Sybil EPPLER, Petitioner,
v.
TARMAC AMERICA, INC., Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida.
*593 Dаvid R. Lewis of Foerster, Isaac and Yerkes, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, for Petitioner.
Frank W. Hession and Robert B. Guild of Hession & Guild, Jacksonville, Florida, for Respondent.
SHAW, J.
We have for review Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc.,
Does the testimony of the defendant of a sudden unexpected stop immediately after starting forward constitute sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of negligence which attaches in a rear-end collision?
Id. at 778. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the affirmative as explained below and approve Eppler.
In the late afternoon of September 27, 1994, Sybil Eppler's station wagon was stopped in a line of traffic at a stoplight and Lawrence Morris's cement-mixer truck, which was owned by Tarmac America, Inc., was stopped directly behind her. At some point after the light turned green, Eppler's car was struck from behind by Morris's truck, which was moving forward at a low rate of speed. Eppler's car rolled forward and made contact with a car driven by James Richards. Richards' car was undamaged and he later drove off. Eppler also appeared uninjured, and she too drove off. The next day, however, Eppler complained that her neck and back hurt, and she sought treatment from a chiropractor and from a psychiatrist. She sued Tarmac.
Eppler testified at trial that she was struck by Morris's truck before she had started moving forward at the stoplight. Morris, on the other hand, testified that once the light had turned green, all the vehicles in line began accelerating and then Eppler suddenlywithout warning and for no reasonslammed on her brakes. At the close of all the evidence, Eppler moved for a directed verdict, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tarmac, finding no negligence on Morris's part.[1] Eppler appealed the denial of her motion for a directed verdict and the district court affirmed, ruling that the evidence presented by Tarmac was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence that attaches to the driver of a rear vehicle involved in a rear-end collision:
In the instant case, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant established an unexpected stop immediately after starting to move when the signal light changed. We, therefore, [affirm the trial court's ruling on the motion for a directed verdict].
Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc.,
While Eppler agrees that evidence of a sudden unexpected stop by the forward driver is sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence that attaches to the *594 rear driver, she contends thatviewing the testimony in the light most favorable to Tarmacher own stop was merely sudden, not unexpected. She claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict. We disagree.
The rebuttable presumption of negligence that attaches to the rear driver in a rear-end collision in Florida arises out of necessity in cases where the lead driver sues the rear driver. The device bears only upon the causal negligence of the rear driver:
The usefulness of the rule is obvious. A рlaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of proof of all four elements of negligence duty of care, breach of that duty, causation and damages. Yet, obtaining proof of two of those elements, breach and causation, is difficult when a plaintiff driver who has been rear-ended knows that the defendant driver rear-ended him but usually does not know why. Beginning with McNulty, therefore, the law presumed that the driver of the rear vehicle was negligent unless that driver provided a substantial and reasonable explanation as to why he was not negligent, in which case the presumption would vanish and the case could go to the jury on its merits.
Jefferies v. Amery Leasing, Inc.,
This Court in Gulle v. Boggs,
We have stated that the presumption announced in McNulty, and subsequently followed, is rebuttable. It is constructed by the law to give particular effect to a certain group of facts in the absence of further evidence. The рresumption provides a prima facie case which shifts to the defendant the burden to go forward with evidence to contradict or rebut the fact presumed. When the defendant produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the impact of "the presumption is dissipated". Whether the ultimate fact has been established must then be decided by the jury from all of the evidence before it without the aid of the presumption. At this point the entire matter should be deposited with the triеr of facts to reconcile the conflicts and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
Gulle,
In the present case, Tarmac came forward with evidence showing the following: (1) The Tarmac truck was stopped ten to eleven feet behind Eppler's auto in a line of traffic at a red light;[2] (2) when the light turned green, all the vehicles in the line proceeded forward and were accelerating in a routine fashion;[3] (3) the Tarmac *595 driver, Morris, accelerated slowly with the other vehicles, shifted from first to second gear, and had been in second gear for three or four seconds when Eppler suddenly without warning and for no reason slammed on her brakes.[4] Pursuant to the Gulle standard, this evidence "fairly and reasonably tends to show" that the presumption of negligence on Morris's part is misplaced, for an abrupt and arbitrary stop in such a situation is not reasonably expected. In fact, it is a classic surprise.
