behind me have caused There’s that can “bias,” that it government explained the objections and ruled immediate overruled later motions mistrial. in- against against appellants, .for “bias” had no but However, jury it instructed in favor of its stead was “biased” witnesses “unfortunate.” comment “mafia” immensely difficult and because jury that further told the The trial.court cooperating task of with the dangerous any par- thinking about it should such as this one.74 government a case group weighing when ticular historical to objected this line When the defense case, particularly in this the evidence it argument, the trial court stated traditionally negative with conno- groups that the rebuttal was a fair re- believed tations! closings. Neverthe- sponse appellants’ to argument, govern- Later in rebuttal less, caution, an out of the court issued explanation of its ment returned jury disregard instruction that the charging telling pur- strategy, personal opinions or any reference to the pose prosecution behind expansive its by any attorneys expressed “bias” it the 22rid because Street Crew was closing arguments. during obligation just “an not to look at what is us, right dig deeper. but to It’s before Analysis sidewalk, just right? in the like weed yellow top, governing can our pluck You standard off coming Dandelion is back.”73 in clos prosecutorial review misconduct n ing argument is or rebuttal “well-settled.” rebuttal, Finally, concluding when Finch United argument government responded to the (D.C.2005). by determining “We appellants that it was against biased start. were, challenged whether the comments favor certain witnesses. fact, were, improper.. they we must Attempting exploit the use the term If just right be- about one incident. And think about more than look at what was [I]ittle it[;] us[;] obligation dig perfect deeper it makes sense. If that were the fore it was our truth, only thing prose- conspiracy find the we firmly law could are con- cute, go prosecute gangs[;] you it’d never it’d never vinced when in the back and you prosecute organized dig deeper, you will All those Ital- find the truth and crimes. families, prosecut- you they'd get ian look of that never when at all Mafia ed, you [Emphasis added]. will hold these men accounta- back ,.. added], [Emphasis ble. regard pulling 73. With to the reference to out weeds, “bias," quote regard government's was: 74. With to the prosecutor argued: obligation get to the We have truth. just against obligation Cooper We have an look at We’re not Mr. or biased us, right dig deeper. Rushing is before Beaver Mr. Arnette what but to Mr. or .Mr. or n sidewalk, just right? It’s like Mr. We are biased a weed Mr. Harris or. .Tann. witnesses,' yellow top, pluck we You can and a in favor of our because ask off coming We have an Dandelion back. these folks to come here do obligation problem, root of We ask sit get unthinkable. them stand, you, baggage and we didn’t do that Terrence look at air all of their - Jones[;] point finger we didn’t that. We went men do for- these behind ward[;] Cooper they prosecuted we did. Lannell me call them out for what alone[;] get prosecute happens, they we didn't And when that attacked [D]euce— whole, way and didn’t it it [D]euce as a it work. We and that’s works.... Little, Alphonce personal? Maybe can take out but there’s So is Is there a bias? else, is, going against defendants], somebody Al- [the to be because it’s not there but *79 people phonce just weapon is is Little the It’s those who do what asked. obligation!;] [Emphasis hands. That's our it was to do added].

487 or judge proper erred comments ... we whether the trial determine determine responding cumulative impact his discretion whether the of abused the er- “[Ajbsent improper rul Id. some substantially jury’s rors influenced the them.” ver- dict”) (internal by judge, the trial we ing omitted). or omission quotation marks conviction, ordinarily cannot reverse considered, in as Factors focus must therefore be our ultimate sessing gravity harmlessness include “the or Irick judge the did failed what do.”. misconduct, ,the of relationship the its (D.C. States, 565 26, v. A.2d 33 United guilt, of issue the effect of any corrective (footnote omitted). 1989) by tlj.e judge, strength the trial action Appellants allege types two of Irick, of the case.” 565 A.2d .government’s closing government’s in- the improprieties government’s at 32. first notes the We arguments. Their first con and rebuttal closing arguments very and rebuttal were government tention is that the made sev Moreover, lengthy. .they part were of an inflame, designed eral statements the period, argument by par the extended jury urge the .to passions jury the weeks) .(nearly ties two in a trial .that message policies apart send a based opening nine months from state lasted evidence, from the consideration to the In comparison, ments final verdict. including: argument jury the about government’s alleged missteps the took doing community’s bidding, argu relatively form of brief references “enough enough,” ment that refer the. protracted arguments amid about the com weeds,” “pulling ence to out the and the facts,of plex, and numerous See case. analogy to Italian Mafia. See McGriff (Vonn) States, Washington v. United 884 States, (D.C. v. United 705 A.2d 289 CMaurice) (D.C.2005); A.2d 1080, 1089. States, 1997); Powell v. United A.2d 455 Morris, (“the 622 offending at A.2d (D.C.1982). 405, 410 The other assertion relatively comment was a reference brief by government is that appellants made (inter during lengthy closing argument”) credibility improperly vouched for the omitted). quotation nal marks by openly declaring, during its witnesses objected, Each appellants time that argument, its bias favor them. See Finch, gave timely trial court and effective cura McGriff, tive instructions. See 7056A.2d at assuming appellants’ con Even 289. We discern no abuse discretion. correct that these tentions are remarks Moreover, government’s po because the improper, were never we fol tentially improper' remarks tended grounds find no theless reversal. appellants’ attacks on motives and low con testing for harmlessness When strategies prosecution, many closing, rebuttal arguments, text of arguments generally these were collateral court may [ [if “this affirm the convictions ] keiy and not focused' on the matters rele appellant is] satisfied did question appellants’ guilt. vant to the from suffer ‘substantial prejudice’ States, See Bates v. United Finch, prosecutor’s improper comments.” (D.C.2000) (remarking periph on the (citing 867 A.2d at 226 Kotteakos v. United comments improper eral nature 750, 765, 328 U.S. S.Ct. harm). prosecutor evaluating (1946)); (Ivery) L.Ed. 1557 Gardner (D.C. clearly remark— improper most. A.2d. 36 2006) (“where, here, asking community to do what as occurred there to have been inadver- requires—appears im- multiple instances asserted *80 recordings longer were no made; original the government’s rest of the

teritly the by jail. Approximately the ambiguous as to their maintained are more (cid:127)remarks See, Irick, in June 2006 were e.g., Cooper calls that made impermissibility. dozens, the to been lost. (“Despite decisions the have at 35 estimated may or governing prosecutor what a law motions, Cooper brought During pretrial a say credibility of may not- 'about the attention the trial the issue to the easy to or always is not discern [witness] give to to the judge prepare the and asked Finally, findings ap apply.”) jury’s the instruction. jury “missing evidence” through the evi peared carefully parse argued, appeal, as he does Cooper ' ultimately against appellant, each dence to use con- he have been able would appellants of the most acquitting sfeveral missing calls for the tents of the impeach- Brewer charges against them. See serious witnesses, or alterna- government ment of (D.C. v. United him. nonhearsay by verbal acts tively,-as 1989). Therefore, confidently say canwe hearing, trial court a motions After appellants did suffer substantial by government was loss found that the any improprieties, prejudice as a result The court also found that unintentional. individually collectively, taken either of the any no evidence "that there was government’s arguments. tó have been favorable material would Therefore, the court denied Coo- Cooper. Discovery D. in- missing for per’s request Appellants discovery three related make However, prohibited the court struction. brings' arguments. Cooper alone a claim testimony' government eliciting from government’s loss related of his any from witness conversations about phoné jail. appellants bring calls from All missing on the calls. Ad- would have been Brady75 involving government’s claims stipulation ditionally, parties introduced Dewey Chappell Kyara witnesses essence, stating, in that the into evidence Johnson. by govern- 2006 calls were lost June them had ment and efforts recreate Cooper’s Phone 1. Loss of Jail Calls failed. argues that the Cooper trial court erred trial Cooper argues that the court erred “missing giving

