133 A.3d 812
Pa. Commw. Ct.2016Background
- Scott R. Blake applied (May 2014) for Special Investigator 1/2 positions and claimed a Pennsylvania veteran’s preference based on attending the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (July 1991–Jan 1993), receiving 45 credits but not graduating or performing active duty after leaving.
- Blake’s DD Form 214 listed his rank as "cadet," active service limited to the 18-month West Point attendance, and award of the National Defense Service Medal.
- The State Civil Service Commission’s Veteran’s Preference and Certification Division denied the preference; Blake appealed and the Commission heard the matter.
- Commission acknowledged statutory ambiguity about whether academy attendance constitutes "active duty"/"soldier," but instead found applying the preference to Blake would lack the required “reasonable relation” to public duties and raised constitutional concerns.
- Blake argued the Code’s undefined term "active duty" should be read consistently with federal definitions (e.g., 38 U.S.C. §101(21)), which include academy cadet service as active duty.
- The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding academy attendance counts as "active duty" for purposes of Pennsylvania’s veteran’s preference statute and rejecting the Commission’s as-applied constitutional reasoning.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether West Point cadet attendance qualifies as "active duty"/a "soldier" under 51 Pa. C.S. § 7101 | Blake: "active duty" should be interpreted consistent with federal law (38 U.S.C. §101(21))—cadet service is active duty, so he is a "soldier." | Commission: PA Code is exclusive; "active duty" here excludes mere academy attendance because §7102 emphasizes both training and service and the Code distinguishes active duty from training. | Court: Adopted federal definition by analogy; academy cadet service constitutes "active duty" and Blake is a "soldier." |
| Whether §7102’s language adds extra eligibility criteria beyond §7101’s definition of "soldier" | Blake: §7101 alone governs; §7102 describes purpose of preference, not additional elements. | Commission: §7102 shows legislature intended both "military training" and "military service" as requirements. | Court: §7101 (as interpreted) controls; §7102 does not add separate qualifications. |
| Whether the Commission should have decided the case on statutory grounds before reaching constitutional issues | Blake: statutory construction resolves the case; constitutional analysis unnecessary. | Commission: Raised constitutional "reasonable relation" concern and relied on it to deny preference. | Court: Administrative body should avoid constitutional questions when statutory resolution is available; Commission erred to rely on constitutional rationale. |
| Whether applying veteran's preference to Blake is unconstitutional as-applied under "reasonable relation" test | Blake: N/A (maintained statutory entitlement). | Commission: No reasonable relation between Blake's West Point service and veteran preference purpose. | Court: "Reasonable relation" jurisprudence is directed at facial challenges; Commission’s as-applied constitutional ruling was misplaced and unnecessary. |
Key Cases Cited
- Housing Auth. of the Cnty. of Chester v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1999) (discusses "reasonable relation" test for veteran preferences)
- Soberick v. Salisbury Twp. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 874 A.2d 155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (interprets §7101 "soldier" definition and statutory plain language)
- Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1938) (upholds veteran preference so long as exam ensures fitness to perform job)
- Commonwealth v. O’Neill, 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951) (invalidates certain promotion preference as lacking reasonable relation)
- Hoffman v. Twp. of Whitehall, 677 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 1996) (addresses limits on veteran preference in promotions)
- Sicuro v. City of Pittsburgh, 684 A.2d 232 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (addresses improper application of veteran preferences to non-soldiers)
- Jacobs v. United States, 680 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1982) (interprets "active military service" in retirement context)