The present "arbitrary stop" case thus differs from Tacher v. Asmus,
The district court in Tacher explained that the forward driver's stop should have beеn reasonably expected:
We conclude that a sudden stop by a preceding driver or drivers approaching or going through a busy intersection should be reasonably expected so as to impose a duty on the drivers which follow them to operate their vehicles at a safe distance. It is not at all unusual for vehicles [proceeding] through busy intersections, for example, to have to suddenly brake for pedestrians, emergency vehicles or other drivers running a red traffic light from a сross-street. For that reason, we do not believe that the evidence of a preceding vehicles' sudden stop at a busy intersection, in this case, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence on the part of appellant, Tacher.
Tacher,
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the decisions of both the trial and district courts below. Abruрt and arbitrary braking in bumper-to-bumper, accelerating traffic is an irresponsible and dangerous act that invites a collision. Cases involving allegations of such an act are properly submitted to the jury, for the crucible of *596 cross-examination is well-suited for gleaning meritorious from non-meritorious claims. In the present case, the trial court properly denied Eppler's motion for a directed verdict.
We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve Eppler on this issue. We distinguish Tacher as explained herein.[6]
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The question certified by the First District and answered by the majority is whether a defendant's testimony of a "sudden unexpected stop" immediately after starting forward constitutes sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of negligence. A sudden stop, however, is not necessarily an unexpected or unanticipated stop; that is, one that could not reasonably be anticipated by the rear driver under the circumstances. As observed by the Fifth District:
It is not merely an "abrupt stop" by a preceding vеhicle (if it is in its proper place on the highway) that rebuts or dissipates the presumption.... It is a sudden stop by the preceding driver at a time and place where it could not reasonably be expected by the following driver that creates the factual issue.
Pierce v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co.,
Where, as in this case, it is claimed that the rear-end collision was precipitated by a sudden stop by the preceding driver, most districts (including our own) have found that the presumption cannot be rebutted if the stop hаppened at a place and time where it was reasonably expected. See Pierce v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co.,582 So.2d 712 , 714 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); see also Kao v. Lauredo,617 So.2d 775 , 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Tozier v. Jarvis,469 So.2d 884 , 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); but compare Eppler v. Tarmac Am., Inc.,695 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (the defendants testimony of a sudden and unexpected stop of the preceding driver at an intersection was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence and create jury issue of fault).
Id. at 158.
The Third District recognized the conflict between the district courts of appeal as it expressly certified direct conflict with Eppler in its opinion:
We conclude that a sudden stop by a preceding driver or drivers approaching оr going through a busy intersection should be reasonably expected so as to impose a duty on the drivers which follow them to operate their vehicles at a safe distance. It is not at all unusual for vehicles [proceeding] through busy intersections, for example, to have to suddenly brake for pedestrians, emergency vehicles or other drivers running a red traffic light from a cross-street. For that reason, we do not believe that the evidence of a preceding vehicles' sudden stop at а busy intersection, in this case, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence on the part of appellant, Tacher.
We therefore affirm the directed verdict entered on the issue of liability in this case. Further, as we recognize that our holding in this case is in direct conflict with the first district's Eppler decision, we certify direct conflict. *597 Tacher,743 So.2d at 158 (emphasis supplied).
Likewise, the concern in the present case should be whether the forward driver's sudden stop should have been reasonably expected or anticipated by the rear driver. The majority oрinion does little to assist the district courts of appeal in resolving the conflict among them concerning application of the presumption of negligence in a rear-end collision when there is a sudden stop by the forward driver at a busy intersection. Instead of resolving the conflict among the districts, the majority attempts to distinguish Tacher from Eppler and neither approves nor disapproves of Kao v. Lauredo,
Further, the additional facts supplied by the majority opinion aрpear nowhere in the First District's Eppler opinion. In Eppler, the First District summarized the testimony at trial as follows:
At trial, both appellant [the plaintiff] and the Tarmac truck driver [the defendant] agreed that appellant had stopped due to a red light, but their testimony differed as to the cause of the accident once the traffic light changed to green. Appellant testified that she was hit by the Tarmac truck before she started forward; however, the Tarmac driver testified that appellant started forward and then stopped suddenly in front of him which caused him to rear-end her vehicle and push it into the vehicle ahead of her. The only other witness to the collision, the driver of the lead vehicle struck by appellant, testified only that he had not started moving forward after the light change when appellant struck him from behind.
Eppler,
Tacher was the operator of the third car stopped behind Matthews' vehicle at a distance of three to five feet. After the light turned green, Tacher testified that he observed both the Asmus vehicle and the Matthews vehicle begin to move forward. At that point, Tacher stated that he began to move forward traveling at approximately three to five miles per hour. Suddenly, he saw the Matthews vehicle abruptly stop.