in not evidence” give “missing evidence” refusing discovery instruction as a sanction for the i.e., instruction, that:: government’s of a number of his loss r phone jail. calls If to an issue this from There was extensive evidence relevant power of jail phone by only evidence of calls multi- was within the one made case parties party produce, produced by was not ple appellants admitted In investigation trial. its absence has not party, been course case, you if prosecutors sufficiently explained, may, into received a then containing you appropriate, number of CDs calls infer that the made deem Cooper, jail from between June 2005 and evidence would have been unfavorable it. produce As it who preparing party November 2006. failed However, discovery, you such an sent should draw the CDs technology copying. your its unit from evidence that inference to both process, recordings judgment equally of certain calls available enough parties duplicated passed were lost time had or which would (1963). Brady Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d *81 you of govern- or think court’s characterization the other that evidence unimportant. ment’s loss of the recordings 'as the result negligence” of “substantial care- “real District Jury Instructions for the Criminal 16 constituting lessness” a Rule violation. (5th rev.2013). Columbia, No. 2.300 ed. of However, our of supplies review the record (cid:127) Criminal Rule Superior Court for this court no basis to disturb the trial 16(a)(1)(A)requires government the to dis judge’s regarding conclusion the minimal any written relevant close the defendant importance the missing of evidence by the made defen recorded statements (particularly light defense of the doubts knowledge, or of which it has dant he.properly expressed regarding whether of dili discover in the. exercise due would Cooper able to would have been make use avail gence, those statements and make any of the may statements that inspection, copying, for able the defense lost recordings).76 been contained This court has noted or photographing. Tyer, 912 at A.2d 1166. duty to discoverable produce that “[t]he missing Because the evidence instruc- duty to evidence entails the antecedent “essentially tion creates from evidence Allen United preserve evidence.” non-evidence,” (D.C.1994). we have said that States, 548, trial 649 A.2d 553 courts should take that its care use does If. trial a court concludes unfairly change “the tone the evi- government’s preserve that the failure to jury to “give dence” or invite the undue 16, a violation of Rule evidence' constituted weight to presumed content of testimo- sanction, fashioning appropriate “[i]n Id.; ny presented.” Thomas v. United weigh degree negli court should States, 52, (D.C.1982). A.2d Any involved, gence or bad faith the importance of prejudice Cooper claim makes re- lost, of the evidence and the evidence lated to the trial court’s refusal adminis- guilt (Anthony) adduced at trial.” Robin missing is ter instruction Under- son v. United mined corrective measures (D.C.2003). may The trial court select employ, trial did both which included the’“extremely range from broad” sanc prohibition against government elicit- “just action that tions corrective ing any testimony regarding the contents circumstances,” Tyer under the v. United calls, missing and the administration (D.C.2006). stipulation informing of a that the request review the of a for a “We denial possession calls had lost while been missing evidence instruction abuse of Therefore, government. we find no discretion,” “will not id. we trial abuse court’s discretion. trial as to what reverse the court’s'decision remedy. choice sanctions, any, impose if unless ... substantially there is an which has error Dewey Chappell Allen, rights.” a defendant’s prejudiced government Dewey Chappell was a wit- omitted). (emphasis 649 A.2d at 553 appellants ness with ties to and the 22nd agrees with He was for unrelat- Street Crew. arrested 23, jail activity January on Cooper recorded calls ed criminal dispute ongoing. Subsequently, trial he does not the trial discoverable and appeal, provided calls. Cooper, has not the contents of the 76.' even any specificity as to how he would have used at his home gun found gov- for the indicated cooperating witness became who testimony belonged person previously was focused ernment. His ob- Cooper and the efforts of. others. rela- Chappell’s stored it at home justice regard to the Johnson struct agreed to take Chappell tive. the Terrence aftermath sisters it at his once weapon and store house *82 murder, flight hid- and Harris’s into Jones his rela- police “snooping around” started Taylor murder. following the James ing tive’s home. . government testimony, the Prior to his conducted, sentencing the was Before to disclosures related Dew- made extensive government course and decided reversed history other ey Chappell’s criminal ap- ballistics information to disclose the part As impeachment material. potential However, government the ar- pellants. disclosures, in- government the these gued discovery no violation that there was a been appellants gun formed that had not have because the information would by Chappell’s from taken law enforcement Dewey Chappell had been relevant unless 23, 2009, on ar- January during his home link that known of the ballistics at the timé that government rest. also disclosed The government. he There- testified for the Chappell’s fingerprints had been lifted fore, to curry he no reason favor with had gun. from the the-government through cooperation. n Dewey impeached exten- Chappell was sively by counsel bias various defense argued they appellants , All that were during his After the cross-examination. argument a entitled to trial. Their new. case, during the government rested its information, by disclosing was that the cases-in-chief, the Inte- defense National (1) government prevented the from them (“NIBN”) grated Ballistics made Network cross-examining Dewey Chappell on- government the aware that a there was perceived prosecution fear for the Janu- possible link the gun between (2) homicide, ary showing Chap- 2009 Chappell’s been taken from home and weapon pell hiding and therefore January homicide that occurred in 2009 January in- hindering homicide prior government to his The did arrest. (3) vestigation, possi- investigating disclose fact the defense. weapon connection ble between government also made conscious appellants which were con- murders of effort not to discuss matter with Dew- hearing, After a victed this case. ey Chappell so that would not be aware he appellants’ motions for a trial denied link, and therefore he would not trial, discovery new finding no violation. any curry motive to additional favor claims, Appellants renew their in es- now later, government. About a week sence, appeal. while ongoing, the defense cases still

