88 Cal.App.5th 953
Cal. Ct. App.2023Background
- Olga Marcela Escobar‑Eck is CEO of Atlantis, a land‑use/lobbying firm representing All People’s Church in a pending San Diego development review; she spoke at public meetings on the project.
- Joshua Billauer runs the public “Save Del Cerro” social media accounts and opposed the Church project; he posted multiple public social‑media messages accusing Escobar‑Eck of undue influence and misconduct and referenced a 2007 search warrant.
- Billauer also sent Escobar‑Eck a private Zoom chat message threatening to “make sure you get sent back to where you came from.”
- Billauer sued Escobar‑Eck (libel/IIED); Escobar‑Eck filed a cross‑complaint alleging libel per se based on several social‑media posts (Dec. 30, 2020; Feb. 5, 2021; Feb. 7, 2021; Apr. 8, 2021).
- Billauer moved to strike the cross‑complaint under the anti‑SLAPP statute (§ 425.16); the trial court denied the motion, finding the posts were protected but Escobar‑Eck showed a probability of prevailing; Billauer appealed.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: it declined to extend the litigation privilege to these public social‑media posts and held Escobar‑Eck met the second anti‑SLAPP prong (probability of success), including showing actual malice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Billauer) | Defendant's Argument (Escobar‑Eck) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the challenged social‑media posts are protected activity under the anti‑SLAPP first prong | Posts are communications about a public development issue and thus protected petition/speech | Even if related to public issue, protection alone does not preclude liability; some posts directly defame Escobar‑Eck | Court assumed posts were protected for purposes of appeal but proceeded to second prong and affirmed denial of strike |
| Whether the litigation privilege (Civ. Code § 47(b)) shields Billauer’s social‑media statements | Social‑media posts relate to an official proceeding and are privileged (analogous to preparation for hearings) | Posts were public, not communications in a judicial/quasi‑judicial proceeding to interested participants; privilege shouldn’t extend to broad social‑media publication | Privilege does not apply to these public social‑media posts; court declined to extend the litigation privilege in this context |
| Whether Escobar‑Eck made a prima facie showing of probability of success on libel per se (anti‑SLAPP second prong) | Posts are opinion/hyperbole, substantially true, or not attributable to Billauer (Feb. 5 Facebook) | Posts convey provably false factual imputations injurious to professional reputation; submitted evidence of reputational/harm and linked posts | Court: Escobar‑Eck met burden as to Dec. 30, Feb. 7, Apr. 8; disputed Feb. 5 posts also met minimal‑merit standard given record; anti‑SLAPP denial affirmed |
| Whether Escobar‑Eck must prove actual malice (limited‑purpose public figure) and whether she did | If Escobar‑Eck is a limited‑purpose public figure, she must show actual malice; Billauer lacked such malice evidence | Escobar‑Eck need not be all‑purpose figure; in any event presented clear and convincing circumstantial evidence (threatening DM, reliance on irrelevant warrant, hostility) | Court found clear and convincing evidence of actual malice (reckless disregard), so plaintiff’s burden satisfied |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 871 (discusses two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework)
- Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co., 6 Cal.5th 931 (anti‑SLAPP second prong is summary‑judgment‑like)
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (limits anti‑SLAPP analysis to speech that supplies claim elements)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (SLAPP standard: both prongs required to strike)
- Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232 (scope of litigation privilege in judicial/quasi‑judicial contexts)
- Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048 (litigation privilege principles)
- Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205 (limits of privilege for communications to nonparticipants)
- Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 244 (actual malice and limited‑purpose public figure doctrine)
- Harte‑Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (actual malice requires reckless disregard; ill will alone insufficient)
- Issa v. Applegate, 31 Cal.App.5th 689 (framework for distinguishing fact vs. opinion/hyperbole in defamation)
- Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (elements and nature of libel and libel per se)
- Balla v. Hall, 59 Cal.App.5th 652 (defamation standards for limited public figures)