Tacher,
More importantly, to the extent the majority attempts to distinguish Eppler from Tacher, the distinction is one without a difference as to the critical issue of the rear driver's negligence. The majority claims that the two cases can be distinguished by asserting that the plaintiff in Eppler "slammed on her brakes `for no reason,'" whereas in Tacher, the court "noted no such misconduct ... [rather] Tacher is framed as a simple `sudden stop' case." Majority op. at 595. This distinction, however, is misplaced because the focus of the Third District's opinion in Tacher was that "the stop happened at a place and time where it was reasonably expected." Tacher,
The majority's concern over the possibility of misconduct on the part of the forward driver should be directed toward the issue of the forward driver's comparative negligence, where, as in this case, that forward driver is the plaintiff. Even if the trial court were to enter a directed verdict as to the rear driver's negligence, this decision would not end the liability equation as to the forward driver's negligence. I would address the majority's concern with fault on the part of the forward driver by holding that if the forward driver stopped suddenly at a busy intersection for no justifiable reason, the forward driver could also be found negligent.
In other words, while a sudden stop alone does not defeat a directed verdict on the issue of the rear driver's negligence, a sudden stop that occurs because the forward *598 driver failed to exercise reasonable care (i.e. stopped for no apparent reason) could also be the basis for a claim of comparative negligence where the forward driver is the plaintiff. Indeed, after this Court first adopted the presumption of negligence in rear-end collisions, the principle of comparative negligence replaced the all-or-nothing contributory negligence doctrine. See Hoffman v. Jones,
Although addressing a case where the rear driver was the plaintiff, Judge Griffin's explanation in Jefferies v. Amery Leasing, Inc.,
At the time when this rear-end collision rule was developed, Florida was still a contributory negligence state. Thus, if the presumption were not overcome, the following driver's claim would be barred. Under cоntributory negligence, a negligent plaintiff could not recover against a negligent defendant.
... Today, when a rear driver sues a lead driver for damages from a rear-end collision, and the lead driver answers with an affirmative defense of comparative negligence, the rule will, at most, establish as a matter of law that the driver of the rear car is liable for some portion of the overall damages. There is no logic in blindly applying the rear-end collision rule to determine the rear driver automatically to be the sole source of negligence in all rear-end collisions. If it is sufficiently demonstrated that the lead driver was negligent as well, the jury should pass upon the question of shared liability and apportionment of damages.
Id. at 371 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted); see Johnson v. Deep S. Crane Rentals, Inc.,
As to the defendant's negligence, "If the defendant had a justifiable reason for not observing traffic rules, then it was his duty to go forward with the evidence tо show that he was not negligent...." McNulty v. Cusack,
As the majority explains, the rebuttable presumption of negligence places the burden on the defendant to produсe evidence that "fairly and reasonably tends to show" that the defendant was not negligent. Gulle v. Boggs,
The issue of whether the defendant's explanation is sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence should be evaluated under the standard governing directed verdicts. In other words, once the rear driver provides an explanation for the collision, a directed verdict should only be granted if the party opposing the directed verdict could not prevail under any reasonable view of the evidence. See Bruce Constr. Corp. v. State Exch. Bank,
This is particularly true in negligence actions. See Conda v. Plain,
The undisputed circumstances of this case show that when the light turned green, the plaintiff was in the proper lane of traffic stopped at a traffic light behind three other vehicles. The plaintiff testified that she was stopped at the traffic light when she was rear-ended by the defendant's truck. The defendant driver, however, stated that the plaintiff had started moving forward after the light turned green, and then suddenly "slam[med] on the brakes," just like the forward driver in Tacher. Taking the testimony and the reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the defendant, we must assume that the plaintiff had started moving forward and then stopped before the collision.
*600 The sole evidence that the plaintiff's vehicle started and then stopped after a traffic light turned from red to green at а busy intersection does not provide a basis to infer that the driver of the Tarmac vehicle should not have been able to anticipate the stop and avoid the rear-end collision. As Judge Green noted, "It is not at all unusual for vehicles [proceeding] through busy intersections ... to have to suddenly brake...." Tacher,
While the Tarmac driver's testimony may establish that the plaintiff stopped suddenly, there is no evidence from which a jury could properly conclude that his vehicle was being operated with the degrеe of care required by the traffic regulations[10] to control the vehicle so as to avoid colliding with the forward vehicle. Thus, in Eppler, as in Tacher, Kao, and Pierce, the forward driver's stop, even if abrupt, should have been reasonably anticipated as a matter of law.