the match was confirmed NIBN. Brady issues are mixed questions of law and fact. Mackabee However, Chappell Dewey appar- (D.C.2011). ently suspect by never considered a findings While a court’s of “historical trial January murder. error, fact” are reviewed for clear where ended, After the merits of this trial portion findings legal court’s “concern[] sentencing, Chappell but before was de- facts,” consequences they are link historical briefed about the ballistic and told (internal investigators any quotation reviewed de novo. Id. that he was unaware omitted). facts related that homicide. He also marks “curry suppression prosecution. avoid “[T]he favor” and evidence, Therefore, to an prosecution favorable the undisclosed lacked evidence process request necessary accused violates due upon impeaching qualities so as n is where the evidence either Brady. material material under punishment, irrespective. or guilt Moreover, record, on this we no see prosecution.” good faith faith bad of the, suggest evidence would' bal-" 1194; Brady, 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 87 listics investigatory information had value' Williams, (Wesley) A.2d at 561. “The appellants such that its non-disclosure only if evidence there is rea material government’s would have violated the dis that, probability had the evidence sonable Mackabee, obligations. closure 29 A.3d at defeñsé, been disclosed result (mere speculation might proceeding would have different.” been discovery have led to exculpatory evi *83 Bag Id. at 562 v. (quoting United States Brady insufficient to dence establish a vio 667, 3375, 682, ley, 473 87 U.S. 105 S.Ct. lation). Finally, agree we with the trial (1985)). evi L.Ed.2d 481 material Such court that the cross-examination extensive may impeachment dence matters. include Dewey Chappell of on issues related to States, (Michael) Robinson 50 v. United bias, including weapon on based the that (D.C.2012). 508, 519 A.3d home, was in found his was such that had the ballistic concern evidence been disclosed there The non-disclosure was still no that ing Dewey Chappell possibility not reasonable the material un Brady, grounds der for. results of this case would been find no diffe we Fortson, . 662-63; “Impeachment is not ma rent See 979 A.2d at relief. evidence States, if v. terial the witness does not have knowl Watson United 940 A.2d (D.C.2008). edge of 187-88 underlying the fact.” Ifelowo United A.2d 295 13 n. Kyara Johnson (D.C.2001) Scott, (quoting Williams v. ; Johnson, Kyara (5th eyewitness as an Cir.1994)) F.3d Blunt v. (D.C. Laquanda both the Terrence Jones and murders, 2004) (“When govern Johnson was a critical evaluating possibility of the Cooper’s ment in witness. She testified testimony, objective bias adverse the murder, 2006 trial about Jones’s prosecution subjective likelihood and the Terrence again in this trial about murder government prosecute intent are Rather,.it .following and her sister's* In weeks irrelevant[.] is the witness’ be murder, Laquanda’s Kyara gave grand prosecution ppssible lief that is can Laquan- bias.”) (citations jury testimony night about produce quo internal death, Kyara omitted). grand jury, da’s because, Before tation marks is This course, Alphonce testified saw Little flee that she a witness cannot be motivated by jumping scene crime way act in a if no knowledge certain he has moped by back of a another man .driven he should be motivated do so. wearing hair in carry his dreadlocks and Here, there is no that Dewey however, trial, At gun. she testified ing Chappell finding was aware of the NIBN heard a on direct-examination that she linking weapon house to found away but moped not Little driven had seen fact, January 2009 homicide. on one. way to government went out of its avoid cross-examination, exposing Kyara On Chappell knowledge the bal- Johnson that, acknowledged listic link so have motive that she had lied he would Rushing moped. concerning them testified she grand jury. also She incon closing that the argue on to she had went government informed credibility. Little’s story Alphonce sistency Little about undermined been told the Shaquita friend by her moped concerned, gov- Long was As far as Kyara was Long. the fact that Apparently, unchallenged that she proffer was ernment Longs the moped told about moped. she never saw testify that would before knpwn appellants previously govern- immaterial This fact'renders During a break testimony. cross-exami- identify her ment’s “failure” to alleging nation, appellants made motions information Kyara source of Johnson’s Rushing claimed that discovery violation. testimony. finding Our grand jury her because exculpatory Long was an witness fact that supported is immateriality testimony would version support her any made further counsel never defénse from escorted where Little was not events they any Long. Nor ask for did mention by Rushing and scene the murder Beaver to interview' order sort continuance Rushing, car. Rushing’s Beaver trial, subpoena despite her Long, Cooper, joined by renew claina court to of the trial express invitation appeal. Williams, (Wesley) at 563 do so. n Kyara responded that wit- potentially exculpatory (importance jury testimony about grand AL. Johnson’s attempt no where nesses decreases *84 long moped phonce Little and the had to to a continuance order made receive Additional- been available to defense. testimony). investigate their proffered, Shaquita ly, government at Long government told the outset Jury E. Grand Claims Laquanda Johnson’s investigation into Arnette, Tann, Harris Appellants drive murder that she never saw Little on at bring three claims raised trial based Instead, in- Long on a away moped. jury: grand misuse of the government’s saw vari- government formed the she pre- in the improprieties on two focused" driving Crew members ous 22nd Street -on process alleged a third indictment an hour moped on 22nd Street about jury the su grand abuse of- the after before,the , shooting. case perseding indictment discovery no viola- The trial court found Pre-indictment, appellants handed down. tion, to government make but ordered the in argue government improperly that the to for interview- Long appellants available process by sum grand jury fluenced to appel- court also offered allow ing. The testimony given previous marizing cases, necessary, if to' reopen lants to their live wit juries calling grand1 instead Long could not be located the extent nesses; appellants prose also contend cases prior completion their presented incompetent evidence cutors (which days begin three were scheduled in violation of Tann’s mari grand jury testimony for the Kyara after Johnson’s Post-indictment, appellants privilege. tal finished). government .unlawfully government contend that jury discovery tool Brady grand no violation based- used We find called a witness Kyara prosecutors and when involving facts Johnson these “locking-in” his acknowledged grand jury purposes Long. Defense counsel already testimony appellants had inconsistency between after they knew of the find that trial Kyara’s version of been Alphonce Little’s and indicted. We handling its both of not abuse discretion to cross-examine did events used Therefore, appel- recognized The trial court matters trial. these the marital no on privilege are entitled to relief based lants issue and noted Tracey could claims. testify their to that fact at Moreover, trial. reviewing grand after jury testimony, her juries convened and grand Two the court found that Tracey should not against appellants. In issued indictments about that privileged'state- testified grand jury indicted all October trial, ment grand jury. before the At except Rushing. February appellants Harris, joined Tann and now Arnette Alphonce gave gov- after Little appeal, argued of the in- dismissal Rushing’s information about ernment new dictment based on Tracey’s incompetent murder, Laquanda Johnson role testimony prosecutor’s and the summariz- grand jury handed the su- second down ing grand jury. evidence The upon gov- perseding indictment which the judge, relying primarily trial on Bank proceeded Appar- in this ernment case. Nova Scotia v. 487 U.S. only presented ently, new 2369, 101 108 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 228 grand testimony the second was the (1988), rejected both of appellants’ pre- reciting Rushing’s Mayberry of Detective indictment claims. recently involvement La- discovered also quanda’s prosecutor murder. The grand jury final The issue was raised transcripts summarized numerous of testi- during discussions about the anticipated mony grand jury investiga- from previous testimony' witness, a government Willie tions, prosecutors and then left those tran- Jones. The intended call scripts accompanying exhibits Willie to describe a Jones conversation grand jury for its consideration.77 Tann, that he had with after the Terrence Tann, During testimony Tracey murder, Jones which told him Tann privilege the issue of marital was raised. Tann approached govern- a different Tanns in April were married 2004— ment in a witness *85 manner. threatening approximately year one after the Leslie essentially; Tann objected, grounds on marriage, Jones murder. Prior to their proffered testimony the was vague Tracey Tann told that he killed a man reviewing After Jones’s Willie irrelevant.. (Leslie nickname) named “Bone” Jones’s jury testimony in grand the course of rul- cross-examination, on 22nd On Street. ing objection, the trial court noticed Tann’s defense counsel the discrep- elicited testimony his given after the date Tracey location between the where ancy in indictment this case. superseding that Tann testified told her the murder (22nd sponte, Sua the court raised Street), the issue was committed and the loca- improper that it was to call to -witnesses tion actually (Shipley where it occurred Market), participate grand jury investigations in in an attempt undermine her already order to obtain evidence on indict- testimony. response, prosecution introduce, re-direct, government represented The sought to ed cases. Tracey’s subpoenaed give Jones was grand jury testimony to the Willie effect that (in marriage after their Tann her con- evidence on other murders still told unindicted fidence) actually investigation by grand jury. under that he had committed Shipley government proffered the murder at Market. further that it had government represented reviewing grand jury 77. The that the rea- not make sense to the provided son summaries were was that the explanation. without exhibits, transcripts, which referenced would “if it is only established propriate had facts rele- that Willie Jones learned grand substantially influenced pre-grand a violation during case the instant vant indict, grave or if there govern- jury’s decision -According to the jury interview. was free the decision to indict ment, doubt that then testified about the Willie Jones of such vio from the substantial influence to his incidental testimo- facts this case , Williams, at A.2d (Phillip) lations.” matters. ny about-other unindicted omitted) (internal quotation marks govern- with the disagreed The court Scotia, at (quoting Bank Nova 487 U.S. and found'that Wil- representations ment’s 2369). 256-57, 108 S.Ct. already testimony about lie Jones’s was the' domi- in this case indicted offenses Here, clearly the record reflects grand jury appearance. his purpose nant quoted applied that the trial court However, pleadings a series after from Bank Nova Sco standard correct that it would be hearings, the court found in tia deciding whether dismiss from prohibit Willie Jones inappropriate improper exposure of despite the dictment proper- government testifying because the grand testimony to the privileged marital underlying ly information uncovered the (Phillip) jury.78 the record Similar jury during pre-grand in- testimony Williams, case the record in this shows lawfully to a sub- pursuant terview issued jury compelling evi grand Instead, court ruled that poena. testimony than other dence before remedy prohibit proper would be Specifically, grand error. admitted using Willie from Jones’s premarital testimony from Tra heard way during testimony any grand jury describing how cey Tann killed man trial. “Bone,” related to one named who was Therefore, Tracey’s incompe his rivals. 1. Pre-indictment testimony largely cu post-marital tent matter, general “[A]s prop testimony with her that was mulative not dismiss an indict may [federal] Furthermore, jury. erly grand before grand jury proceedings ment errors in powerful testimony grand jury had prejudiced ‘such errors the defen unless eyewitnesses describing Leslie from two Scotia, Bank Nova 487 U.S. dants.” Little, Alphonee testify murder: Jones’s (Phillip) Williams 2369; 108 S.Ct. Jones, shoot ing saw Tann Leslie he (D.C. Curry, describing how he Tyrone 2000) for Dis standard the same (adopting *86 Tann run gunshots heard and observed courts). Except trict of Columbia shooting immediately of from the scene the “in errors involving cases “fundamental” thereafter. - protections of the the which structural correctly Consequently, trial court compromised so the grand have been jury statements, fundamentally premarital that the concluded proceedings the render going to Tann’s unfair,” ap- is and other evidence murder the indictment dismissal of (2012 14-306(b) investigations grand e by Repl.) used to describe a § 78. Se D.C.Code (“In spouse proceedings, Jury Investigation, jury”); civil and criminal In re Grand 431 testify ("[I]t competent 584, (E.D.Va.2006) partner or not domestic is ... F.Supp.2d 592 any made as to communications confidential privilege may the marital well-established that marriage during one the to the other during testimony.”) grand juiy invoked be (Cotey) Wynn v. partnership.”); domestic (Thomas) Morris, (citing States v. 988 United (D.C.2012) States, 181, 48 189 A.3d 1335, (4th Cir.1993)). F.2d 1337 (“[t]he comfortably may ‘proceeding’ word

