107 So. 3d 350
Fla.2012Background
- Charrron v. Birge involves a rear-end collision where the rear driver sought to rebut a statutory logic of negligence using a presumption; the Fifth DCA held the rear-end presumption could be rebutted under Florida’s comparative fault regime; the Fourth DCA in Cevallos had held the presumption could not be rebutted and that the rear driver could not recover absent a complete absence of fault; the Florida Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict between these holdings; the Court adopted the Charron approach and disapproved Cevallos, upholding a rebuttable rear-end presumption under comparative fault; the case analyzes the evolution from contributory negligence to pure comparative negligence under Fla. Stat. 768.81 and related precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the rear-end presumption is rebuttable under comparative fault | Charron; rear-driver presumption dissipates if front-driver fault shown | Cevallos; presumption bars recovery unless rear-driver shows no fault | Yes; rebuttable under comparative fault |
| Whether Florida’s comparative negligence statute permits apportionment when the rear driver is presumptively negligent | Recovery apportioned by fault of all negligent parties | Presumption controls if unrebutted | Yes; damages apportioned by fault per §768.81(2)-(3) |
| Whether the presumption applies to non-rear drivers (front driver or passengers) | Presumption available regardless of plaintiff’s role | Presumption limited to rear drivers | Presumption applicable in rear-end cases even if plaintiff is not rear driver when no other jury questions exist |
| Relation between Charron and Cevallos after Hoffman v. Jones and Eppler v. Tarmac | Adopt Charron logic consistent with Hoffman/ Eppler | Cevallos supports a different rule | Court adopts Charron approach, disapproves Cevallos |
Key Cases Cited
- Charron v. Birge, 37 So.3d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (conflict with Cevallos; rear-end presumption rebuttable under comparative fault)
- Cevallos v. Rideout, 18 So.3d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (presumption not rebuttable; complete absence of rear-driver negligence required)
- Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 752 So.2d 592 (Fla.2000) (origin of rear-end presumption; rebuttable)
- Clampitt v. D.J. Spencer Sales, 786 So.2d 570 (Fla.2001) (rear-end presumption can disappear when facts show otherwise)
- Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26 (Fla.1965) (presumptions disappear when facts appear)
- Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973) (adoption of pure comparative negligence)
- Pollock v. Goldberg, 651 So.2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (rear-driver evidence can support front-driver fault)
- Cleaveland v. Florida Power & Light, Inc., 895 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (rear-end rule does not bar claim where lead-driver negligent evidence exists)
- Shedden v. Yellow Cab Co. of Miami, 105 So.2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958) (rear-end presumption as evidentiary device)
- Van Dyke, 590 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1st DCA 1991) (evidence of lead-driver negligence raises comparative fault questions)
- Jefferies v. Amery Leasing, Inc., 698 So.2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (joint consideration of liability and comparative fault)
- Charron v. Birge, 37 So.3d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (already cited above; central authority for approach)