2018 Ohio 4959
Ohio2018Background
- In 1915 Nick and Flora Kuhn reserved a one-half oil-and-gas royalty on a 60-acre tract when they conveyed the land. The reservation language appeared in the original 1915 deed.
- Successive conveyances through 1969 (Carpenter to Blackstone) and later deeds repeatedly contained exception language referring to the Kuhn royalty reservation.
- Blackstone (root of title is the 1969 deed) sought declaratory relief and quiet title, arguing the Kuhn royalty was extinguished under the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act; the trial court agreed as to both statutes.
- The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding the 1969 deed’s exception preserved the pre-root royalty under the Marketable Title Act. The Blackstones appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court considered whether the 1969 deed’s reference to the royalty interest was sufficiently specific under R.C. 5301.49(A) to preserve the 1915 royalty from extinguishment by the Marketable Title Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a reference in the root-of-title deed must include recording volume/page or recording date to preserve a pre-root interest under R.C. 5301.49(A) | Blackstone: A reference must be specific enough that an examiner can go directly to the recorded instrument (e.g., volume/page or grantor/grantee and date) | Kuhn heirs: The 1969 deed’s exception naming the interest and original reserving parties is specific enough to preserve the interest | Court: Rejected a volume/page or date requirement; a description of the interest and to whom it was granted is sufficiently specific to preserve the interest |
| Whether the 1969 deed’s exception is a “general reference” or a “specific identification” under R.C. 5301.49(A) | Blackstone: The 1969 language is too general to preserve pre-root interests | Kuhn heirs: The deed identifies the type of interest and the reserving parties, so it is specific | Court: The 1969 exception was specific (not “general”) because it clearly described the one-half royalty and named the reserving parties |
Key Cases Cited
- Toth v. Berks Title Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 338 (1983) (a deed is a muniment of title and specific references in the record can preserve pre-root interests)
- Heifner v. Bradford, 4 Ohio St.3d 49 (1983) (the Marketable Title Act’s purpose is not limited to minimizing title-search time)
- Stewart v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 574 (2017) (statutory terms are interpreted by their ordinary meaning)
- Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 149 Ohio St.3d 512 (2016) (discusses the interaction and legislative history of the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act)