495 also, Jones, Indeed, “compelling prosecutor of were evi- review. Leslie stated probable grand jury grand dence” for the find the second was correctly setting privileged cause even aside the that Alphonce perjured alerted Little testimony. post-marital find that the We prior grand himself before the jury. “raise,a not testimony did sub- problematic Where there is no indication that, the doubt, question, grave stantial much less grand jury any way inwas based on misled as to whether had a substantial effect [it] government’s manner of the presenta- charge.” on grand jury’s decision evidence, tion we no basis Scotia, 263, Bank Nova 487 U.S. at 108 find that trial court -the abused its discre- indictment, S.Ct. in refusing tion to dismiss the argument about Appellants’ 2, Post-Indictment testimony inway presented which Finally, regard to the trial grand jury supersed which issued the fashioning an court’s reme appropriate ing type indictment amounts to the of reli dy government’s for the improper elicita which, facts, on ability challenge these also tion from Willie Jones before grand prejudice under does establish jury of concerning already information in standard, Bank Nova Scotia See id. at matters, again dicted we review for an 262-63, (determining 108 S.Ct. 2369 discretion, abuse and find none. See dismissal of indictment warranted Breitkreutz, 214, United States v. 977 F.2d reliability challenge the basis of a (6th Cir.1992) (reviewing 217 abuse accuracy agents’ reading of IRS tandem the trial court’s of the discretion denial grand transcripts jury given before the no grant motion to defendant’s appropriate showing prejudice). Regarding the use allegations post-indict relief. based grand of transcripts jury generally, ment grand jury misuse of the court has we note “sanctioned “ incriminating testimony’!). ‘lock-in’ prosecutor’s of a of a wit transcript use grand jury “While investi wields broad prior grand jury testimony ness’ sworn gatory prior to powers returning an indict later,. separate grand jury proceeding.” that, ment, uniformly courts have held v. Miles United 654 targeted once a individual has been indict (D.C.1984); see also United v. States Ca ed, government must its cease use 338, 344-45, landra, 414 U.S. S.Ct. grand jury its preparing case .for (1974) (“The grand jury’s 38 L.Ed.2d Corp. trial.” See Resolution Trust drawn, wídély sources of information are Thornton, (D.C.Cir. 41 F.3d validity of and the an indictment is not 1994) (internal quotation marks altera character of the affected omitted); tions see also Beverly v. United considered.”) (5th Cir.1972) (“It F.2d prosecutor’s As to summaries grand jury is a misuse of the to use it as a testimony transcripts contained discovery.”). substitute for presented grand we jury, find However, “any fashioning appro does not reflect at- record *87 remedy post-indictment a tempt by prosecutor priate the wheré vio the deceive Miles, jury.” grand jury lation oc grand process A.2d at of the has The 483 curred, prosecutor represented, impose contra- courts federal one without diction, accurately particular the circumstances of the “fit[s] that she summarized See, e.g., testimony transcripts the in the and left case.” States v. Kovale United (E.D.Mich.1976). 267, for 406 271 transcripts grand jury F.Supp. the with its ski 496 two PFCV proper rational contends that Tann’s convic-

