11 N.E.3d 964
Ind. Ct. App.2014Background
- On Sept. 7, 2012, Billy Young and others accompanied Latoya Lee to Ramon Gude’s apartment; an unknown third man shot and killed Ramon during the encounter.
- Young handed an unloaded gun to a codefendant, attempted to strike Ramon, and fled after the shooting; the shooter was never identified at trial.
- Young was charged by information with murder (alleging Ramon was killed “by shooting a deadly weapon, that is: a gun”).
- After a bench trial, the court dismissed the murder charge for insufficient proof connecting Young to the shooter, then sua sponte convicted Young of Class B attempted aggravated battery based on evidence the defendants planned to "pound on" Ramon.
- Young was sentenced to 15 years and appealed, arguing the conviction was for a different crime than charged—denying fair notice and violating due process.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Young's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conviction for attempted aggravated battery as a lesser included offense of murder was proper | Lesser offense was available; Young had notice and could defend because the indictment referenced a shooting and evidence showed a planned shooting | Charging information alleged killing by shooting; conviction rested on a plan to beat Ramon, a different factual basis, so Young lacked notice | Reversed: conviction improper because it was based on facts different from the charging information and thus denied fair notice |
Key Cases Cited
- Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995) (framework for determining inherent vs. factual lesser included offenses)
- Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (conviction on an uncharged theory violates due process)
- Addis v. State, 404 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing variance from total failure of proof and reversing when conviction was for an uncharged offense)
- Coates v. State, 229 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. 1967) (failure of proof requires reversal; variance not always fatal)
- Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007) (amendment of charging information that affects substantial rights is impermissible after trial begins)