If testimony that the rear driver did not know why the forward driver had abruptly or suddenly stopped at an intersection were sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence, then the rear driver's failure to observe the cause of the stop would always be sufficient to dissipate the presumption. This would inappropriately shift the focus to the forward driver's conduct and away from the conduct of the rear driver for failing to stop under circumstances.
I would point out, however, one other wrinkle in the facts in this case. In addition to the arguments it advances in support of the First District's decision, the defendant also asserts that even if its driver had been negligent, the trial court's failure to grant a directed verdict on liability was not erroneous.[11] Also, because there was still a factual dispute as to whethеr the defendant was a legal cause of the plaintiff's damages, this would have been a further reason for not granting a directed verdict on liability.[12] Indeed, although the defendant claims that the plaintiff's damages were either pre-existing or caused by a subsequent accident, when the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on liability at the close of the case, it did so on the basis of the "conflicting evidence about the sudden stop." There was no discussion whatsoever about сausation or about the plaintiff's comparative negligence. In affirming and certifying the question for review, the district court did not address these arguments raised by the defendant. See Eppler,
NOTES
Notes
[1] The jury responded "No" to the following question on the verdiсt form: "Was there negligence on the part of Defendant Tarmac America, Inc. which was a legal cause of damage to plaintiff Sybil Eppler?"
[2] On direct examination of Morris, the following transpired:
Q. How far were you back from her....
A. Yes, at the light I was back approximately 10, 11 feet from her.
[3] On cross-examination of Morris by Eppler's lawyer, the following transpired:
Q. How many cars were in front of Mrs. Eppler's vehicle?
A. I would estimate three cars.
Q. You don't know for sure, though?
A. No, but I estimated it was four in front of me, so she was right in front of me.
Q. Okay. It was Mrs. Eppler's car, and then three more in front of her?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, when the light turned green, do you recall what occurred with regard to the three vehicles in front of Mrs. Eppler's car?
A. Traffic started off, just the way they always do.
Q. Do you have a vivid recollection in your mind as to whether or not the vehicle in front of Mrs. Eppler started off?
A. Yes, as far as I'm concerned, it did.
Q. Okay.
A. All the traffic was moving.
Q. So it's your testimony that the vehicle immediately in front of Mrs. Eppler's vehicle started off?
A. Yes, sir.
[4] On cross-examination of Morris, the following transpired:
Q. So it's your testimony that the vehicle immediately in front of Mrs. Eppler's vehicle started off?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. And then Mrs. Eppler just slammed on brakes without any reason; is that right?
A. That's what I thought.
. . . .
Q. Now, I got to make sure I understand you now. You took off in first gear, you shifted into second gear, and had you given it any gas in second gear?
A. Somewhat, yes.
Q. And then Mrs. Eppler slammed on brakes for no apparent reason, and then you hit the brake; is that right?
A. That's right.
(Emphasis added.)
[5] See, e.g., Pierce v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co.,
[6] The district court in Tacher certified conflict with Eppler; Tacher is not currently before this Court.
[7] After the advent of comparative nеgligence, an unrebutted presumption of negligence no longer means that the negligence of the rear driver must be the "sole proximate cause" of a rear collision. Thus, I would disapprove of language in cases such as Kao v. Lauredo,
[8] A directed verdict on liability includes both the issues of negligence and legal cause. See, e.g., Fla. Std. Jury. Inst. (Civ.) 3.1(d). This instruction is titled, "Directed verdict on liability," and provides:
The court has determined and now instructs you, as a matter of law, that (defendant) was negligent and that such negligence was a lеgal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] to (claimant). (Claimant) is therefore entitled to recover from (defendant) for such [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] as is shown by the greater weight of the evidence to have thus been caused.
Id. (brackets and parentheses in original). When a trial court has directed a verdict on the defendant's negligence, the issues for the jury to resolve are causation and damages. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 3.1(c).
[9] This is in contrast to other states that provide that the jury may be instructed on the rebuttable presumption of the rear driver's negligence. See, e.g., Bettner v. Boring,
[10] The traffic regulations require that the "driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon, and the condition of, the highway." § 316.0895(1), Fla. Stat. (1997).
[11] Because there was a question of the plaintiff's comparative negligence, the directed verdict should only have been on negligence and not as to liability. See Note on use of Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Civ.) 3.1(d) (instruction on directed verdict on liability "should be given only when the sole issue to be determined by the jury is the matter of damages").
[12] See supra note 8.