We this is the and believe robbery to apply. courts for for trial tions armed AWIKWA standard merge not each Queen Richard do Here, court’s decision to trial bar remaining ór his PFCV convic- other with using government from Willie Jones’s Jones murder. This tion the Terrence testimony put gov- at trial grand jury merger issues de novo. reviews same it exactly position ernment States, Nero v. 73 A.3d 159 United in absent its misuse would been (D.C.2013). government grand jury. The learned from information Willie Jones relevant Jeopardy The Double Clause during pre-grand-jury proper a interview against multiple protects pun defendants subpoenaed directly him and could have offense, ishments for the same but does witness, than him having a trial rather prohibit multiple punishments not testify on grand jury already indict- at the v. “separate acts.” Owens criminal United unchallenged is ed It matters. (D.C.1985). States, 1086, 1094-95 497 A.2d legitimate a government purpose rule, general predicate two a where “[A]s originally subpoenaing Willie Jones merge, a armed offenses do defendant grand namely, to learn unin- jury; about may separate be counts of convicted investigation. dicted under matters ” relating PFCV each offense.... Ste facts, these trial Accordingly, given States, v. 760 venson A.2d United remedy permit court’s choice —to (D.C.2000). rule, however, The government to call Willie Jones as a wit susceptible exception: “multi to a limited from prohibit using grand ness but to his merge, ple PFCV will if convictions even any way fitting testimony —seems felony merge, offenses do predicate (precluding and not in error. id. at 271 Cf. if they out of a uninter arise defendant’s government calling from the witness at rupted single weapon a possession of dur only trial remedy” was “the effective ing single act of violence.” Matthews cíase). Therefore, appel facts (D.C. A.2d grand jury lants’ claims are denied. 2006); see Nixon v. United also (D.C.1999) (applying Merger X. that, holding lenity three rule PFCV Appellant argues for merger of the Tann merged into where convictions one the de (1) following his convictions: three convic- into fendant times con fired- several ear second-degree tions for of Ter- murder victims). taining multiple (2) Jones, his rence three PPCV convic- tions out of the arising Terrence Jones determining multiple whether (3) murder, his two PPCV convictions aris- single PFCV convictions are based ing Taylor-Bernard out of the James violence, act or acts of apply distinct we (4) incident, Mackey his two convic- PPCV “fork-in-the-road” so-called “fresh arising tions óf robbery out the armed Matthews, impulse” at test. (5) Queen, his Richard AWJKWA 1106; Stevenson, (“If A.2d at 1037 arising PFCV out Queen convictions scene of the crime defendant can facts arising with his convictions out PFCy that he said have realized has come facts. of the Terrence Jones road, fork nevertheless interest, joins decides to a different

Appellant Arnette Tann as invade then (2). (1) him arguments subject make intentions successive (1), (2), (3), arguments punishment....”). concedes but cumulative *88 n (cid:127) test, Tann’s PFCV the two Under that Jones because PFCV in- offenses robbery convictions related .and “separate assaulting volved Harri- acts.” shooting Queen merge. of son, Richard do Therefore, 76 A.3d at 844. we leave Donald Matthews testified Tann and unmerged his arising PFCV convictions car, Queen pinned against other men of robbery the armed out AWIKWA of him, through pockets, his beat and went Queen. Richard Queen away, to- run tried and that picked up gun-that Tann had fallen to XI. Conclusion Queen in ground and shot back. analysis, In the final we reverse Tann reached and had “fork-in-the-road” judgment at trial following: Bea- opportunity impulse” for “fresh when conviction, judgment CPWL ver’s Ar- Queen began picked up to run and Tann judgment PFCV nette’s conviction relat- gun to shoot. and made the decision ed the armed robbery Richard Baker, 1010; at See 867 A.2d Sanders v. Queen, and judgment Amette’s of convic- (D.C. 809 A.2d for robbery. tion armed We remand the Stevenson, 2002); A.2d at 1037-38. case the trial court with following Similarly, Tann’s Queen- Richard (1) judgment instructions: to enter a merge related PFCV convictions do not against conviction for Arnette the lesser- aiding with his conviction for PFCV (2) robbery79 included offense of ' abetting Cooper’s murder Terrence merge following judgments of convic- argües Tann that the Jones. convictions judgments tion—Tann’s three conviction merge should Terrence Jones- because the second-degree for murder Terrence Queen a rapidly Richard incident “was de Jones, judgments Arnette’s three of con- veloping, assaultive event.” short-lived second-degree for viction murder of Ter- However, Harrison, in at we Jones, judg- rence Tann’s three PFCV concluded that two convictions defendants’ ments conviction associated with his first-degree felony mur AWIKWA and convictions for the murder of Terrence showing not merge der did on facts Jones, remaining Arnette’s two PFCV nearly one one victim at defendant shot judgments arising of conviction out of the same time other defendant as the shot Jones, murder of Terrence Tann’s two a second victim. Id. at 831-32. alsoWe judgments arising PFCV of conviction out resulting that the held defendants’ PFCV Taylor-Bernard Mackey of the inci- James convictions merge did not because the In judgments all other respects, dent. “separate shootings from fresh im arose of conviction are affirmed. pulses targeted different-victims.” Id. ordered. 844; So see Wages also v. United (D.C.2008) (PFCV con Opinion by Judge shooting Associate victions different vic GLICKMAN, merge only concurring part single tims “there'was a when incident, is, dissenting part. shooting one assaultive victims”).. multiple act that resulted GLICKMAN, Judge, Associate way, same the. Tann’s PFCV associated concurring part part: and dissenting shooting of robbery with his Richard Queen merge part, join per For most I curiam does PFCV shooting opinion disposing appeals in these Cooper’.s related Terrence Robinson, 112; Jackson, (Leon) See 100 A.3d at 940 A.2d at 996. *89 498 Harrison) VII.C, ing they if did know- at even join I cannot

