Billy Joe Henderson v. Iowa Colony, Iowa Colony Police Department and Louis C. Hearn, Jr.
01-15-00599-CV
| Tex. App. | Oct 9, 2015Background
- Henderson was arrested by Officer Louis C. Hearn, Jr. after a CenterPoint Energy complaint alleging tampering with electrical service; charges were later dismissed.
- Henderson sued Iowa Colony (the municipal defendant), the Iowa Colony Police Department, and Hearn (pro se) alleging state-law false arrest and malicious prosecution and seeking damages.
- Hearn moved to dismiss under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(e); the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Hearn after oral hearing.
- Iowa Colony filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign/governmental immunity to the state-law tort claims; the trial court granted the plea and dismissed Iowa Colony for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Appellees contend (1) Henderson’s claims do not fall within the Texas Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver (§ 101.021), (2) intentional torts (false arrest, malicious prosecution) are excluded from waiver (§ 101.057), and (3) Henderson’s suit against the municipality barred individual recovery against Hearn (§ 101.106).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Iowa Colony waived immunity under the TTCA (§ 101.021) for Henderson’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims | Henderson argues immunity was waived (also suggested waiver by deceit/misconduct) | Iowa Colony argues the TTCA waiver is limited to vehicle, real property, and tangible personal property claims and does not include these torts | Court upheld dismissal: claims do not fall within § 101.021 waiver; immunity bars suit against Iowa Colony |
| Whether intentional-tort exclusion (§ 101.057) prevents waiver for false arrest and malicious prosecution | Henderson contends his claims are actionable against the city | Iowa Colony contends intentional torts (assault, battery, false imprisonment, other intentional torts) are expressly excluded from TTCA waiver | Court upheld dismissal: § 101.057 excludes these intentional torts from waiver |
| Whether filing suit against the municipality bars individual recovery against the officer and requires dismissal of the officer under § 101.106 | Henderson appealed dismissal of Hearn but did not brief point; may argue individual liability should remain | Appellees argue § 101.106(a) makes the municipal suit an irrevocable election barring individual recovery and § 101.106(e) requires immediate dismissal of employees when municipality moves | Court upheld dismissal of Hearn: plaintiff’s suit against municipality barred individual recovery and dismissal was proper under § 101.106 |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standard for plea to the jurisdiction and that governmental immunity defeats subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999) (distinguishing immunity from suit and immunity from liability; limits on TTCA waiver)
- Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (plaintiff bears burden to establish court’s subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998) (application of § 101.106 and related election-of-remedies principles)
- City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986) (defining the limited waiver areas under the Texas Tort Claims Act)