Bishop v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections, 529 F. App'x 685

Background

Bishop and Henry were probationary corrections officers at London Correctional Institution in 2005; they and other female officers complained to Warden Timmerman-Cooper about Lt. Yvonne Richardson’s allegedly discriminatory scheduling and hostile treatment.
A joint written complaint was received by the Warden on October 17, 2005; the complaint and ensuing investigation became widely known among staff.
After the complaint, Richardson authored negative ten-month performance evaluations for Bishop and Henry (signed Nov. 20, 2005) marking them “below” in cooperation and communication; both retained overall “satisfactory” ratings earlier in the year.
Bishop’s probation was extended in November 2005; both officers were terminated by the Warden on December 12, 2005, with termination letters citing “performance evaluations.”
Bishop and Henry sued under Title VII for retaliation (claiming a cat’s-paw theory: Richardson’s retaliatory animus influenced the Warden). The district court granted summary judgment for ODRC; the Sixth Circuit majority reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs established prima facie retaliation (knowledge and causation)	Plaintiffs say Richardson knew of their protected complaint and that adverse evaluations/termination followed soon after, creating causal inference	ODRC says Richardson didn’t specifically know plaintiffs were complainants and timing/acts don’t establish causation	Court: Plaintiffs met prima facie burden on knowledge and causation (circumstantial evidence + temporal proximity with additional evidence)
Whether the employer articulated a legitimate reason for termination	Plaintiffs dispute that performance explanations were true or were the real reason	ODRC: Terminations were for legitimate, nondiscriminatory performance reasons (evaluations, incidents, probationary status)	Court: ODRC articulated a legitimate reason (performance); burden shifts to plaintiffs to show pretext
Whether plaintiffs showed pretext under a cat’s-paw theory (i.e., biased subordinate caused unbiased decisionmaker to act)	Plaintiffs argue Richardson’s retaliatory animus produced tainted evaluations that the Warden relied on without an independent, unbiased investigation	ODRC contends the Warden conducted an independent review/consultation and made an independent decision (breaking causal link)	Court: Genuine issue of material fact exists whether the Warden conducted an independent, untainted investigation; cat’s-paw pretext claim survives summary judgment
Causation standard after Nassar (but-for causation) applied to cat’s-paw context	Plaintiffs rely on evidence permitting a jury to find Richardson’s bias was the but-for cause via tainted evaluations and lack of meaningful independent review	ODRC and dissent say the Warden’s customary independent review suffices to negate but-for causation	Court: On summary judgment, factual disputes about whether an independent, untainted decision occurred preclude dismissal; remanded for factfinder to consider but-for causation question

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (clarifies employer’s burden to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reason)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and drawing inferences for nonmoving party)
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (cat’s-paw theory: biased subordinate can cause employer liability)
Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. standards for proving pretext)
Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. treatment of McDonnell Douglas framework in retaliation cases)