several cases. Section section, ingly intentionally encourage or or colleagues assist my In that however. (i,e., Foreman). principal Tann appellants Harris could assailant that and hold jury guilty, Harris and Tann aiding The found abetting and Robert be liable for , first-degree Tay- armed for while shooting Taylor of James and murder Foreman’s death with intent kill Mackey if Tann lor’s assault even Harris and and Bernard wounding Mackey. presence of Foreman’s or while armed unaware intend actions and to assist or did I The issue on which differ fundamental in his criminal encourage Foreman activi- person my colleagues is whether ty. my colleagues majority I believe can be as an aider and abettor guilty found holding theory on an that erroneous base District of Columbia under the law the liability theory of accomplice novel —a to assist proof without that he intended or devising, and one not relied on their own I think encourage principal offender. at argued appeal. trial or banc, in Sitting not. en we declared Wil son-Bey “requirement opinion in that it is per explains [for As the curiam detail, shootings aiding abetting liability] that ac more occurred 4, 2006, complice to have intended that May playground at a on 22nd be shown committing in gov- principal According Street succeed Southeast. elaborated, trial, charged in a proof after Omar offense.”1 We ernment’s Harri- at decision, Ashley subsequent that this court verbally son has slapped abused “adopted that ‘in Tyndle, several members of the 22nd the doctrine order Tann, Crew, person spe for the including Harris held accountable Street aiding cific Tyndle’s rushed to defense. Harris and intent of an , another under abetting .liability, theory principal shots at' Tann fíred'' several Harrison. Foreman, Crew, knowingly or another member of the aider abettor must have aid on the scene a few later ed the other with the that person arrived moments intent and, Tann, charged to Harris in- the other commit person unbeknownst join requirement, dependently in shoot- This core has a decided crime.’”2 ing. long history, Judge Foreman Harrison is missed which reviewed but hit, supported finding opinion that he Learned Hand’s defin influential killed, ing Taylor. may accomplice liability He under federal law also have fired Supreme injured Mackey. appel- shot that Over United States v. Peoni.3 Nye objections, lants’ the trial instructed Court endorsed Hand’s definition & States,4 Harris and Tarih could be v. United and it now Nissen well guilty shootings specific for these two found as settled “the intent to facilitate partic- by and abettors based on their the commission of a crime another” is aiders (i.e., ipation aiding abetting in “the crime” shoot- an essential their own element Wilson-Bey 1. principal offender] v. United committed would 903 A.2d banc). (D.C.2006) (en conduct; upon accessory's 831 follow they he in some all demand that sort associate Little v. venture, [principal’s] himself with he (D.C.2010) (quoting Wilson-Bey, participate something he 834). about, bring wishes that he seek succeed”). action to make it (2d Cir.1938) (explaining 3. 100 F.2d "accessory”] [of that "all these definitions 613, 619, nothing 4. 336 69 S.Ct. proba- to do U.S. L.Ed. whatever with the (1949). bility crime [the the forbidden result " *90 abettor, and abet- to be liable as an or general aiding the aider “it is not under federal statute, § 2.5 “The ting 18 intent sufficient that intentionally engaged U.S.C. he in necessary support which, to a conviction for aid- out, give acts it. turned did assis- goes ing abetting the mere beyond encouragement or principal”; tance action knowledge the defendant’s addition, in accomplice “the in- must have pur- would tend advance some nefarious to give, tended the or encouragement” aid Rather, principal. defen- pose reason, For the it principal.9 same act the specific dant must with intent is not sufficient that the merely defendant facilitating advancing principal’s or had the same mens rea as the principal.10 crime.”6 underlying commission of the There “a dual mental requirement” is state aiding “our statute abetting Because for accomplice liability: accomplice not substantially does not its differ from feder- only culpable must have “the mental state counterpart,” federal al we “look required for underlying crime commit- interpretation courts’ federal statute by ted he also “as- principal”; must construing in our own.”7 or encourage[] sist[] the commission of Thus, contrary to position espoused crime committed the principal with government implemented 'by promote or' facilitate such intent case,8 trial court in this for a defendant commission.”11 983, Washington, persuading 5. United States v. 106 F.3d criminal law ás “[t]he act of an- crime”). (D.C.Cir.1997) (quoting person 1004 States v. other Nor United commit a has 841, (D.C.Cir.1982)); case, Raper, government any 676 F.2d 849 see been able to find — also, States, e.g., any jurisdiction, holding v. United U.S. from Rosemond a defendant -, 1240, 1245, 134 L.Ed.2d 248 indepen- S.Ct. 188 liable as an aider and abettor for the ("[Ujnder (2014) provide § 2 ‘those who dent criminal act of another that-the'defen- assist, knowing persons committing intentionally encourage aid to federal dant did br not crimes, crime, with way. the intent to facilitate the in some ”) committing (quot are themselves a crime.’ Denver, ing LaFave, Central Bank N.A. First Inter 13.2(c) v. Wayne § 9. R. at Criminal Law Denver, 164, 181, N.A., (5th state Bank 511 U.S. alia, ed.2010) (citing, Bog 713-14 inter 1439, (1994)). 114 S.Ct. 128 119 State, 941 (en L.Ed.2d (Colo.1997) danov v. 247 P.2d banc)). Frampton, 6. United States v. 382 F.3d (2d Cir.2004). specific 10. have held that “where a mens We offense, rea is an element of a criminal (internal Wilson-Bey, quo- 7. at 831 defendant must have him mens rea omitted). marks tation and brackets offense, guilty to be whether is self he charged principal as a or as an aider government's position, 8. at trial and Perry abettor.” 36 A.3d appeal, accomplice’s "if is an inten (D.C.2011) (quoting crime, Kitt v. United participation tional in his associ (D.C.2006)). This is gives aiding principal, ation with a rise sufficient, necessary, condition for but abetting liability.” Appellee, Br. for at accomplice liability. government argues 204. The thus Harris if, by and Tann were aiders and abettors Harrison, (internal shooting Bogdanov, they "incited” Foreman 941 P.2d at 250-51 attack, omitted); join they quotation even if did so marks see citation and LaFave, 13.2(b) unknowingly unintentionally. supra § The trial also n. at 713 ("Generally, may accomplice court instructed the accordance said that theoty. accomplice liability But the no has cited exists when the intention , assists, authority supporting ally encourages claim that uninten or the sense that its aiding purpose encourage or another incitement can constitute an is to assist tional d (10th abetting. which the in the commission of a crime as to Dictionary Cf. Law Black’s ed.2014) state.”). (defining accomplice requisite mental has the “incitement" the field Tann; things that has- accomplice al- abet Harris and This does not mean Accomplice liability depends princi- identity of the backwards-. ways must know the to en-' intended case; accomplice oh whether the always It almost is the pal offender. principal, not eouráge assist thé course, accomplice' know that an does principal to encour- whether the intended assisting or 'en- intentionally whom he is ’ age accomplice. or assist the offense, couraging commit an because venture co-participants they are *91 colleagues agree that the My trial (even know the accomplice may if not jury instructing the in erred accordance name). 'in- it is possible But principal’s theory aiding of and government’s with thé an and circumstances to be aider some agreement abetting.. spite of in their Yet person induce help or another abettor —to con- appellants’ this affirm point, they on crime, knowingly to so to commit a and do theory of a novel of victions on the basis knowing 'who intentionally and —without devising suffers from the their own example is typical is. A person that other government’s theory. same as the defects knowingly attaches himself person who theory, Harris and Tann are Under this mob, lynch large group, as a to a such accomplices as even if liable Foreman’s body', that is gang, vigilante criminal or a encourage or assist they not to intend c^id breaking or on the law. engaged in bent (1) Foreman, they a “com- shared because intentionally person may assist or Such a (2)' munity purpose” with Foreman and- to encourage commit group others reasonably it foreseeable that their acts, thereby for their illegal be liable shared inspire would someone who actions abettor, as* an aider and offenses ..even community purpose to commit the their though (given the..group,.the size of crime.13 action, chaos or other circum- of the - theory aiding To evaluate stances) may he know who is in the abetting liability sup- without intentional group principal or it who offenders is port principal, important for the it are.12 But one cannot-be liable an aider :things about its central understand two having and abettor without the intent First, “community of concepts. the term encourage or actor at all. principal assist imply activity purpose” does concerted accomplice. One cannot be an inadvertent putative part principal on the of the trial court allow- therefore erred in my colleagues, According accomplice. to. Tann-guilty ing Harris-and find requisite “community purpose” may government’s theory they novel any agreement, exist the absence of if, by shooting Foreman aided abetted understanding, cooperation or between themselves, they at Omar Harrison un- question; respect crime in them n unintentionally indeed, “incited” knowingly and they may unaware of each other join acting in the attack. It beside independently, Foreman albeit Second, point that aid same end.14 most intended criminal Foreman 28; below, at 445 12. As I discuss two of the relied 14. Ante 446 n. see also ante n. cases Ochoa, ("[A] by majority, 'community necessarily upon purpose’ 41 N.M. State v. Kukis, (1937), tacit, implies- P.2d 609 State there exists some if not (1925), P. are understanding 65 Utah cases always explicit, agreement or (such this sort. all as a code of con between involved duct), agreement if even there is no commi t (majority's emphasis)). specific crime.” 13. See at 444-45. ante critically, my colleagues’ theory colleagues’ theory of accom- My accomplice lia liability treats plice reasonable foreseeabil- bility principal for the actor’s reasonably ity legal equivalent as the of intentionali- acts patterned foreseeable seems to be Pinkerton conspiracy liabil the doctrine ty.15 establish Pinkerton ity. To liability, how represents expan- This a considerable ever, prove must’ “that an accomplice liability, sion of the doctrine existed, agreement for, above, that a as discussed is a .basic re- substantive crime was committed quirement American criminal law co-conspirator actually “must accomplice agreement, intend of that furtherance and that assisting his acts have effect reasonably substantive crime was' a encouraging” pu- That the consequence agreement foreseeable principal.16 n accomplice reasonably tative should conspirators.”19 My between the col (and, for principal’s foreseen the actions leagues’ theory substitutes “community of matter, approved that he would have purpose” conspiratorial agreement *92 them) not of them had he foreseen is qua the sine non of Pinkerton. is enough. foreseeability is not Reasonable difference, But this is no small because legal equivalent intentionality; of as Pinkerton liability reasonably fore explained Wilson-Bey, this court acts of co-conspirators seeable is based (cid:127) equate concepts the two is to confuse in- of agency relationship the existence tentionality with the mental state which conspirators. between the a Such rela negligence enough, mere is based.17 Often tionship is agreement created their but reasonably do people not intend the fore- not “community purpose” their mere consequences seeable of their actions. my colleagues use term.20 a permitted While trier of fact is to infer essence, In I say my fair to think reasonably that a defendant intend did colleagues’ “community purpose” theory acts, consequences of a tri- foreseeable aiding abetting is and required er of fact is not and cannot be .unintentional so, against cannot what this court Wilson- presumed do and to have warned Bey: hybrid . that, done so.18 adequate justi- a without 26; 15. Ante at 445 and n. see at also ante 447 seeable’ to the defendant or the ‘natural and (“[W]e rely probable principle consequences’ n. 32 on the that Harris of the criminal ven- intentionally par- and Tann could be found to ture in which have intended the defendant ticipated degree reasonably consequences higher a their mens-rea foreseeable —when acts.”). case, course, negligence required jury than was in this convict n acts.”). required principal finding actor for those to make a Fore- reasonably man’s intervention was foresee- Tann, 38; 18. to Harris and let able alone that Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 835 n. see Montana, 510, two intended to assist their actions defendants also Sandstrom 442 U.S. v. anyone. 522-24, 39.(1979) 99 61 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (instruction in a case “law criminal that the presumes ordinary LaFave, 13.2(c) person intends the 16. supra § n. 714. at voluntary consequences of his acts” held to unconstitutionally persua shift the burden of 836-37; 17. See Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at see sion). also, e.g., v. 100 Robinson United A.3d (D.C.2014) rejected ("Wilson-Bey th e 19. (and Collins v. United proposition any incorpo instruction (D.C.2013) (quoting Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at it) rating may that a be held liable defendant 840). merely as an aider abettor based on and i.e,, negligent state of for acts of con mind — fore- 20. merely ‘reasonably Wilson-Bey, were federates that See claim, of that support law. common fícation, [of doctrines the two “conflat[es] is from abetting] into None them aiding they cite five cases. conspiracy and theory of vi- Maryland sprawling jurisdiction, one omnibus from telling It liability.”21 derives24), carious criminal (whence law our common “broad- cites the majority opinion that the adhering to the Peoni none is from a court among the to kill ‘outsiders’ conspiracy er five were de- Four of the cases doctrine. as constitut- Crew members” 22nd Street Peoni, the fifth was de- cided before community of ing the evidence “the both law, but under hot under common cided matter, that, as a factual purpose amalgamation aiding and abet- statutory Harris, Tann, Fore- shared between no principles that has ting conspiracy at, shooting,” and the the time man jurisdiction. of our in the law counterpart to Harris and was “foreseeable reason it approves five cases None cited mem- 22nd Street Crew Tann that other my col- aiding abetting theory of including, unbeknownst bers the area — believe, nor, I leagues espouse; would them, by join- respond Foreman —would Tann courts in those cases find Harris and Harri- to shoot Omar ing the effort accomplices on such as Foreman’s liable Harris and uphold The effect is son.” theory. they theory that on a convictions Tann’s co-conspirators rather Foreman’s cases, Kentucky v. Whitt In the-two they aiders theory that were his than and Landrum Com- Commonwealth25 has abettors. But monwealth, appellate court held that *93 op liability of Pinkerton relied the doctrine not convicted of could be the defendant charged Tann Harris and were here. in the ab- aiding abetting a homicide and shootings Taylor/Mackey under with the intent proof of he shared the sence Pinkerton, contended government and the in- principal, who had purpose or required it “was not in trial court that tervened, ánd without independently Harris prior between to show association knowledge, in defendant’s defendant’s .... [as] third Tann] and the shooter [or My col- with the altercation decedent. association, under while relevant [s]uch would have leagues infer that the result not,, theory, vicarious-liability had there been evidence different been view, necessary aiding for government’s putative principal and the aider Perhaps abetting.”23 purpose.27 the same and abettor shared so, it is strategy,-,but if misjudged its trial however, belied, That inference remedy job this court to not the of Kentucky’s highest subsequent decision mistake. government’s Haynes v. Commonwealth.28 for a sound rationale providing lieu Haynes point. is rather on decision theory abetting, hybrid aiding their sons, “Upon receiving word that his two my colleagues grounded it is claim (1927). Ky. 25. 221 298 S.W. 1101 21. Id. at 841. (1906), Ky. 587 26. 123 96 S.W. 22. Ante at 446 n. 28. (“If acting more id. two or 27. But at cf. Appellee 23. Br. 193. at another, and one of independently assault wound, other is not them a mortal inflicts 671 n. 24. Woods v. United abettor.”). guilty as an aider and Parnell, (D.C.2013); see In re Estate of (D.D.C.1967). (Ky.1974). 28. 515 S.W.2d 240 F.Supp. that, leagues’ and Tounsel notion appellants John Robert outcome would Haynes, engaged in what [Ray] have been different had there been evi- a ‘shoot-out’ with William might be called dence that Haynes’s Joe intervention was Caudill, Haynes Joe appellant armed foreseeable to his sons. On the contrary, rifle, scene of himself with a went there was such evidence the case—as affray, shot and killed Caudill.” expressly acknowledged, the court Tounsel were convicted of All three appellants (who Haynes provoked may gun they appealed. manslaughter, and With battle) saw his father their aid coming sons, respect to two who were tried not ask him “stay and did back”—and homi- their father’s aiders abettors the court that it held did “amount to cide, Kentucky Appeals the Court encouragement.”32 or assistance is, said under what circum- question “[t]he Utah, The cases from New Mexico and pérson engaged affray in an stances does Kukis,34 State v. Ochoa33 and State like become an aider and abettor another support do not wise the thesis that á de uninvited, assuming even who intervenes may fendant convicted as an be aider and or they ‘share the criminal intent proof abettor without that' intentionally he purpose’ ”?30 encouraged or assisted the principal. The my colleagues’ Contrary theory merely two cases illustrate that a member aiding abetting, the court reversed of a intentionally helped criminal mob who two sons’ lack of evidence convictions may other members commit a crime they sought father’s their intervention aiding guilty abetting found them anything “assistance or did provide even if he not know which particular does him, encouragement” regardless any actually perpetrated member of the mob purpose they criminal intent or shared the offense.35 Neither Ochoa nor Kukis shooting their father -had Caudill.31 Nothing Haynes supports' my suggests col- that a could defendant be: found justify Id. at 240-41. dence here will not conviction of the participants in the father’s act. sons.as *94 Whitt, (quoting at S.W. at 30. Id. 241 298 Id. 1103; added). emphasis 31, supra. See footnote 32. said, Specifically, 31. Id. court 589, (1937). 41 72 33. N.M. P.2d 609 may There is no from which be inferred, distinguished reasonably from 362, (1925). Utah 34. 65 237 P. 476 speculation, that either of the sent for sons the father. There is no evidence even that proposition apply not to sustain John knew he had arrived after 35. That does Robert until weight killing. evi- the convictions of Tann in this The clear of the Harris and. They stopped prosecuted is John Robert case. were not for of dence that had shooting agqinst.Taylor Mackey bn appeared fenses and before father theo Ray during ry they encouraged fired a that or never shot intentionally Tounsel Ray by proceeding. All an on Omar Harrison a the entire that Tounsel assisted attack do, Crew) (i.e., group hap that he did as he the 22nd Street could have done lay place protection pened rock include Had such a in behind a theo Foreman. to, jury presented approach, ry properly been saw his father's ask back,, conviction, appeal stay opinion on him to but that omission resulted in my would might different. See Rosemond v. United not itself to assistance encour- be amount or — 1245, course, -, 1240, Nor, agement. does U.S. S.Ct. the fact 1248-50, (2014). that is may provoked 188 L.Ed.2d 248 But Tounsel have the encounter. balance, prin- which áre confront bearing great On in mind situation with we doubt, ciple evi- ed. of reasonable we think the “joint in a action” retaliating members if accomplice he lacked as an

guilty gang.40 Al- mob to of a rival against others or members intent' to aid abet Rather, Supreme as the gunman identity break the law.36 second though the in a subsequent trial, said Mexico nothing Court New at was not established case, a defendant cannot convict “a suggests that the defen- opinion court’s a unless liability for crime accessory upheld have been would dant’s conviction acts.”37 principal’s intended the defendant unknown that he and the absent evidence in con- acting together and gunman were appel- Illinois-intermediate Lastly, the Illinois is Su- People v. Cooks38 with each other. cert late court’s decision that, except that the and Kukis clear even preme' to Ochoa has made similar Court rule, criminal member of a was a a design defendant under state’s common mob, a and the case gang than rather pro- “the intent must have defendant hybrid of a application state involves the commis- principal’s] [the or facilitate mote thap law) (rather provid- common statute an sion” of offense.41 alia, person “legally a ing, inter sum, my colleagues I submit conduct of another for the accountable” un- unprecedented crafted an of their “common person furtherance Harris and upholding sound rationale agreement.”39 The de- design or criminal ir- rationale that is Tann’s convictions—a convicted under in Cooks was fendant Wilson-Bey other with reconcilable by committed provision for a murder of this court. I am com- binding decisions on circumstan- gunman based unidentified judicial pelled to that this exercise gang fellow add that the twb were tial evidence noted, however, parties the common of all the Utah be the acts be 36. It should doctrine, agreement equally reject- design and all are accepted which we accomplice liability responsible consequences of those Wilson-Bey, for the ed in "probable presence and natu- at the scene of are the acts. Mere criminal acts that further design, person consequences” of the common accounta- ral crime does not render offense; part person’s presence were not even if those ble for an consequences however, crime, original accomplice's may Id. at 481. intent. the scene other circumstances considered Carrasco, P.2d 124 N.M. 37. State determining trier of when accountabili- fact Ochoa, (1997). 72 P.2d at 616 Cf. ty. ("The may not be held for the inde- accused conspiracy appears to combine The statute though pendent of another even the same act including abetting principles, aiding both.”). person be the victim of an assault consequences probable doc- the natural and Wilson-Bey rejected. trine that Ill.App.3d 192 Ill.Dec. (1993). *95 N.E.2d 365 405, Cooks, 625 N.E.2d at 370. 40. 192 Ill.Dec. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, 38, 5-2(c), par. ch. 39. 254, Perez, People Ill.2d 244 Ill.Dec. provided person "legally 41. which that a is ac v. (2000). “Ac of when 725 N.E.2d countable” for the conduct ánother law, countability” the court ex under Illinois (c) during before or the commission either degree culpability plained, on the offense, "focuses pro- of an with the intent to persons to deter commission, of the offender and seeks he or mote or facilitate encouraging intentionally aiding or solicits, aids, abets, from agrees, attempts or she Thus, unless the ac commission of offenses. person planning in the or to aid that other complice the commission intends aid . commission offense. crime, guilt will attach.” Id. Ill.Dec. engage no persons in a When 2 or more com- (emphasis in the 1265-66 design agreement, any 725 N.E.2d at or acts mon criminal original; quotation marks and design internal cita in the furtherance that common omitted). by party tion one are considered to committed objectionable creativity is all more be- BELLINGER, Appellant, Kevin M. sponte it is done sua without

cause briefing or other any input benefit on merits of the “communi- parties STATES, Appellee. UNITED theory of ac- ty purpose/foreseeability” No. 13-CO-252. or in this complice liability application its ill-advised, I think it unfair case. District of of Appeals. Columbia Court contrary norms parties, court’s Argued Feb. 2015. majority rely on this develop for the 25, 2015. major of a doc- Decided Nov. unforeseeable reshaping affording law without trine criminal it in opportunity to parties address briefing.42 past, In the

supplemental when ap-

this court has deciding considered

peal parties on a basis “the failed to identi-

fy discretionary departure and brief’—a' general points

from rule that - urged appeal are deemed to be have taken care to “ensure

waived—we fairness, govern-

procedural both defense, by providing

ment and to the each

party opportunity the- brief’ the This ’so

issue.43 even when the issue

injected legal the court involves settled There is no reason to

principles. deviate

from that rule of fairness basic here. reasons, foregoing respectfully I

For the from cu- per

dissent Section VII.C opinion

riam convic- and would reverse the arising

tions Harris and Tann from Mackey.

shootings Taylor token, By encourage princi- I think it unfair must 42. same intend assist the pal.) inappropriate majority to find that the for the trial court's to instruct "erroneous" failure Randolph v. United 882 A.2d 210 , "community purpose” theo- (D.C.2005); ("[N]o 226-27 see also id. at 226 ry liability affording was harmless without *96 gored, matter whose ox is this court has fre opportunity to and Tann an address Harris briefing quently requested post-argument question. (Parenthetically, myself, I counsel, adequately raised issues not persuaded trial am not to find harmless the that, parties fully end after both haVe been rulings instructions re- court’s erroneous heard, position the court is in the best jecting requirement accomplice that an decision.”). render a sound

Case Details

Case Name: Michael D. Tann v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Nov 19, 2015
Citation: 127 A.3d 400
Docket Number: 09-CF-1438+
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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